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Abstract 
The early 21st Century has represented a significant break in the norms of traditional 
notions of value and security in highly industrially developed societies: A rapid move has 
occurred from the likes of Frances Fukuyama’s 1992 manifesto of the triumphs of liberal 
democracy to the sudden resurgence of political, religious and cultural conflicts within and 
across nation states. This thesis will focus on two key philosophers who wrote on the role 
of nihilism in political and cultural decline, Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) and Albert 
Camus (1913-1960).  The discussion will frame the position of these thinkers as seeking to 
engage with an aesthetic response to this ethico-political crisis, drawn from the ‘theatrical’ 
metaphysics of Hellenic, and to a lesser extent, Indian and Chinese philosophies from the 
Classical world. The core of this aesthetic response is the metaphysical position of non-
duality, a conscious perspective which regards the substantive components of experience 
(for example, mind/matter, self/other, reason/emotion, nature/culture and so on) to be 
syncretic relationships rather than exclusive dichotomies.  
Reflecting the emphasis that both Nietzsche and Camus placed on the theatre as a model 
for exploring their own philosophical visions, the thesis has been divided into three acts. 
The first act will cover Nietzsche’s ‘diagnostic’ approach to nihilism and tragedy, with the 
second and third acts focussing on Camus’ approach first to philosophical meaning, and 
then to living within nihilism. Initially, the study engages primarily with Kaufmann’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s works (1974), and further engages with modern scholarship, 
including Melanie Shepherd’s study of the Eternal Recurrence (2011), André Van Der 
Braak on the relation between Nietzsche and Japanese ‘physiological Buddhism’ (2009), 
and Thomas Brobjer’s meta-analysis of Nietzsche’s lifelong engagement with Eastern 
thought (2004). Drawing on these influences, as well as the impact of Schopenhauer’s 
Buddhism, the first section considers the aspect of non-duality in the physiological and 
cosmological structures of Nietzsche's thought, particularly in terms of tragedy, affirmation 
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and the Eternal Recurrence. The first section briefly considers the artistic movements that 
immediately followed Nietzsche’s death, the modernist avant-garde, as having employed 
aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but in reverting to dualistic and absolutist ideals, came 
to further the advent of nihilism in Europe rather than avert it.  
Camus’ work has enjoyed something of a renaissance in contemporary scholarship ,with 
the recent flourishing of works including Mathew Sharpe’s book Camus, Philosophe? 
(2015), Ashley Woodward’s Camus and Nihilism (2011), Elizabeth Ann Bartlett’s 
Rebellious Feminism (2009), Richard Kamber’s On Camus (2002), and Stephen Bronner's 
Camus, Portrait of a Moralist (1999), among others. This thesis draws on those studies 
and others to engage with Camus’ development of a non-dual perspective of the value of 
nihilism. My interpretation begins with Camus’ early studies, including his baccalaureate, 
on the transition from Hellenism to a Christian Europe and will draw further on Camus’ 
Taoist and Hindu inspired mentor, Jean Grenier. The study will then explore the 
environmental foundations of being in Camus’ description of ‘Mediterraneanism’, 
concretising the role of the lifeworld in philosophy. The final chapter of Act Two will close 
with a discussion of Camus’ exploration of performativity in embodied being, the meeting 
of his understanding of spirituality and the setting of existence. 
Act three will move to the area of Camus’ work that is most mired in controversy, his role in 
the political landscape of wartime Europe and the brutal Algerian war of independence. 
Drawing on the history of his engagement with Communist and Anarchist organisations, 
the thesis will present Camus’ stance of neutrality in the Algerian war not as an implicit 
promotion of colonial power, but rather as an expression of solidarity with all who were 
subjected to the violence of poverty and silence under colonial rule. His advocacy of 
allowing the French to remain in Algeria will be seen in terms of the necessary importance 
of cosmopolitan difference in the political landscape, and an acknowledgement of the 
inherent violence of expelling populations on the grounds of ethnicity in any 
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circumstances. The final chapter will view the ethic of mesure and perpetual rebellion as 
an expression of a non-dual anarchism, divorced from the Hegelian politics of linear 
progress. The thesis as a whole aims to demonstrate the centralisation of the body and a 
related aesthetic attitude of engagement with traditional ‘negations’ across a generational 
shift in philosophy to model a non-dual ‘good’ or ‘democratic’ nihilism with which to counter 
the contradictions of modern political life. 
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Prologue: Hegemony and the ‘End of History’ 
It is becoming increasingly evident that every day we continue our current forms of behaviour, the closer we 
bring our species and planet to total annihilation. This is not a doomsday prediction, nor a messianic warning 
of coming judgement, but a sober reflection on the irreparable damage which industrial civilisation is 
inflicting on the crucial life supporting systems of Earth’s ecology. At the beginning of 2019, Australia is 
experiencing nationwide, record breaking heatwaves in both intensity and duration;  the central United States 1
is under a polar vortex which has brought the temperature so low as to be able to freeze human blood;  the 2
single largest continuous feature in our oceans is a floating storm of plastic referred to as ‘The Great Pacific 
Garbage Patch’.  Even if a sudden collective response were to lead to a global cessation of the consumption 3
practices that contribute to these disasters, the feedback effects of climate change will continue to wreak 
havoc for decades to come.  Under this stultifying shadow of the unknown, the philosophical spectre of 4
nihilism has taken root, expressed as political populism for authoritarians, civilisational chauvinism and the 
rather peculiar argument that we could not possibly stop choking the natural world if it would have a 
negative impact on investors. The libertarian proposition that individual choices in a free market would lead 
to the greatest forms of liberty and justice has abjectly failed.  
 These disparate observations are both contemporaneous and, in a sense, as old as the discourse of 
‘modernity’ itself. What has fluctuated over time has been the level of optimism with which cultures and 
societies view the end goal of their civilisation. By and large, the vision of Anglophone, Western cultures 
was one of triumph up until the end of the twentieth century, with Francis Fukuyama famously writing of the 
conclusion of historical progress arriving through the victory of liberal democratic capitalism.  However, this 5
optimistic account of the ‘western’ political project has collapsed, with the arrival of previously unseen 
scales of terrorist attacks in developed, first world nations, the intensification of financial crises and the 
abject failure of the market to resolve the long-standing problem of environmental destruction. Embedded in 
 Commonwealth of Australia. ‘Special Climate Statement 68—widespread heatwaves during December 2018 and 1
January 2019’. Bureau of Meteorology. http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/current/statements/scs68.pdf. (accessed 11 Feb, 
2019). 
 Milman, Oliver. ‘What is the polar vortex – and how is it linked to climate change?’. The Guardian. https://2
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/30/polar-vortex-2019-usa-what-is-it-temperatures-cold-weather-climate-
change-explained. (accessed 11 Feb, 2019).
 Pyrek, Cathy. ‘Plastic Paradise: The Great Pacific Garbage Patch.’ Contemporary Pacific 28, no. 1 (2016): 268-70.3
 Mauritsen, Thorsten, and Robert Pincus. "Committed Warming Inferred from Observations." Nature Climate 4
Change 7, no. 9 (2017): 652-55.
 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Press, 1993.5
 1
these problems, and often hidden behind the twenty-first century decline of Western hegemonic power, there 
remains still the persistent problem of the value of life. Is there a possibility of a meaningful engagement 
with the world in the shadow of an artificially constructed apocalypse? How do we balance the immanent 
needs of the body, subsistence, pleasure and love, in a society that demands a single-minded commitment to 
reason? Put simply, does one still wind their watch if the world is about to end? 
 In an attempt to answer these difficult questions, this thesis will cast back to two prominent 
philosophers in the Western tradition who sought to engage with the failing value structures of their times. 
Friedrich Nietzsche and Albert Camus are two prominent, and arguably controversial, counter-institutional 
philosophers who each had personal and philosophical reasons for responding to the escalating crisis of 
western culture. Both had fathers who died during involvement with great institutions of the state, 
Nietzsche’s father a Christian minister and Camus’ a soldier in the First World War. Nietzsche had been 
forced to end his university career early due to persistent problems stemming from the contraction of sepsis 
during the Franco-Prussian war; Camus was prevented from completing a doctoral degree on account of his 
tuberculosis. The convulsions of war, the deprivation of poverty and the failure of historic institutions were 
commonplace in the lives of both these men. In response, each embarked on a project of critical engagement 
with the prominent values of their times, and sought to rearrange them in the light of classical philosophies 
from the Pagan and Eastern worlds. The thesis will explore this revitalisation of the ethics and aesthetics of 
non-duality from classical philosophies of Greece, India and East Asia, in the works of these modern Western 
philosophers, who encountered and attempted to overcome the experiences of nihilism and absurdity. These 
conditions of meaninglessness will be framed as inherent in a culture enthralled by a mind-body divide, and 
further, alienated from the world of primary sense perception by the imposition of abstract reason and 
technological advancement. Metaphysical and epistemological dualism has been overtly expressed 
throughout much of the Western Canon, from Aristotle’s hylomorphism, Descartes’ material and non-
material substances, Hume’s ‘Fork’ of knowledge of facts and knowledge by relations of ideas, to the rather 
modern example of Sartre’s ontological modes of being-in-itself and being-for-self/-others. However, while 
these theories of knowledge or the nature of reality have largely been superseded, the associated value 
dualisms have remained as drivers of social disruption. The continual value association between ‘the 
feminine’ and nature can be seen, for example, in the insistence that women should find ways to balance 
economic participation with the natural demands of childbearing and motherhood, rather than engaging in a 
more equitable distribution of domestic and economic labour.  In addition to the feminist analysis on gender, 6
 Griffin, Susan. ‘Split culture’ in Healing the wounds: The promise of ecofeminism (1989): 7-17.6
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similar discourses have arisen to critique the oppressive value dualisms of race, sexual orientation, class, 
indigeneity and other excluded groups who have been pushed out of the history of binary western 
rationalisms. The thesis will explore these themes, and the attempted resolutions of non-dual ‘unity in 
difference’ that can be found in Nietzsche and Camus’ ethics, aesthetics and political thought.  
 My thesis broaches two distinct fields of philosophy: Firstly, the study of modern European 
aesthetics, particularly in relation to the advent of cultural nihilism; and secondly, the comparative 
engagement between the implicit metaphysics of the Classical East and modern attempts to combat nihilism 
through means of resistance to orthodox western philosophy. The primary discursive lens of this study will 
be the metaphysical conception of non-duality, which has been predominantly associated with mystical 
philosophy-religions of precolonial Asia. Non-duality is a metaphysical or conscious perspective which 
regards the substantive components of experience (for example, mind/matter, self/other, reason/emotion, 
nature/culture and so on) to be syncretic relationships rather than exclusive dichotomies. As a result of this 
primary level of discourse, aspects of philosophical inquiry that have been minimised in the western canon 
will be brought back into focus, such as embodiment, negation and the non-rational. Of course, in the spirit 
of non-duality, these philosophical re-engagements with historically diminished experiences will not seek to 
overturn the value of the mind or rationality, but rather be presented as a necessary complement to their role 
in subjective experience. Further, non-duality will be posed as a hallmark of tragic aesthetics and ethics, as 
conceived by Nietzsche and Camus. This will allow tragedy to be posed as a relational value system which 
engages the tension between optimistic and pessimistic ethical systems.  
 The thesis has been written in three ‘acts’ to reflect the theatrical and performative nature of the 
primary philosophies in question: Nietzsche began his study of ancient cultures with a doctoral thesis on the 
metaphysical anomalies apparent in pre-Socratic tragic theatre. Camus also had a deep interest in tragic 
theatre and himself worked as an actor and screenwriter for an Algerian theatre company in his youth. Taking 
inspiration from these theatrical origins has enabled a chronological presentation of the relevant 
developments in this period of philosophical inquiry, as well as a thematic organisation in terms of the 
progressive stages of nihilistic awareness, the rediscovery of immanent value and the political consequences 
and opportunities that emerge. 
 The discussion begins with Nietzsche’s ‘diagnosis’ of the condition of nihilism, defining it as the 
detachment of modern subjectivity or consciousness from traditional sources of meaning, such as the 
authority of religion or a decline in the power of the nation state. The perspective taken is primarily grounded 
in Kaufmann’s 1974 interpretation of Nietzsche’s works, and further engages with modern scholarship, 
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including Melanie Shepherd’s study of the Eternal Recurrence (2011), André Van Der Braak on the relation 
between Nietzsche and Japanese ‘physiological Buddhism’ (2009), and Thomas Brobjer’s meta-analysis of 
Nietzsche’s lifelong engagement with Eastern thought (2004). Drawing on these influences, and the impact 
of Schopenhauer’s Buddhism, the first section considers the aspect of non-duality in the physiological and 
cosmological structures of Nietzsche's thought, particularly in terms of life-affirmation and the doctrine of 
Eternal Recurrence. The first section briefly considers the artistic movements that immediately followed 
Nietzsche’s death, the modernist avant-garde, as having employed aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, but in 
reverting to dualistic structures, came to further the advent of nihilism in Europe rather than avert it.  
 The thesis will then move onto one of Nietzsche’s ‘spiritual successors’, engaging with Albert 
Camus and his philosophy of the Absurd and Rebellion. Camus’ work has enjoyed something of a 
renaissance in contemporary scholarship, and this study aims to build on the emerging body of work which 
addresses Camus’ affinity with classical, rather than modern sources. The middle act of the study will engage 
with Camus’ development of a non-dual perspective, beginning with his early studies, including his 
baccalaureate, on the cultural and intellectual transition from Hellenism to a Christian Europe. His 
engagement with religious philosophy was further impacted by the influence of his thesis supervisor and 
mentor, Jean Grenier, who had a distinct interest in Hindu and Taoist philosophy. While these philosophy-
religions are not explicitly addressed in detail within his works, Camus’ writing on the natural environment 
reflects a typically Taoist naturalism and aims to reintegrate the human experience into its primal, natural 
setting; this will be used to further discuss Camus’ account of environmental philosophy and its role in an 
inclusive ethics. This religious background will provide a framework to study Camus’ conception of the body 
and the creative self, mirroring the physiological affirmation of Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence.  
 Act three will move to the area of Camus’ work that is most mired in controversy, his role in the 
political landscape of wartime Europe and the brutal Algerian war of independence. Drawing on the history 
of his engagement with Communist and Anarchist organisations, as well as the direct and personal 
engagements he had with his working class community, the thesis will present Camus’ stance of neutrality in 
the Algerian war not as an implicit promotion of colonial power, but rather as an expression of solidarity 
with all who were subjected to the violence of poverty under colonial rule. His advocacy of allowing the 
French to remain in Algeria will be seen in terms of the necessary importance of cosmopolitan difference in 
the political landscape and an acknowledgement of the inherent violence of expelling populations on the 
grounds of ethnicity in any circumstances. The final chapter will interpret the ethic of perpetual rebellion as 
an expression of a non-dual anarchism, divorced from the Hegelian politics of historicist progress. The study 
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will engage with the recent flourishing of works on Camus philosophy, including Mathew Sharpe’s recent 
book Camus, Philosophe? (2015), Elizabeth Ann Bartlett’s Rebellious Feminism (2009), Richard Kamber’s 
On Camus (2002), Stephen Bronner's Camus, Portrait of a Moralist (1999) and Olivier Todd's biography of 
Camus, titled Camus, A Life (1996), among others. In addition to these targeted sources, the thesis as a whole 
will engage with contemporary interpretations of Eastern thought, primarily from notable scholars D.T. 
Suzuki and Alan Watts who were roughly contemporaneous with Camus’ life and works.  
 In the first chapter, I will explore the development of nihilism in Europe as a political and 
philosophical phenomenon, reading it through the prism of the dualistic mind-body divide in the modern 
European consciousness and the absolutist nature of this hierarchical arrangement. The chapter aims to 
highlight the epistemic ‘distance' created by exclusively rational and transcendental understandings of human 
consciousness when disassociated from the body and its passionate and physiological engagements. In 
particular, this will be viewed through the modern conception of the experience of beauty in Kant’s 
philosophy as the disinterested silencing of passionate aesthetic engagement. The discussion will further 
engage with the inherent limitations of knowledge due to the condition of being an embodied perspective, 
which constructs and engages with an interpretation of phenomena. Nietzsche’s philological and linguistic 
training will be drawn on to demonstrate the reciprocal influence between our experiences and descriptions 
of the world. Given the lack of any objective, transcendental or independent source of value, Nietzsche 
concludes that modern Europeans are divorced from meaningful experience and are hurtling towards a 
nihilistic existence that must be confronted and resolved.  
 Nietzsche posited that the pathway out of nihilism is an intensive struggle of revaluing all values, 
which will be the focus of Chapter Two. Rather than simply drawing on historical references to re-impose 
particular values, Nietzsche seeks a methodology of value creation that is independent from and applicable to  
the contingent and limited conditions of human lives. The first stages of this project can be seen in 
Nietzsche’s doctoral thesis, where he begins to address the aesthetics of non-duality in his study of Tragic 
Theatre, particularly in terms of the generative aesthetic potential in the meeting of opposites, the Dionysian 
and Apolline artistic impulses. To further draw out the non-dual aspects of tragic philosophy, Nietzsche’s 
work will be contrasted against his pessimist influence, Arthur Schopenhauer. The chapter further discusses 
the influence of Schopenhauer on Nietzsche’s understanding of Eastern philosophy, in conjunction with a 
burgeoning interest in Indian literature in Germany. This lead to a somewhat distorted view of Buddhist and 
Vedantic traditions, which Nietzsche tentatively associated with nihilism, and in response work by André Van 
Der Braak has been presented to reconcile Nietzsche’s work with the more physiological Chinese and 
 5
Japanese Buddhism. The chapter ends by tying these Hellenic Paganisms and Buddhist metaphysics together 
with a discussion of the non-dual nature of the Eternal Recurrence and the role of affirmation in overcoming 
nihilism.  
 The final chapter of part one will consider two prominent aesthetic and philosophical movements  
which attempted to address the underlying experience of nihilism, following Nietzsche’s death in 1900. The 
early twentieth century was marked by both an expansion of secularism and industrialisation in Europe, 
overturning the certainty of established value structures. These rapid developments spawned a cluster of 
artistic responses, broadly referred to as the avant-garde, with each seeking to represent societal discord and 
the emergence of new values through the medium of distorting traditional aesthetic principles. Among these 
movements both Surrealism and Futurism are presented as competing visions for a new value system to 
guide European modernism into a resurgent age of aesthetic meaning. The Surrealists latched onto the 
syncretism of the dream- and life-worlds in Nietzsche’s thought and attempted to reconcile conscious and 
unconscious approaches to meaning through this relationship. The Futurists, on the other hand, valorised the 
emerging machine transformation of daily life, and sought a new primacy of experience based in the 
dynamism and motion of technological industry. However, both movements commit to dualistic hierarchies 
and the absolute value of their preferred aesthetic orientation, and are thus subsumed into the process of 
nihilism, rather than becoming an obstacle to it.  
 Act Two will then split from these internal European attempts to resolve the value crisis of industrial 
nihilism, turning instead to the work of French-Algerian philosopher, Albert Camus. Chapter four will begin 
the discussion of Camus as the spiritual successor of Nietzsche’s project of affirmation, revaluation and the 
resistance to nihilism, particularly through the frame of religion and secularisation which had presented the 
most immanently recognisable front of nihilistic experience. Further, Camus’s academic studies began, and 
ended, with an investigation of the incorporation of Greek metaphysics into the Christian worldview, 
concluding in effect that the measure of reason had been subsumed under the totalitarian authority of grace. 
Much of Camus’ reading revolves around the problem of theodicy, that is, the contradictions between the 
absolute principles of divinity and the very real experiences of suffering and evil. The chapter will continue 
with a discussion of the influence of Jean Grenier as a scholar of Taoist and Hindu philosophy, and the 
implicit impact this had on Camus’ ethics and how this intellectual influence impacted his childhood 
appreciation of the natural world. These spiritual observations will be presented as a mature metaphysical 
backing for the concept of existential absurdity, grounded in a relational ontology between experiences of 
being and non-being. 
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 Chapter Five will shift from the concerns of inner life to Camus’ conception of the physical, external 
world. Drawing from his essays on nature and the work of his mentor, Grenier, an external world metaphysic 
emerges, encapsulated in Camus’ concept of Mediterraneanism. Mediterraneanism is both a metaphysic and 
an attitude of sensitivity to the natural environment that exists prior to the imposition of artificial, socialised 
environments of modern, urbanised spaces. I will argue that the subject becomes disconnected from the 
spontaneity of nature when existing in a fabricated environment based on abstracted and artificial 
experiences, and propose Camus’ phenomenology of lucidity as a method of reconnecting with the immanent 
aspects of life amongst a world that actively denies the natural. Camus offers the natural world as a place 
where one can participate in the sublime, losing the sense of ego and engaging in the physiological intensity 
of relational experiences with the irrational other: one’s face in the sun, the expanse of the desert, or the 
depth of the oceans. These observations throughout Camus’ writing on the natural environment and the 
significance of environmental philosophy will be clarified in terms of the more contemporary language of 
eco-feminism. This chapter will aim to show a common logic of relational ontology in Camus and 
contemporary environmental philosophy, in contradistinction to the hierarchical and phallogocentric value 
hierarchies of Kantian judgement.   
 Camus’ philosophy, like Nietzsche’s, is also an engagement with the generative potential of the body 
as a physiological source of philosophical and creative meaning. Chapter Six, the final chapter of Act Two, 
will consider the archetypes of the Absurd Hero, with particular focus on the role of the stage actor as a 
microcosm of the subject acting in the face of the Absurd. This will be used to reconstruct Camus’ 
conception of performative being, the merging of one’s spirit and their situatedness as an incarnated subject. 
In a return to earlier discussion of Vedantic and Buddhist embodiment, the chapter will consider the links 
between these sketches of performative ontology and the philosophical practice of Yoga. This will be framed 
in terms of determined physiological practices and methods, designed to lead oneself to a defined state of 
consciousness. Further, the practice of sexual Yoga will also pose some potential support for a more holistic 
reading of Camus’ account of absurd sexuality in ‘Don Juanism’. This involves firstly a primacy of the body 
in sexual politics, as opposed to historical discourses or sexual power, and secondly, an experience of value 
that is dependent on the dissolution of the discreet self into the non-dual confluence of sexual activity. 
 Turning from Camus’ portrait of the Absurd self and world, Act Three will focus on his later work 
regarding social relations and political philosophy. The first chapter in this section will begin with a 
discussion of poverty, which Camus referred to as his most fundamental lesson in freedom. The chapter will 
consider Camus’ own experience with poverty, his childhood and his brief association with Marxist politics. 
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Poverty will be framed as not merely a state of financial or material deprivation, but in terms of exclusion 
from the goods of society. Poverty will be explained as an artificial and exclusionary socialisation in terms of 
the intersections of illness, disability, illiteracy, class, race and gender as boundaries to full subjectivity 
within the frame of an economics that instrumentalises individuals by measure of their material productivity. 
This reading will be assisted by drawing links to anthropological studies of stone age economics and the 
relative affluence of subsistence economies. When affluence is reframed as a society of inclusion and mutual 
aid, and the liberty of free and open access to the natural world, historical and economic progress are 
revealed as projects of preserving excess rather than of improving living standards.  
 The Algerian War of Independence stands as one of the most controversial aspects of Camus’ life  
and works. Chapter Eight will explore Camus’ relationship to the colony, country and conflict, and situate 
these concerns within Camus’ broader philosophy. Famously refusing to take a side in the brutal war, Camus’ 
silence lead to him being accused of being a stalwart supporter and champion of colonial power. However, 
the chapter will address Camus’ concern about the implicit violence of displacing civilian populations, and 
the dangers of legitimating the violence of one side over the other, especially in an environment of 
escalating, racially motivated reprisal massacres. Camus’ rejection of an Arab ethno-state mirrors his 
rejection of a French colony: the only pathway to freedom for Camus was the cosmopolitan dissolution of 
boundaries of race and power, and the adoption of non-hierarchical and pluralistic political organisation. This  
view will be related to experiences of colonial violence in the context of Australian race politics. Of principal 
concern in this debate will be the elevation of ecological relationship as the basis of sovereignty, an 
immanent replacement for the historicist totalitarianism of state politics. Particularly in terms of White 
Australia’s lack of a treaty with its Indigenous population, decolonial projects should be instituted to 
reinstate the primacy of sovereignty with a significant relationship with the land over the dispossession of 
exclusive and historical claims to ownership. 
 The final chapter will primarily grapple with Camus’ The Rebel, reading it as a rejection of  
hierarchical values and power, framed particularly for Camus in terms of the enlightenment values of liberty 
and justice. Camus sees the dialectic of totalitarianism as using these values to stand as universal justification 
for political violence, such as the Soviets using targeted terror in the name of proletariat justice, or to use a 
more contemporary example, the United States arguing that regime change should be enacted by force in the 
name of democratic freedom. Camus sees an opportunity to escape these political contradictions through the 
discourses of anarchy and voluntary association, taking political values such as freedom and justice as limits 
rather than rules of behaviour. This will involve some framing of the anarchist movement, both in popular 
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culture and academic formulations. Camus’ own involvement with syndicalist groups and readings of 
anarchist theorists will be foregrounded, with particular attention to the inclusion of Camus’ ethic of mesure 
as an anarchic principle. Grounded in the aesthetics of non-duality, Camus’ anarchism will be seen as a 
revitalisation of Hellenic virtue ethics, which compels us to transform our political negations into an artful 
and lucid self discipline, and is a natural extension and conclusion to Nietzsche’s revaluation of values.  
 9
Act 1: The Rise of European Nihilism 
Chapter 1: The Transcendental Ego and the Diagnosis of Nihilism 
There are few more contentious philosophers in the Western Canon than Friedrich Nietzsche. His association 
with the Nazi political movement of the 20th Century, thanks to the interpretations of his nationalist sister 
Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, is so firmly locked into the popular knowledge of his life and work , and his 7
assertion that ‘God is Dead’ has drawn the ire of theologians and believers. But behind this ‘Nietzsche the 
Legend’ stood a man desperate to resolve an impasse that threatened the very constitution of humanity itself. 
In some ways, Nietzsche resembles a modern psychologist. He had practiced as a medical orderly during the 
Franco-Prussian War, was a self-described ‘scientist’, and predominantly concerned himself with the 
prevalence of mental phenomena and our personal experiences of the world. Nietzsche did not, however, 
engage in therapy for individuals. His philosophical insight implicitly rejects the possibility that humanity 
can be saved one mind at a time through rational discussion. Rather, psychological ills occur on the level of 
cultures, and thus people are as blind to their symptoms as a fish is to water. Nietzsche’s philosophy is 
directed at a privileged few who have an acute sensitivity to the transitory and illusory nature of life, and the 
strength and fortitude to overcome the tragedy of existence.  
 Given that there is no truth behind appearances, and that there are no gods underpinning and giving 
meaning to our lives, it is up to radical individuals to reject the soporific equalisation of liberal politics and 
courageously forge a pathway for humanity into the unknown. But before taking up the cure, an account of 
the diagnosis is necessary. Nietzsche grounds his project in a revaluation of all values, through which he 
rejects the historical assumptions of transcendental and idealist philosophies. This involves a critique of the 
‘distance’ created by disinterested judgement, and the hierarchical view of mental phenomena as separate 
and superior to physiological experience. Drawing on the use of conflict in tragedy as a source of the 
beautiful, Nietzsche rejects the idealisation of beauty as a universal, a priori mental category, and rather 
highlights the necessity of perspective, and the limitations this places on our phenomenological apprehension 
 Walter Kauffman. Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 7
1974 (8)
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of the beautiful. Nihilism is for Nietzsche the artificial conformity to illusory values that are presented as 
universal, objective and morally necessary. The internal conflict which arises from subordinating 
physiological drives to the structures of rational thought drains the individual of vitality and homogenises the 
social group to the detriment of all. Only by discarding these narcoleptic values can humanity return to the 
glorious, art-like world of the Hellenes and the Brahmans, a world of authentic and lived value. 
 This chapter will engage primarily with Nietzsche’s account of modernity, and its radical break with 
the primal ground of experience, through Nietzsche’s often polemic reading of the canonical thinkers who 
came before him. In particular, this will involve Nietzsche’s attempt to ground the transcendent in 
phenomenological experience, and a rejection of what he sees as the linguistic error of the noumenon. The 
chapter will then develop this discussion into Nietzsche’s epistemology of perspectivism, and an attempt to 
differentiate and defend this worldview from critiques of relativist morality and knowledge. This discussion 
will be supported by a perspectivist analysis of the syncretism of embodiment and language in a study of the 
phenomenological impact of bilingualism. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the Hellenic 
influences on Nietzsche’s rejection of absolutist historicism, and the inevitable collapse of modern certainties 
that the metaphysical necessity of nature’s flux and impermanence would ensure.  
Meaning and Value in the Modern Subject 
The modern, western consciousness continues to be defined by a brand of dualism derived from the 
Cartesian mind-body divide. One commentator, Barry Stroud, has gone so far as to claim that “the 
philosophical, mathematical, and scientific legacy of Descartes is by now so deep and so pervasive in our 
culture that its full extent can no longer be measured with certainty or precision.”  Descartes famously 8
claimed that the body, as matter, is defined by extension in the physical universe: it occupies space. The 
mind, however, does not share this property, and further, it is capable of thought, a power which eludes 
physical matter. This created an opposition between the mental and the physical, the internal and the 
external, thought and the world, which has been the subject of much philosophy since, dividing European 
thought into rationalists and empiricists, sparking a search for the ‘true thing’ behind appearances, and 
creating a moral imperative for the mind to conquer the body and the natural world. While many attempts 
have been made to reconcile this divide, or reduce one aspect to the other, the basic folk psychology of the 
Western subject consists of this fundamental impression, of being a mind, soul or consciousness distinctly 
 Barry Stroud, "Our Debt to Descartes." Chap. 30 In A Companion to Descartes, [ed: Janet Broughton and John 8
Carriero]. Malden, MA, Oxford: Blackwell Pub, 2008 (513).
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separate from, and in control of, the body. This has lead to a moral divide, fuelled by centuries of religious 
dogma, wherein the rational mind was considered as morally superior to its binary opposite, the sensory 
contact with the world. Nietzsche’s ‘revaluation of values’ seeks to awaken the mind from this self-imposed 
illusion. In his late text, Twilight of the Idols (1889), he writes of the senses that “they do not lie at all. It is 
what we make of their evidence that first introduces a lie into it, for example the lie of unity, the lie of 
materiality, of substance, of duration … ‘Reason’ is the cause of our falsification of the evidence of the 
senses.”  This chapter will seek to understand Nietzsche’s response to the ‘atomistic’ conception of self, 9
challenging the conception of a purely transcendental identity, and grounding his philosophy in the necessary 
limitations of one’s own unique perspective. The development of dualist and fundamentally schizophrenic 
psychology will be discussed as central to Nietzsche’s predictions of a coming age of nihilism, and the 
reconciliation of embodied self with the phenomenological world will be posited as essential to the 
continuation of human life in modernity.  
 To engage in yet another analysis or interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy would serve no purpose 
other than to add to the cacophony of irrelevance, colloquially referred to as the ‘Nietzsche Industry’. Rather, 
the core ideas present in his philosophy will be utilised to provide a stable and adequate foundation for the 
development of a new aesthetic and moral attitude. At first this reorientation will centre on Nietzsche’s 
rejection of the possibility of philosophy’s most treasured relic, that being Truth. In challenging the very 
potential of a Truth behind appearances, Nietzsche reverses course on the traditional methods of philosophy. 
There is no attempt here to seek a certain foundation from which to build a pathway to perfectly rational 
thought, nor is there an attempt to build an accurate worldview from infinite empirical observations. We 
encounter instead some of the earliest examples of European phenomenology, an attempt to critique the 
structures of perception through which we encounter the world, and a moral imperative towards forging as 
much of an authentic experience of existence out of these fluctuating and inconsistent experiences as we can. 
Further, we find ourselves reading one of the first rigorous psychologists, a thinker who took an interest in 
the way our perceptions, memories and experiences could be altered by renewed encounters with the world, 
and the distortions that rational thought can inflict on the primary, sensory understanding of the world.  
 This distinction in approaching psychological phenomena is perhaps most aptly demonstrated in an 
area which Nietzsche has challenged objective rationalism, that is, taste and judgement, in particular of 
beauty in the natural and artistic domains.This area of thought was addressed by Immanuel Kant in his 
Critique of Judgement (1790). Judgement presents a challenge to transcendental, rational consciousness, in 
 Friedrich Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ. Camberwell, Victoria: Penguin Classics, 1990 (46). 9
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that judgements of beauty are by no means universal or demonstrable as a priori, and no rules of beauty can 
be drawn from observation or reason. Kauffman summarises the challenge that Nietzsche mounts against 
Kant’s position, writing that “Kant, as is well known, seems never to have questioned the existence of the 
moral law as a synthetic judgment a priori—i.e., as a proposition which is neither tautological nor dependent 
on empirical observation, and yet knowable by, and binding on, all rational beings … Thus he skipped the 
very question with which Nietzsche's thinking about moral values started—and this is the clue to Nietzsche's 
incessant polemics against Kant."   Nietzsche sought to re-establish the physiological engagement with the 10
beautiful, and thus set himself against Kant, who he perceived as very explicit in his assertion that the 
judging individual must remain in a state of disinterest in order to adequately judge beauty. This disinterest is 
applied to the particular object in question, in order to establish the possibility of a universal judgement 
common to all humankind: “For where anyone is conscious that his delight is in an object is independent of 
interest, it is inevitable that he should judge the object as one containing a ground of delight for all human 
beings.”  Unlike the agreeable, which proceeds from personal taste and the provision of gratification, or the 11
good which proceeds from categorical and moral approval, beauty is a concept which cannot be taught or 
learned, and as such is a taste independent of one’s prior convictions.  Further, the object itself must not be 12
allowed to influence the beauty associated with it: “One must not be in the least bit prepossessed in favour of 
the existence of the thing, but must preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of 
judge in matters of taste.”  The question of interest then centres not on the immediate interaction with the 13
object of beauty, but rather the interaction between the reasoning individual and the a priori concept of 
Beauty.  
 Nietzsche’s failure to account for interest in his aesthetic discourse can be seen as a shortcoming in 
terms of situating the necessity of art. Kauffman contends that “Kant and Shopenhauer had described the 
aesthetic experience as definitively free from interest - and their main reason must be sought in their 
conviction that interests are essentially utilitarian, hedonistic, or moral, while the concern for beauty is 
not.”  However, as will be discussed below, the disinterested conception of art also favoured the 14
establishment of universal intersubjective categories, while Nietzsche’s tragic aesthetics are framed by 
 Kauffman,  Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, 103.10
 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Judgement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007 (42). 11
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perspectivism and the syncretic non-duality of subjectivity and negation. Further for Nietzsche, the input of 
the audience is considered in similar terms as the artist, that is to say “he seems to imply that man has a vital 
interest in the beautiful which is somehow different from the other, ‘psychological’ interests that modern 
writers have in mind.”  The experience of beauty is nourishment for the Will that the sterility of analytic 15
knowledge cannot provide, much in the way that a joke will only make you laugh if you ‘get it’, but not if it 
is explained in detail. However, this vitality can be interrupted by indoctrinating a society with the attitude of 
disinterestedness, as has been largely achieved in the west,  and which can be linked to Nietzsche’s rejection 16
of ascetic modes of thought as denials of natural human drives. For Nietzsche, beauty is necessarily a direct 
psychological experience of one’s perceptual framework interacting with a physiological emotive sensation, 
meaning that the imposition of disinterestedness is an artificially constructed distance, in effect, sacrificing 
the immanent experience of beauty for apparent certainty of something greater than our subjective selves. 
 In his book, Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche further criticises Kant and other philosophers for 
representing their personal desires and drives as representative of universal truth. Kant’s philosophy is 
reduced into its very basic components, proposition and conclusion. “Kant asked himself: how are synthetic 
judgements a priori possible? - and what, really, did he answer? By means of a faculty.”  This faculty, 17
discovered by Kant, is that faculty which allows synthetic judgements a priori. A similar investigation may 
posit ‘How is the perception of time possible’ and offer the answer ‘by means of a faculty that perceives 
time’ and while certainly true, it is only in a tautological sense. And it is in this tautology that Nietzsche cuts 
through the charade with a question that is perhaps most relevant to this study: “Why is belief in such [a 
priori] judgements necessary?”  A possible answer for Nietzsche lies in a posthumously published essay, 18
titled On Truth and Falsity in an Extra-Moral Sense (1873). Here, Nietzsche asserts that the formation of self 
through the intellect is not a process of unity, but rather one of dissimulation, the concealment of one’s 
thoughts and character to the exclusion of those that present a ‘stable person’ to the public sphere. The idea 
of the self arises like all other ideas - “every idea originates through equating the unequal. As certainly as no 
leaf is exactly similar to any other, so certain is it that the idea ‘leaf’ has been formed through an arbitrary 
omission of these individual differences, through a forgetting of the differentiating qualities, and this idea 
 Ibid15
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now awakens the notion that in nature there is, besides the leaves, a something called the ‘leaf’.”  The 19
category of judgement is necessary in order to preserve the ‘forgetting of difference’ which presents as the 
unified self. For Nietzsche, the sensation or perception of beauty would precede the idea of it; the idea of 
Beauty would be that which remains when all the differences of these experiences are concealed.  
 Kantian thought, and the subsequent modern philosophies that followed, frequently fall into the same 
trappings of epistemological obsession, that is, to frame all mental experiences in terms of rationalist and 
idealist ontology. Nevertheless, judgements, moral and aesthetic, are not predicated on truth-knowledge, but 
rather on value-knowledge, predicated on the phenomenology of feeling. The moral claim that murder is 
wrong because life is sacred is not a matter of a priori truth, but a matter of impassioned value. Another clear 
example, the highly divisive issue of pregnancy termination, could be treated as a matter of truth, science and 
medicine, but as a moral stance, either side is making a judgement of value, not truth. Cognitivist 
interpretations of moral judgment continue to rely on the notion of judgements a priori, framing instances of 
thought as positively existent aspects of subjective being, which can be described in terms of truth or falsity. 
For example, J.J.C. Smart states “I see the fact-value distinction in terms of the ‘is’-‘ought’ distinction. 
Talking about a person’s values is talking about that person’s desires or attitudes and is hence about a matter 
of psychological fact.”  I believe that Nietzsche expresses with unambiguous clarity that our values, our 20
fears and desires, wills and drives, are what ‘is’, that they are tied to our physiological being, and are vastly 
different to facts which describe static aspirations. In this sense Nietzsche’s non-cognitivist approach frames 
the experience of value as a dynamic event, more so than an existent idea; further, the experience of a value 
is not a state, but rather a process of becoming. The rationalist and mechanical view of modernity is 
described by Nietzsche as “only an interpretation and arrangement of the world… and not an explanation of 
it.”  And for Nietzsche, language does not seek to express existent ideas of truth behind appearances, but 21
rather that language is a manner through which the chaos of the phenomenological is made intelligible. This 
is the core of Melanie Shepherd’s argument which asserts that for Nietzsche language production is a process 
of creation rather than discovery, and notes that “we can think of language as a system that originates from 
and yet distorts and obscures a physiological semiotics.”  The persistence of language signs, to Nietzsche, 22
 Friedrich Nietzsche. Truth and Falsity in an Extra-Moral Sense. New York: Institute of General Semantics, 1992 19
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has conditioned the modern subject to believe that language represents a persistent reality. In this sense, the 
mechanical and rational sciences are derivative of the value-laden linguistic structures which inform and 
frame their inquiries.  
 Nowhere is this misunderstanding between the terms of immanent and transcendent knowing clearer 
than in Nietzsche’s famous statement ‘God is dead’. As Kauffman explains, “that is an attempt at a diagnosis 
of contemporary civilisation, not a metaphysical speculation about ultimate reality.”  Nietzsche’s philosophy 23
steps back from truth and wonders at a more fundamental problem, that is, the value (or lack thereof) in the 
pursuit of knowledge at all. Nietzsche distances himself from other philosophers, claiming “they wanted to 
furnish the rational ground of morality - and every philosopher hitherto has believed he has furnished this 
rational ground; morality itself, however, was taken as ‘given’.”  Of course, it may have been overlooked 24
that before studying a faculty of judgement or morality in a scientific, factual manner, that one should 
establish their existence is of a scientific, factual nature: that is to say, it is not a matter of necessity that 
moral and value experiences operate in the manner of a priori knowledge. Can one scientifically establish 
the existence of a morality? For Nietzsche, Kant’s cognitive faculties are proposed on the recognition of 
value in the experiential phenomenon for which they purport to be the cause. The value in truth is given or 
we would not be concerned with it, but the truth of value as primary experience is denied. In a preface to The 
Birth of Tragedy titled ‘Attempt at a Self Criticism’ Nietzsche clarifies that the ambition of his aesthetic 
study was “to see science under the lens of the artist, but art under the lens of life.”  This reframes the 25
artistic, aesthetic vision of the world as closer to a direct and living reality than the explanatory descriptions 
of science or history. It is through judgements of value that we determine that which is worth scientifically 
studying and inventing or economically producing and consuming.  
 Nietzsche’s representation of Kant’s philosophy is at times imperfect, and plagued by his polemical 
dismissals. However, he latches on to Kant’s transcendent categories of judgement as representative of the 
modern, subjective consciousness. In its most basic terms, Nietzsche sees the modern condition as existing 
subjectively in the world of symbols, signs and knowledge, rather than the lifeworld of embodied and 
impassioned experience. Synthetic judgements a priori by definition posit knowledge of related concepts 
unconnected to experience, that is, universal and noumenal. Nietzsche refuses to accept that concepts exist 
separately to the processes of experience, as demonstrated in his discussion of dissimulation and the 
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exclusion and difference which is crucial to the formation of unified ideas. It is in this sense that Nietzsche 
provides the foundations for this aesthetic study, in his rejection of truth as the only arbiter of philosophy, 
and his veneration of value as an independent and primary form of knowledge, a precursor to the ‘body 
knowledges' of the phenomenological and feminist traditions that would come. The discussion will now turn 
to perceptual structures which ground us in the phenomenal world, crucial to Nietzsche’s view of art, 
morality and judgement. 
The Inherent Limitations of Perspective and Knowledge 
The academic study of Nietzsche covers a broad range of disciplines, interpretations and topics, but I believe 
that in addressing contemporary aesthetic phenomena, Nietzsche’s conception of “perspectivism” is integral 
to a foundational understanding of the existential cultural conditions of the Modern West. Perspectivism 
refers to the philosophical proposition that knowledge is always limited by the partial and limited perspective 
of the knowing subject. While Nietzsche proposed the idea from within nineteenth century Europe, the 
advent of post-colonial and multicultural societies has only come to further highlight this condition of 
subjective being. As far back as as the 1970s, perspectivism had been dismissed by Eric Hirsch on the 
grounds of “the absolute impossibility of viewing meaning from different perspectives.”  Perspectivism in 26
the twenty-first century though, is still as fashionable a bogey-man as the myth of ‘Nietzsche the Nazi’; 
while postmodernism, a theory of culture closely associated with perspectivist epistemology, was viewed as 
the casualty at the close of the second millennium, it was largely due to assumptions surrounding the 
“relativist” leanings of the movement. As Ophelia Benson asserts “This view purports to show that science is 
neither universal nor peculiarly well equipped to arrive at the truth; that on the contrary it is local, Western, 
socially and culturally embedded, and therefore, merely one form of knowledge among many .” Quite aside 27
from the cultural and linguistic assumptions built into the practice of Western science through semiotic 
connotation, Benson fails to mention other historic challenges to the universality of scientific knowledge, for 
example, Hume’s challenge to the uniformity of nature, or the problem of induction.   28
 Nevertheless, this is how perspectivism is often addressed: with hostility, as a foreign attacker on the 
advances of Western knowledge, as a threat to objectivity and truth, and a gateway to superstition, mysticism 
and terrorism. Benson continues to insinuate that perspectivism legitimises the beliefs of “fundamentalists, 
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theocrats, obscurantists, Nazis, Holocaust deniers."  Science is often given as the contrast to perspectivist 29
thought, with science doing the dirty work, being hard, cold, calculating: ‘we deal in facts’. Benson describes 
the proponents of perspectivism as thinking themselves “edgy and transgressive.”  It is worth highlighting 30
that many of the movements which Benson identified above as legitimised by perspectivist thought, such as 
fundamentalism and theocracy, are themselves grounded heavily in the same universalist reasoning as the 
transcendental project. Nietzsche himself encountered the social implications of an universalist perspective 
in the proto-Nazi movement of Wagnerism  and it is in opposition to fundamentalists and obscurantists that 31
his polemics are frequently directed. The misunderstanding of perspectivism as a moral position of relativist 
apologetics is at odds with its roots in Nietzsche’s philosophy of the Free Spirit. Contrary to Benson’s claim 
that “we have to choose, we can't have it both ways, we can't embrace irrational ideas we just happen to like 
and reject the ones we don’t,”  perspectivism illuminates that this, like all other judgements, are bound to 32
immanent and subjective assumptions. The rational is itself one among many modes of human 
understanding, one form of perspective, “each one of them would be only too glad to present itself as the 
ultimate goal of existence and as the legitimate master of all the other drives."  Nietzsche would see the 33
irrational drives of the individual as necessary and complementary to the rational ones, as the Dionysian is 
necessary and complementary to the Apolline.  
   To say that only Western rationalism can lead us away from barbarism and obscurantism, the Neo-
Enlightenment may well be committing the institutional fault Freud identified in the Churches of Western 
religion of “forcing on everyone indiscriminately, its own path to the attainment of happiness and protection 
from suffering.”  Where Nietzsche differs from many of his predecessors, as well as many of his successors, 34
is that his method is averse to the construction of an all-encompassing system, which would be antithetical to 
‘Truth,’ as all perspectives illuminate and contribute to yet more of this ever incomplete notion.  But even 35
apologists of perspectivism display an insistence on a systematic and defined apprehension. Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism is often given shorthand as “there are no facts but only interpretations.”  Atwell goes on to 36
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say that interpretations can only be of facts so this formulation of Nietzsche’s idea is incoherent, and argues 
for a reading of pragmatic epistemology grounded in ‘common sense’. Atwell argues that “Common sense 
tells us, for example, that snow’s being white is a fact and snow’s being green is not; hence there are at least 
some facts, and apparently there are numerous additional ones of the same sort.”  Contrary to what common 37
sense tells us, the above description of a fact is more an interpretation of the nature of facts; it is clear that 
experience does not tell us that “snow is white”. One experiences snow through sensory interpretation, just 
as one experiences facts through semiotic interpretation. The whiteness of snow as a “fact” is one of the 
linguistically and culturally agreed signifiers of snow. The linguistic correlation of a word of course is not a 
concrete reality: for a person with lifelong blindness that snow is white can be superficially known to be a 
fact, but not interpreted as an experience.  
 And is snow only white? That snow is also cold, which many would consider a fact, is also merely an 
interpretation, based on perspective and relativity. A cold day in Brisbane, Australia is perhaps a hot day in 
Stockholm, Sweden, even at the same temperature. Perspectivism is the acknowledgement that everyday 
experience is interpreted in terms of valuations and our descriptions which serve to convey these valuations 
are the facts, derived from our interpretations. The numeric value of the temperature, the fact, is a semiotic 
middle world, a static approximation presented as a sign, and has more or less equal validity as any other 
aesthetic representation of an embodied experience. Whether ‘it is cold’ or further even, if ‘it is cold below 
zero degrees celcius’ can be regarded as fact or interpretation comes down to the cultural and linguistic 
assumptions inherent in the perspective from which the enquiry is made: thus, empirical and scientific 
observation gives us “no facts, but only interpretations,” revealing perspectivism in “that physics too is only 
an interpretation and arrangement of the world.”  “Facts” are a production of language and perspective and 38
they are themselves merely symbols which are created, not discovered. 
 To expand on this point, a study published in the journal Psychological Science sets out to “explore the 
possibility that using a specific language causes differences in ongoing cognitive processing by manipulating 
the language of operation in bilinguals and measuring their performance in a categorization task.”  In the 39
study, German-English bilingual participants underwent a series of categorisation tasks involving similar 
situations in different linguistic contexts. For example, groups of English speakers and German speakers 
were asked to categorise videos featuring people walking towards implied goals in which the target was of 
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varying prominence (e.g., a far building; towards a car; up to and through a door). The videos were shown in 
differing orders and the participants asked to note the similarity of a target video in terms of goal orientation 
within the set. The study found English speakers have a 37% preference towards identifying in favour of 
strong goal orientation, while German speakers had a statistically higher rating of 62% preference. Bilingual 
German-English speakers who were in the German speaking group continued the statistically higher trend of 
goal orientation, but with a slight decline, with bilinguals in the English group showing higher prevalence 
than English monolinguals, but also lower preference than all participants of the German study.  Overall, the 40
study concluded “that bilinguals exhibited categorization patterns of the nondisrupted language [which] 
shows that verbal interference reduces access not to the general language faculty but only to a specific 
language.”  This challenges the notion of cognitive categories as universal faculties, demonstrating that a 41
single conscious subject is capable of sustaining separate, contextually bound perspectives. The study shows 
that people are capable of simultaneously functioning thought processes which privilege and diminish 
varying aspects of experiential phenomena. The findings of this study support the perspectivist notion 
wherein our facts, as linguistic categorisations such as ‘what is a goal?’, are contextually bound in not only 
the language of operation, but are also determined by direct and immanent experience of one’s embodied 
perspective. Given this lack of and objective foundation to our knowledge of the world, and the 
physiological and linguistic impacts on our basic cognitive functioning, traditional absolutist philosophical 
concepts like the Good, or Truth, become obsolete. It is in this context of cultural, epistemic and moral 
uncertainty, driven by the rapid globalising of the industrial age, that Nietzsche warns of an impending wave 
of visceral, lived meaninglessness.  
The Coming Age of Nihilism 
Nihilism is a concept which Nietzsche is intimately associated with, though to call him a nihilist would be to 
make the same mistake as considering Marx to be a capitalist for writing on capital, or Seneca to be a 
hedonist for writing on passions. Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism is that of a man watching a train 
wreck in slow motion, an unfolding calamity made of the very tools developed to separate ourselves from the 
danger of the natural world. This calamity is not unique to European thought, and Nietzsche identifies it as 
central to the emergence of Socratic thought. He writes, “the fanaticism with which the whole of Greek 
thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: 
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either to perish or - be absurdly rational … The moralism of the Greek philosophers from Plato downwards 
is pathologically conditioned.”  As the apparent successors of Greek thought, modern European nihilism can 42
find its origins here. In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche praises Heraclitus for recognising the inherent flux 
and infinite plurality of the lived world, casting him against Parmenides and Plato who claim permanence in 
being, evidenced by the stability of Reason, with change being attributed to the imperfections of the senses.  43
This is the inception, to Nietzsche, of the necessity of ‘Being’ and the impossibility of ‘Becoming’; one is 
something essential, permanent, unchanging. This creates a state wherein the world is denied for the 
preservation of the self as Being. “It is precisely this (Platonic-Parmenidean) persistent focus on 'Being' as a 
purified entity which Nietzsche sees as at the origins of nihilistic thinking.”  While the case can be made 44
that Plato was not in fact so convinced of the non-reality of the world, or that Aristotle’s hylomorphic 
doctrine is inherently a process of becoming in service of Being, the intensification of dualism in Descartes’ 
philosophy has reignited the ‘world denying’ attitude from which Nietzsche sought to immunise future 
philosophers.  
 As a central metaphor for the internal conflict which creates the cultural drive to nihilism, the 
dichotomy between Heraclitus and Parmenides deserves closer attention. John Palmer notes the 
methodological differences between pre-Socratic philosophers has very much influenced interpretations of 
their conclusions.  While the two philosophers may have been more aligned than often acknowledged, their 45
representation to modern thinkers is of more importance to the subject of this study. Parmenides, a substance 
monist from Elea who denied the reality of change, is for Nietzsche the symbol of Being. Palmer highlights 
that the revelatory nature of Parmenides’ dialogues with the goddess entreats him to adopt a contemplative 
state of “genuine conviction of thought that does not wander” and in this way “whatever apprehension he 
might come to have of whatever is in this way, moreover, he could expect to be permanent and reliable.”  46
That is to say, Parmenides could recognise truths of a monistic nature by analogous properties; this 
methodology was known to Parmenides and his followers as 'The Way of Conviction’, which was “in 
essence, a meditation on the nature of what must be. The goddess will lead Parmenides to develop an 
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understanding of the characteristics what must be has to have just in virtue of its modality or way of 
being.”   47
 The appeal of such an approach has an elegant simplicity, forging a path of wisdom by only 
considering the world as it must be in its stable reality. This methodology, however, demands that the 
meditating investigator comprehend the world as it is, or in its ‘actual Being’, which precludes the possibility 
of change. In order to experience change, a phenomenon must have at one point not been what it is, a mode 
of thought that defies Parmenides’ ‘Way of Conviction’, as something cannot be both what it is and what it is 
not, and change would imply a process whereby Being would be neither. Martin Heidegger, a 
phenomenologist who wrote extensively on the phenomenon of being, was clearly influenced by Parmenides’ 
philosophy, having included the pre-Socratic poet in his coursework lectures. Heidegger shows how Being 
itself is demonstrated in these meditations, writing “The distinction between the two ways is grounded in the 
essence of Being, which is already grasped here in a decisive respect. We can express this essential 
characterization briefly as follows: Being offers itself only to the understanding, and every understanding is 
an understanding of Being. Being and the understanding of Being are the same, they belong together in 
unity.”  To unpack this discussion, we can read it as the revelation of the ‘thing behind appearances’. The 48
world appears to us in a constant state of flux, but the only reality of the world’s Being lies in those parts of it 
which are permanent and stable to it, much like the self may change, but is unified by those aspects which 
remain permanent and essential. Permanence cannot be ascertained by the senses, only by the rational 
understanding, meaning that the illusions of the senses should be discarded for the stable knowledge 
produced by the mind.  
 Parmenides is often juxtaposed to Heraclitus, who apart from the atomists, is one of the primary 
pluralists among pre-socratic philosophy. According to Plato, Heraclitus “says that all things pass and 
nothing stays, and comparing existence to the flow of a river, he says you could not step twice into the same 
river.”  This formulation sees the only permanent aspect of the world as change itself. However, permanent, 49
or at least durable, forms are still accounted for. David Graham compares the formal relationship between 
Heraclitus’ poetic quote and its subject matter, teasing out a multilateral interpretation of the axiom ‘On those 
stepping into rivers staying the same, other and other waters flow’ wherein “rivers, in fact, are long-lasting 
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organizational states of transitory waters. The structure supervenes on the matter and outlasts it, attaining at 
least a relative permanence through its channeling of the ephemeral matter.”  As the river is the structure of 50
organisation which allows the water to actualise its Being, the rational self can be seen as the organising 
principle which unifies the disparate experiences into actualisation. However, the organising principle will 
always be collating experiences and sensory data that remain in a state of flux, implying, like the river, that 
one is the act of Becoming oneself. 
 In aphorism 51 of Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche addresses the method by which appearances 
become Being. He sees Being as a kind of double-edged sword, which we start out using for our own 
personal gain, but eventually become so naturalised to the state that its apparent permanence takes control of 
us. He writes, “ If someone wants to seem something, stubbornly and for a long time, he eventually finds it 
hard to be anything else … the man who always wears the mask of a friendly countenance eventually has to 
gain power over benevolent moods without which the expression of friendliness cannot be forced - and 
eventually then these moods gain power over him and he is benevolent.”  Much like the Greeks had 51
feverishly thrown themselves at rationality and the absurd pursuit of absolute truth to save themselves from 
the crushing reality of the contingency of all existence, the modern European is seen by Nietzsche as a 
species which has thrown itself with fanaticism into morality. This fanaticism is most clearly displayed in 
European Christian history, serving God as the ultimate true reality, the moral force which determines the 
moral certainty of the world. However, this moral existence prepared the European consciousness for 
nihilism, in Nietzsche’s view, by placing value in another life to come, and therefore denying the value of 
this world, the phenomenological lifeworld. And once the truth behind appearances is denied, the value 
which was placed beyond our world of appearances is denied as well.  
 This encounter with void that is left behind is most clearly expressed in the famous madman scene in 
Nietzsche’s The Gay Science. The madman notoriously alerts the marketplace to the death of God and warns 
those present that new forms of meaning must be created to restore the vitality of the soul and preserve the 
continuation of the Will. In this parable, the death of God is clearly enacted by the denials of the populace: 
“‘I seek God! I seek God!’ - As many of those who did not believe in God were standing around just then, he 
provoked much laughter. Has he got lost? asked one. Did he lose his way like a child? asked another. Or is he 
hiding? Is he afraid of us? Has he gone on a voyage? emigrated? - Thus they yelled and laughed.”  It is not 52
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the madman who kills God, nor the philosopher, but the common people who had sustained him in their 
faith. After declaring that God is dead and that we have killed him, the madman continues by enumerating 
the symptoms of nihilism, asking “Are we not plunging continually? Backward, sideward, forward, in all 
directions? Is there still any up or down? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel 
the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is not night continually closing in on us?”  Like the 53
sun setting on our artistic consciousness, Nietzsche’s madman sees our moral lives fading on the horizon, 
and implores those listening to begin the toil of recreating the image of humankind.  
How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest 
and mightiest of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our 
knives: while wipe this blood off us? What water is there for us to clean ourselves? 
What festivals of atonement, what sacred games shall we have to invent? Is not the 
greatness of this deed too great for us? Must we ourselves not become gods simply 
to appear worthy of it? There has never been a greater deed; and whoever is born 
after us - for the sake of this deed he will belong to a higher history than all history 
hitherto.  54
 The imperative is clear, revive what we have inherited from the ancients on our pathway forward, to 
become what we have thus far been content with imitating, to become the creators of worlds and morals and 
souls. It is the task of becoming gods, but without the distance from divinity to which we are accustomed. 
Stanley Corngold notes that in Nietzsche’s philosophy, “a first step toward the recovery of will and energy is 
to grasp that the present need for transcendental orientation is unnecessary.”  This is not to say that the 55
transcendental is non-existent, but rather that in order to directly encounter the divinity of existence, it must 
be sought in our immanent and intimate experiences. In the way that the Greeks became absurdly rational, 
seeking solace in that which lay behind the appearance of the world, Nietzsche implores us to become 
absurdly aesthetic. This is demonstrated in the elevation of dreaming to a source of knowledge and meaning, 
a world of pure appearance which is encountered as an immersive experience and an affront to our waking 
experiences. And it is from this that we should take our cues for the waking world, “Either we have no 
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dreams or our dreams are interesting. We should learn to arrange our waking life the same way: nothing or 
interesting.”  This aesthetic orientation takes as its starting point a balance between the opposites and 56
contradictions of the human experience. The highest truths are a product of the lowest errors, our moral 
sensibilities grew out of the most immoral and self-serving drives and the highest examples of culture are a 
product of our primitive, barbarian natures. To divorce something of value from its immanent foundation, 
that is, to make of it a transcendent category, is to tear it from the source of its real meaning and diminishes 
both the value and ourselves in the process. It is for this reason that the aesthetic of non-duality, the syncretic 
interplay of apparent opposites, emerges from Nietzsche’s work, a concept he inherited from his German 
influences and his philological studies of ancient languages.  
Conclusion: Nietzsche as Cultural Psychologist 
Nietzsche’s approach to philosophy differs markedly from the schools of thought that were prolific in his 
time. Like the classical skeptics, Nietzsche begins from a position of denying the possibility of objective or 
absolute knowledge; however, he is keenly aware of the impact that centuries of illusory claims to truth have 
had on the conscious attitude of the modern subject. The assumptions which underpinned many of the 
certainties of modern knowledge had begun to fall away by the mid-nineteenth century, such as the divine 
order of nature, as well as the collapse of social and political institutions which had claimed absolute power, 
such as the monarchy and the authority of the church. Nietzsche attempts to link this decline in traditional, 
authoritative culture to errors in the philosophical narrative which produced the modern West.  
 Primarily, Nietzsche sees nihilism not as an existent property of the world, but rather as the 
experienced loss of cultural certitude, accelerated by the collapse of assumptions derived from linguistic 
convention, and the heritage of compounded philosophical errors. At the heart of this condition is the 
conviction of ideal or transcendent being: a supposed universal, permanent truth behind the apparent illusion 
of change in the sensory world. Nietzsche emphatically rejects this and all kinds of essentialism, instead 
advocating for a conception of truth and value that is limited by the structures of perception and valid only in 
the moment of lived experience. In place of the rational cogito, or the ‘universal man’ which apprehends 
objective knowledge, a limited subject is found on the threshold between the unintelligible chaos of material, 
embodied existence and the psychological world of signs and ideas. If Nietzsche wishes to be successful in 
his project of revaluation, he sees that he must derive the values of moral existence from this realm of 
experience alone, taking account of the non-distinction between its mundane and transcendent aspects. In 
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constructing his cure for this nihilistic divide between the subject and their experience, Nietzsche attempted 
to revitalise the philosophical and aesthetic methodologies of Classical Greece and Asia. This project of 
revaluation will be the subject of the following chapter, with a particular focus on Nietzsche’s appropriation 
of the non-dual and the reintegration of the body into the process of philosophy.  
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Chapter 2: The non-dual in Nietzsche’s Pharmakon.  
Nietzsche thought himself to have discovered a pathology in the history of Western philosophical discourse. 
This pathology has been explored in Chapter One in terms of the minimisation or silencing of the immanent, 
embodied world of lived experience, and the primal values that have been silenced with it. Through the 
dualistic hierarchy of immanence and transcendence that permeates post-Socratic philosophy in the West, 
substantive and moral meaning was denied to the world of mundane existence: However, as the new 
mechanical sciences of the Modern era proceeded to destabilise traditional justifications for institutions of 
value, the moral void of nihilism begins to expand in their place. In Nietzsche’s time, the failing authority of 
the Church was the primary symbol of this cultural decline; in our contemporary times, it is the failure of the 
West’s ubiquitous security presence and the transformative power of capital.  
 But like any good physician, Nietzsche was not content to merely diagnose modern Europe, and 
devoted himself to finding a cure to what he saw as the European dependence on transcendent, a priori 
morality, with a view that our moral being serves as a veil to sensual reality, separating the subject from a 
direct engagement with the living world. Having been roughly contemporaneous with the English scientist, 
Charles Darwin, Nietzsche was keenly aware of the emerging field of evolutionary science, and the 
consequent implication that the hidden drives of our behaviour were intimately linked to our physiology and 
environment, rather than drawn from a pure rationality. Nietzsche thought that those living through the 
corrupting influence of nihilism needed to be reintegrated into their physiological psychology. It is primarily 
for this reason that the music of Attic Tragedy takes such significance for him; the marriage of the Apolline 
and Dionysian in tragic theatre represents the coalescence of an impassioned physiological experience with 
the subtlety of reflective contemplation, enacting a unity of the apparently divergent aspects of human 
experience. This chapter will explore Nietzsche’s attempt to infuse his modern philosophy with the lessons of 
‘heroic ages’ from his philological studies. First, the primitive non-dualism that Nietzsche intuited within 
Attic Tragedy will be discussed. This will then move on to the influences of the classical East, through the 
works of Schopenhauer, as well as the ‘Orientalist’ studies of Eastern texts, with which Nietzsche engaged 
and referred to in his lectures. This growth in his thought culminated in the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, 
wherein at least as an aesthetic phenomenon, the willing individual is an incarnated justification of the living 
world.   
 27
Living Symbol in Olympian Aesthetics 
Nietzsche’s study in the Birth of Tragedy sets out to explain the apparent contradictions between the function 
of art on either side of the emergence of Socratic thought in European philosophy. In doing so, the analysis 
examines the short-lived movement of Attic Tragedy, exemplified by such poets as Sophocles and 
Aristophanes, as well as the mythological and ritualistic influences which parented this unique and vibrant 
culture. These ‘parental’ movements, the cult of Apollo and the cult of Dionysius, represented diametrically 
opposed views of life, with the Apolline tendency towards ascetic restraint cast against the Dionysian 
expressions of excess and hedonism. “This co-presence of two antithetical divinities is not accidental, even 
though it was not topicalised until modern times, when Nietzsche tackled the issue. In general, it expresses 
the possibility, always present and periodically occurring, of an irruption of chaos into the beauty of 
harmony.”  57
 Nietzsche bids the reader to consider the opposing views of these artistic cults as germinating a unique 
form of beauty, like the opposing biological impulses of the masculine and feminine produce a unique life; 
and further, to consider the Apolline and Dionysian as natural states, “separate art worlds of dream and 
intoxication.”  Nietzsche’s study represents a recognition of the naturalistic role of symbol in aesthetics. In 58
replacing artistic ‘concept’ with ‘symbol’, Nietzsche entices art back from the realm of spirit and into the 
world, his objection to transcendental and ideal aesthetics mirroring his rejection of “‘morality for morality’s 
sake’ [which] is, according to Nietzsche, not only to accept its complete lack of realism, but also to pay the 
price of devaluating actuality itself” (Jaspers, 1965, 145).  Semiotic context can then be considered as the 
frame in which aesthetic phenomena are grounded in the world, a function of organic behaviour and not 
requiring a pluralist source of spirit. The Greek people were intimately aware of the unpredictable and tragic 
nature of their reality, and through symbolic redemption “the Greeks repeatedly overcame all this, or at least 
concealed it, with the artistic middle world of the Olympians.”  59
 For Nietzsche, Apollo is the centrepiece of Hellenic art, the anchor point for the Olympian dream 
world in the hearts’ of Greek poets. This is by no means the result of a monopoly on patronage or instruction 
as the churches of Europe’s dark ages, but the fruit of a mutually informing and beneficial affinity. Apollo is 
a symbol of beauty and as an aesthetic phenomenon, much like a word with a changing definition, is in a 
constant state of becoming, accruing dimension and depth from the constantly evolving contextual 
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environment in which he operates. It is not only true that Hellenic arts can be drawn from Apolline traditions, 
but so too that the cult of Apollo found itself reinforced by the artistic expressions of poets in his name. The 
Apolline can be seen as Nietzsche’s response to Kant’s consideration of the beautiful, but unlike Kant’s a 
priori judgements, the Apolline takes life from wilful and contemplative discipline. This semiotic conception 
of art can be illustrated by analogy to Kauffman’s reading of Nietzsche’s Untimely Meditations regarding the 
supra-historical; “Nietzsche does not look at history as a naturalistic (biological) sequence: for naturalistic 
events as such are not ‘symbols.’ Instead Nietzsche would look at history as a work of art.”   As a symbol-60
deity, Apollo enjoyed a supra-aesthetic existence, taking life from the active participation of the Greeks in 
their expressions of beauty. Among many other epithets, Apollo was given symbolic supremacy over the sun, 
light, dreams and youth, and of course many of these derivative symbols would come to develop in step with 
Apolline culture and art. Despite this diversity of meaning and application, Apolline worship was primarily 
characterised by “the maintenance of the boundaries of the individual, moderation in the Hellenic sense.”  61
The adulation of these qualities in the worship of Apollo could be seen as informing Greek beauty, 
cultivating it through the unity of the Apolline symbol and disseminating it through contextual association.  
 Thus, Apolline arts are characterised by their form-giving nature, restraint and expressions of 
limitation. Sculpture, architecture, poetry and harmonic music were traditionally arts associated with Apollo, 
his followers and creed. But, as the definition of a word changes with use, the symbolic nature of Apollo was 
able to change, through art and ritual, to suit the needs of the Hellenic people. The Greeks benefited not so 
much from the symbol of their beauty, but the symbolic nature of it, giving them a beauty and by extension 
an art that could have a life, evolve and change with the culture and people who carried it. Apollo was not 
confined to the rigorous logic of transcendental beauty, and further, being one symbol among many, could be 
representative of one of many dimensions of artistic phenomena, namely “serene harmony, understood as 
order and measure, is expressed in a Beauty that Nietzsche called Apolline Beauty."  62
 If one views Apollo as symbolic of Kant’s notion of Beauty, then in the same contrast Dionysus arises 
as the symbolic representation of Sublimity within the Hellenic Pantheon. Dionysus was more akin to 
barbarity than the serene heights of Greek culture and art, and his followers were known to revel in orgiastic 
expressions of excess, with “Dionysiac Beauty, which was not expressed in apparent forms, but over and 
above appearances. This was a joyous and dangerous beauty, antithetical to reason and often depicted as 
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possession and madness.”  The rush of Dionysian frenzy, the overwhelming chaos of its music and the 63
apparent unintelligibility of its form are reminiscent of the first stage of sublime experience as described by 
Kant.  The intoxication, the ‘letting oneself go’, which is then thrust into the harmonic world of Apolline 64
restraint, is the key to understanding the unique virtues of Attic tragedy.  It is in this sense then, that tragic 
beauty is created neither from harmony or discord, but the contradiction of the two.  
 With the conflation of the Apolline and Dionysiac into the tragic form, there arises a catharsis of 
conflicting moral impulses, concocting this unity of form through which to channel the necessary 
interdependence of opposing forces.  Attic tragedy, through its dependence on the contradictory nature of 
restraint and excess in art, portrayed moral characteristics in these terms, showing the multiplicity implied 
within defined limits of our moral nature and “In The Birth of Tragedy, the Dionysian represents that 
negative and yet necessary dialectic element without which the creation of aesthetic values would be, 
according to Nietzsche, an impossibility.”  In this way, the Dionysiac element of tragedy can show even the 65
noblest values bringing ruin when taken to excess while the Apolline can render them powerless in restraint, 
a challenge to the essential nature of Beauty and even Morality as a priori.  
 This indicates to Nietzsche a unity between what are typically considered antitheses, such as excess 
and restraint, good and evil, world and spirit. The very form of the art is a demonstration of how the 
universal and the particular are less so the antitheses of each other, but rather the inverse. “Dionysiac art 
tends to exert two kinds of influence on the Apolline artistic faculty: music encourages a symbolic intuition 
of Dionysiac universality, and then endows that symbolic image with the highest level of significance.”  In 66
an example of this Dionysian influence on Apollonian society, Nietzsche briefly mentions the ethnic Dorian 
culture of Greece. Doric culture is most strikingly represented in modern interpretations of Spartan military 
traditions, and this same sense of discipline, restriction and austerity in Doric art, says Nietzsche, is 
intricately dependent on its barbaric opposite. As the development of the Spartan form depended on an 
enemy to wage war against, “only unstinting resistance to the Titanic and barbaric essence of the Dionysiac 
could explain the long-term survival of such a scornfully remote art.”  Even Nietzsche’s own philosophy is 67
subject to this inverse valuation. He recognises, even exalts the illusion of order in the arts of the Dorians and 
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Apolline cults and yet, “as is self-evident, the science of art must oppose this illusion most firmly, and point 
out the false conclusions and self-indulgences of the intellect that drive it into the artist’s trap.”  It is clear 68
that it is not an attack on illusory arts or a call for art to take a form of ‘true representation’ as in hyper-
realism, but rather that the purpose of art must be to display the chaos of reality through the illusion of order. 
 Here begins the idea of creation as a process not of origination, but one of contestation. Considering 
that these symbols have diverse meanings, the contestations between them and the impact they have on 
aesthetic practice are similarly multidimensional. In addition to the direct individuating considerations of 
Attic aesthetics, “a further aspect of the antithesis between Apollo and Dionysus concerns the dyad distance/
nearness … [Apolline] Beauty was expressed by those senses that permit a distance to be maintained… 
forms that could be heard, like music, aroused suspicion because of the involvement they imply in the soul of 
the listener."  Tragedy is precisely the exposure of this suspicion, played out in the supra-aesthetic narrative 69
of living symbol, “the destruction of the veil of Maya.”  The depth of character involved in these symbols 70
washes over the superficiality of aesthetic concepts and brings the authenticity of will to creative genesis. A 
state of flux, a contradiction, a pressure and corresponding resistance are required to destabilise the limited, 
moderated self, and the moderation of the Apolline spirit cannot be drawn into passionate creation without an 
antithetical force where “man’s symbolic faculties are roused to their supreme intensity.”  This can be seen 71
as Nietzsche relating the growth of the symbolic self to the growth of the physical self, in that conflict and 
resistance cause us to grow stronger, while the comforts of artificial order lead to atrophy.   
 Crucially, the analysis of Dionysian beauty is stripped of moral attachments, described as negative 
only in relation to the Apolline, but the Apolline is itself the negative of Dionysian. Both symbolic identities 
have positive and negative traits, a personal depth that allows not only conflict but also consummation, and 
in this exuberant celebration of the multiplicity of being, the Greeks could rejoice in symbolic tragedy, and 
showed “for all our pity and terror we are happy to be alive, but as the single living thing, merged with its 
creative delight.”  This view of art, and its projected view of life celebrates the multiplicity of worldly 72
experience and reminds the individual of their limitations, but also of their connection to the world. In the 
Attic form, the individual is presented as a particular instance of an underlying universal will.  
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Tragedy and Pessimism 
Nietzsche’s development of a tragic consciousness is heavily influenced by his readings of Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism,  and a rejection of optimism, exemplified in Socrates as “the archetype of the theoretical 73
optimist who, in his faith in the explicability of the nature of things, attributes the power of a panacea to 
knowledge and science, and sees error as the embodiment of evil.”  The tragic is very much pessimistic in 74
the nature of its assessment of existence and yet it contains a touch of the absurd; the ubiquity of suffering is 
in no way a reason to deny life, but rather an opportunity for overcoming and a necessary condition of the 
Will’s drive to power. An example of this shift from the pessimistic to the tragic can be seen in section 200 of 
Beyond Good and Evil (1886), where Nietzsche assesses the moral necessity of difficulty in one’s own 
becoming. He writes, “if however the contrariety and war in such a nature [dualism] should act as one more 
stimulus and enticement to life - and if, on the other hand, in addition to powerful and irreconcilable drives, 
there has also been inherited and cultivated a proper mastery and subtlety in conducting war against oneself, 
that is to say self-control, self out-witting."  It is this kind of conflict, between powerful and irreconcilable 75
forces that is portrayed so clearly in tragic art, and “for Nietzsche tragedy is a crucially important kind of 
aesthetic experience with serious consequences, it involves dis-individuation, and it depends on the coming 
together of two opposed fundamental drives.”  The theoretical optimist would reject the notion of a set of 76
irreconcilable drives in conflict, as reason would be able to discern the more just of the drives, or a just 
balance between the two, as in the Socratic maxim ‘know thyself’. While the optimist would see value in 
growing the self, the pessimist embodies the opposite attitude, and comes to a moral position through 
negation. By approaching the very nature of existence as suffering itself, the pessimist loses interest in the 
waxing and waning of one’s own fortunes as meaningless fluctuations. The denial of one’s personal interests, 
and further through the denial of one’s own individuation, for Schopenhauer becomes the ground of 
compassion, an empathetic solidarity in the face of a life which is unpleasant, unequal and uncertain.   77
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 More will be said on Nietzsche’s relationship to Schopenhauer’s pessimism and aesthetics below, but 
for now it is enough to note that the denial of will in the pessimist ethic of compassion is merely a denial of 
the individual will. What crucially separates the pessimist outlook from Nietzsche’s tragedian ethics is again 
the question of disinterestedness. Schopenhauer is in agreement with Kant, that aesthetic judgements are 
necessarily disinterested,  and the judgement of the value of life is fundamentally of the same order. It is 78
difficult to reduce Schopenhauer’s theory on suffering to any singular or linear argument, but it can be 
simplified by considering it as a consequence of our necessary structures of desire. Our personal interests 
arise from perceived deficiencies, or the appearance of a lack in our being. For Schopenhauer, “satisfaction is 
merely the temporary absence of suffering, which soon yields again to suffering.”  Suffering is so 79
ubiquitous that even when we attain satisfaction through the fulfilment of desire, we are returned to a sense 
of lack, if even the lack of something to strive for at all. Indeed, the satisfaction of personal interests can be 
no remedy to suffering, as even if one were to live in perfect luxury, and want not even for more wants, the 
presence of suffering in the lives of others tarnishes the presence of any good. The principle of compassion is 
such that if even one sentient being were to suffer, the mere existence of evil in the world is sufficient to 
establish that non-existence is entirely preferable to what is.   80
 Nietzsche’s objection to this worldview is not necessarily that it is untrue, but rather that it is 
incomplete. To explore why this is the case, we need to explore another of Schopenhauer’s ideas which 
Nietzsche adopted and developed. Paul Katsafanas suggests that Nietzsche’s development of the conscious/
unconscious divide is grounded in Schopenhauer’s distinction between the conceptual and non-conceptual, 
that being abstract knowledge and perceptual knowledge respectively.  In short, Nietzsche expands this 81
from two forms of knowledge into two forms of consciousness, operating under diametrically opposed 
perceptual frameworks. Recalling his definition of ideas as generalisations from Truth and Falsity in an 
Extra-Moral Sense, Nietzsche sees the conscious attention as operating within this aesthetic mode, and 
performs the function of generalising perception, “that our perceptions sometimes represent objects in a way 
that is not sensitive to all of the detail of the object, but is instead sensitive only to the general type to which 
the object belongs.”  This sensitivity to general types is a method of categorisation, whereby the world is 82
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not only separated into separate entities, but reconfigured within the order of conceptual categories. The 
proclivity of the human mind towards classification is the defining mark, for Nietzsche, of the conscious 
mind, and indeed this perceptual mode is independent of the ordinary perception of sensory phenomena. One 
of the crucial factors that separates concepts from phenomena is that they are “systematically related to other 
concepts, and concepts can be employed in nonperceptual contexts.”  This form of activity is clearly 83
distinguishable from the perceptual awareness displayed by animals, for example. An animal will ordinarily 
perceive the diminishing of light as the sun ceases to be visible over the horizon, and adjust its behaviour 
according to the perceptual conditions that it finds itself in. The conceptual, abstract mind however need not 
perceive the actual night in order to perceive it as an idea. One can use a definition of particular hours to 
stand for the idea of the night, or conceive of the night to come when planning for meals or social activities. 
When entering darkness, even in the day, one could say it is ‘black as night’, relating the concept of night to 
the concept of black, when the night is never actually blackness, being illuminated by astrological bodies. 
Night is related conceptually to danger, and thus one can come to fear the coming darkness despite the lack 
of any perceptible threat. Indeed, even the word ‘night’ as a linguistic signifier stands in our consciousness 
for the perception of the event itself.  
 This tendency is universal in conscious attention as its defining activity. It is so primary to that mode 
of awareness that it imposes itself on our sensory perception. When perceiving a pine forrest, an arboreal 
scientist will ‘see’ differently to a lumberjack, who will see differently to a painter, and again differently to 
an arsonist. Each individual may be operating under the same, if not identical, perceptual structures, but the 
difference in understanding arises when these perceptions are generalised to learned concepts. Unconscious 
attention merely perceives, distinguishing features in the landscape; it sees patterns, but not pattern. In and of 
itself, conscious abstract thought is not to be rejected as ‘untrue’ but the danger arises when the conceptual is 
taken as primary over the perceptual. This is the error that Schopenhauer commits in his pessimist ethic, in 
that suffering is itself a concept, a generalisation of infinitely diverse experiences into a universal signifier. 
The association of suffering with evil is an entirely conceptual relation, though this is not to say that 
suffering itself is illusory; rather its use as the measure of existence is an incomplete account of human 
psychology. What is revealed in tragic art is that far from being a cause to deny life, suffering is a mark of 
our temporary individuation against the unyielding forces which control our lives despite our best efforts, 
which operate with such uncaring necessity as to constitute the very ground of existence. Further, in the 
tragic tales of Aeschylus and Sophocles “a great mythical figure was mercilessly crushed despite his or her 
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best intentions. In general, the set of forces—psychological or otherwise—that constituted the great figure 
was essential to the event of suffering such that the figure's fated portion (µοιρα) was inevitable—it was part 
of his or her very being, and had to unfold without mercy.”  The tragic hero finds themselves lost as a 84
subjective agent into the necessity of fate, coming to be merely an aspect of the forces against which they 
were arrayed. The chorus further symbolises this dissolution of individuation, standing on the border of the 
aesthetic plane. As the origin of tragic drama itself, the chorus remained primary to the functioning of 
tragedy itself.  Dismissing readings of the chorus as representative of the constitutional body of the 85
Athenian populace, or as a representation of the ideal audience, Nietzsche proposes that the chorus is a 
concrete form given to the primal unity of nature, a harmony of natural beings which goes on eternally and 
unchanging.  The chorus is that which stands against the outside world as a barrier, the aesthetic condition 86
which allows the raw power and emotion of Dionysian music to be interpreted in the dream image of 
phenomenal forms, but without reduction to the limited perspective of subjectivity. Nietzsche elaborates in 
the following passage:  
Schiller was right in his appraisal of these origins of tragic art: the chorus is a 
living wall against encroaching reality because it - the satyr chorus - depicts 
existence more truly, more authentically, more completely than the man of culture 
who sees himself as the sole reality. The realm of poetry does not lie outside the 
world, a fantastic impossibility, the product of a poet’s mind; it wishes to be 
precisely the opposite of this, the unadorned expression of truth, and must for that 
very reason cast off the mendacious finery of the supposed reality of the man of 
culture. The contrast between his authentic, natural truth and the lie of culture 
masquerading as the sole reality is like the contrast between the eternal core of 
things, the thing in itself, and the entire world of phenomena; and just as tragedy, 
with its metaphysical consolation, points to the eternal life of that core and the 
constant destruction of phenomena, the symbolism of the satyr chorus analogously 
expresses the primal relationship between the thing in itself and the world of 
appearances. Modern man’s idyllic shepherd is nothing but a counterfeit of the sum 
of cultural illusions that he takes to be nature; the Dionysiac Greek wanted truth 
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and nature at the summit of their power - and saw himself transformed into a 
satyr.  87
 The chorus does indeed represent the audience, but not as a political or idealised entity, rather as the 
middle ground between natural and cultural being. Through this, the Athenian was able to vicariously 
experience the inevitability of fate and the destruction of the self, in such a way as to renew the illusory 
wonder of individuation as a temporary aesthetic experience.  The audience did not attend in order to be 88
consumers of entertainment, but to be themselves consumed. The purpose of tragedy was to allow a 
temporary re-integration with the indefinite, imperceptible ground of existence, the void of the being in 
itself, in a way that reinvigorates passion for life in a manner that is lost in the development of the theoretical 
ego as separate from the world.  By constructing a theoretical world through which to encounter lived reality, 
the conscious mind attempts to impose order on the apparent chaos of the world. However, as an absolute 
unity, the chaos is merely an illusion of the impermanent, phenomenal world. This vision bears a remarkable 
similarity to the structures of Eastern thought, which was prominent in German thought of the nineteenth 
century. The impact of Asian, and particularly Indian thought on Nietzsche will be examined in detail, as 
well as its relation to the concept of the Eternal Recurrence.   
Eastern thought and Nietzsche’s Eternal Return 
The scale of Nietzsche’s encounters with eastern thought is a topic of some academic contention, with many 
classical Indian texts being translated during his active period as a philosopher, though relatively few explicit 
references to Indian thought appear in his final works. The extent of this influence is critical in understanding 
the development of Nietzsche’s philosophy; while he clearly did not adopt Brahman or Buddhist thought 
outright, the metaphysical and cosmological viewpoints of Indian philosophy bear significant similarities to 
elements of his work, most significantly the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. Emma Syea notes that Nietzsche 
was at no point interested in faithfully representing the philosophies of India and Greece to the letter, but 
rather “that he mines these cultures for concepts, attitudes and Weltanschauungen [world views] which will 
provide him with alternatives to the life-denying Christian morality he so deplored.”  This discussion will 89
propose that the most productive of Nietzsche’s metaphysical adoptions are grounded in a non-dual 
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conception of the universe, and that this metaphysical assumption is necessary in understanding the concept 
of Eternal Recurrence.  
 However, Nietzsche’s encounters with Indian literature were relatively imperfect, and some 
appreciation of the nature of his relationship to such philosophy is required. The most significant and well 
known influence for Nietzsche on this topic are the works of Schopenhauer, who had claimed Brahman and 
Buddhist thought as the mythological precursor to his conception of the world as will and representation. 
Schopenhauer was an early advocate for the appreciation of Indian thought, which was being introduced to 
the German academy through the channels of European colonialism, going so far as to have referred to 
himself as a ‘Buddha-ist’.  There is some contention as to whether Schopenhauer explicitly adopted 90
Buddhist principles into his philosophy, or as he claimed, that he was merely sensitive to the inherent truth 
both philosophies had stumbled upon. However, such debates are beyond the scope of this study, and it is 
sufficient to note that Schopenhauer was aware of such similarities.  Such affinities can be seen in the 91
second volume of Schopenhauer’s text, World as Will and Representation (1844) where he identifies the 
parallels between his metaphysics and the Four Noble Truths of Buddhist thought. For example,  as Cooper 
writes, “the third Noble Truth, that of the ending of suffering through ‘the extinction of craving,’ parallels 
Schopenhauer’s contention that suffering may be overcome through ‘the denial of the will.’ Again, he 
frequently stresses this parallel …  when speaking of the Indians’ recognition of the ‘great fundamental truth’ 
of ‘the need for salvation’ through denying the will.”  Whether this is an accurate representation of Indian 92
philosophy as a whole is irrelevant; so few contemporary sources on the topic were available at the time that 
Nietzsche, as an early acolyte of Schopenhauer’s thought, would have every inclination to consider 
Schopenhauer an authority.  
 Beyond this, there were additional comments in Schopenhaurian scholarship which Nietzsche would 
have been familiar with, including the works of Hartmann, Dühring, Mainländer, and Bahnsen, and further a 
“general interest in the Orient in Germany during the nineteenth century.”  Thomas Brobjer (2004) has 93
accounted for much of the documented encounters which Nietzsche had with Eastern thought throughout his 
formal education, as well as discussions with his peers and contemporaries, which demonstrate a deeper 
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engagement with those schools of thought than is typically displayed in his published writings. He is also 
known to have introduced some discussions of Eastern philosophy in his lectures at Basel University, as even 
then it was “conventional to refer to Asia and Eastern thought in discussions of early Greek culture, and 
especially in relation to Pythagoras, Democritus, Alexander the Great, Aristotle, and the Aristotelian 
school.”  These references may have been sporadic and brief, but they do display a conviction in the value 94
of Indian philosophy, a conviction that he shared with his contemporaries in his correspondence. An example 
of this would be Nietzsche imploring his friend Paul Deussen to engage in the ‘noble task’ of translating the 
fundamental works of Indian philosophy.  This enthusiasm for ancient Indian thought seems to be in 95
contrast to the commentary that is found in his published philosophy. Some examples of his repudiation of 
Buddhism as a philosophy of nihilism can be found as early as The Birth of Tragedy (1872) where Nietzsche 
warns of “the risk of longing for a Buddha-like denial of the will”  and through to The Anti-Christ (1888) 96
where he considers Buddhism alongside Christianity as a nihilistic religion.  Regardless, Nietzsche seems to 97
have taken an interest in Eastern thought for the way that Indian philosophers would employ physiological 
techniques to control thoughts and the senses.  Just as Nietzsche had supposed that his contemporaries were 98
responsible for poor translations and misinterpretations of Indian thought,  he too appears to have 99
misunderstood the physiological practice of ascesis and incorrectly conflated Nirvana with nihilism, as I 
discuss in the next section.  
Ascesis and nihilism: will denial, or bodily discipline of the will? 
It is my contention that the most significant mistake that Nietzsche makes in his reading of Buddhism is the 
role of ascetic ethics and the corresponding charge of promoting nihilism. Despite the objections which 
Nietzsche raises against Buddhist practice, his philosophy bears many remarkable similarities that were 
beyond the scope of the available textual evidence at the time. Part of this seems to be at least partially 
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attributable to the origin of much of Nietzsche’s knowledge of Eastern philosophy, which was primarily 
sourced from India and the Southern School of Theravada. This is unsurprising, as Theravada, meaning ‘The 
Way of the Elders’, is a largely scriptural version of Buddhism, emphasising the texts purported to contain 
the words of the Buddha himself and his close disciples, commonly referred to as the Pali Cannon. The 
Buddhist practice of the Northern School, Mahayana, meaning ‘The Great Vehicle’, flourished in Tibet and 
China before being exported to Japan in its most common contemporary form of Zen. Nietzsche is known to 
have had limited available resources of Chinese and Japanese literature,  and further, the knowledge 100
transfer of Mahayana Buddhism has primarily been as an oral dialectic tradition, and has been associated 
with praxis in contradistinction to written or orthodox truth. Of course, it would be absurd to assert that 
Nietzsche was a Zen thinker, but it is possible to reconcile Nietzsche’s objections to Buddhist thought by 
considering the traits and practices which are more commonly associated with the Mahayana school.  
 Nietzsche appears to interpret Buddhism as a philosophy which advocates a quietistic form of 
meditation, the suppression of mental and passionate phenomena in a kind of mind-over-matter conquest of 
the self. This would suggest a conception of self which is rooted in dualistic thinking, and while such trends 
did arise within the history of Buddhist practice, it is by no means the authoritative method of achieving 
enlightenment. The practice of Zen philosophy resembles Nietzsche’s philosophical project in that “he wants 
to overcome the dualistic opposition between body and mind itself.”  It is easy to imagine, with his 101
assertions on the nobility of combat, the necessity to cultivate the body and to overcome the self, Nietzsche 
would have had great admiration for the Shaolin Monks who follow the legacy of Bodhidharma, or the strict 
discipline and power associated with the Rinzai Buddhism of the Japanese Samurai warrior class. The austere 
self-discipline associated with these forms of religion could certainly be described as ascetic, but in the sense 
of being a mental control over the aspects of the body, this is merely a first stage in the journey of 
cultivation. Ascesis is an initial step in the process of self-integration, wherein “the first phase in such a 
process of cultivation, a phase characterized by discipline, asceticism and self-mastery, is to place the body 
into a special form or posture. Gradually, the posture becomes second nature … the second phase of self-
cultivation consists of relaxing the discipline (“giving the drives free reign”) and trusting a natural 
spontaneity to emerge.”  Perhaps the most visceral bodily demonstration of this process is the Eastern 102
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martial arts traditions. The initial stages of training in any of these disciplines are typically dominated by self 
control, indoctrinating the postures and techniques and practicing them in submission to the authority of the 
Sensei. However, once these techniques become second nature, the practitioner is free to develop their own 
martial style, and indeed only in this spontaneous application does the art become practically applicable in 
any combat situation.  
 It is important to note that in this conception of the human person, mind and body are never fully 
separate, though levels of self-integration exist on a spectrum. “The integration of mind and body is only 
partial in the average human being. Full integration is the result of prolonged, assiduous cultivation.”  This 103
not only relates to Nietzsche’s assertion that only a select few would be of the appropriate sensitivity to 
engage with this higher philosophy, but it also establishes that the mind must be responsible for the first stage 
of enlightenment or self-cultivation, as the primacy of mind is the illusion which these practices seek to 
penetrate. Zen is a methodology of transcending the duality of mind and body, arriving into a radical 
immanence in the lived world, and “cultivation is therefore not about attaining a mystical experience; it is 
about increasing the body’s ability to process, to ‘digest’ our ordinary experience, to incorporate the 
world.”  This resembles Nietzsche’s basic argument in The Gay Science (1882) that “nature needs to be 104
dehumanized and de-deifed, and the human needs to be naturalized."  The differentiation between Zen and 105
the versions of Buddhism of which Nietzsche was familiar is primarily the physiological emphasis. Even 
aside from those temples which engaged in the martial strains of Zen practice, the life of a monk was one of 
labour. The Zen master of the meditation hall will sweep the floors, tend the garden and wash his bowl, with 
the same humility as the greenest acolyte. No task, no matter how difficult or distasteful, is below the dignity 
of the monk; and this isn’t to diminish the nobility of the monk, but rather to elevate the mundane activity of 
work to a spiritual exercise. Zen scholar Daisetz Suzuki remarks that “what saved Zen Buddhism from 
deteriorating into quietism or mere intellectual gymnastics, which was more or less the fate befalling other 
schools of Buddhism, was surely due to the gospel of work. Apart from its psychological value, it proved an 
efficient agency in preserving the health and sanity of Zen Buddhism through its long history of growth.”  106
To put it in somewhat Hellenic terms, Zen arises from the synthesis of opposing forces, the Apolline 
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principle of harmony and meditation in Buddhism being transformed by the radical introduction of the 
Dionysian ecstasy of Tao.  
 The other predominate similarity between the Zen reinterpretation of Buddhism and Nietzsche’s 
work is an aesthetic resonance between the character of Zarathustra and the Zen role of the Bodhisattva. The 
relationship is one that was invisible to Nietzsche by virtue of the lack of resources on the concept during his 
lifetime, and thus it is important to note that the affinity is not an intentional one, and further, the vastly 
different cultural contexts produce divergences in character as well. A full study on this relationship could be 
fruitful in its own right, but for the purposes of this study, a few comments will serve to illustrate the relevant 
points of interest. The Bodhisattva is a figure within Mahayana Buddhism who rejects the self-directed 
enlightenment of Theravada, instead, “the ‘Bodhisattva’ (Snskt) is one who has realized enlightenment, or 
“nirvana,” but out of compassion for the suffering of sentient beings has deliberately resolved to delay 
reaching final nirvana, complete release from samsaric rebirth, in order to aid others in achieving 
enlightenment.”  The Bodhisattva stands on the threshold of transcendence, recognising in 107
Schopenhauerian fashion that the suffering of one is suffering for all. Turning their back on the ascetic 
heights of disciplined meditation and the dissolution of their own ego, the Bodhisattva returns to the dualistic 
world of ordinary Karma, to be an agent of compassion, a living Buddha-in-the-world. This in some respects 
mirrors the ambitions of Zarathustra, who having attained the highest wisdom of a life in exile, chooses to 
return to the world of ordinary persons in order to gift this wisdom to those who lack the constitution or 
opportunity to discover it for themselves.  
 Zarathustra declares the following at the beginning of Nietzsche’s sole fictional work: “Behold, I am 
weary of my wisdom, like a bee that has gathered too much honey; I need hands outstretched to receive it. I 
would give away and distribute, until the wise among men find joy once again in their folly and the poor in 
their riches … Behold, this cup wants to become empty again, and Zarathustra wants to become man 
again.”  The comparison is imperfect, but some key principles arise. The most obvious is the perception 108
Zarathustra has of having transcended the category of “man” and the corresponding need to return to that 
role in order to distribute his wisdom. The second major implication is that Zarathustra sees the suffering of 
everyday people as being grounded in an illusion which can be dispelled by wisdom. The men of the town 
are seen to have become serious by dispelling folly from their wisdom, and the poor by becoming blind to 
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the riches which are independent of the social currency which has captured their lives. Further, in Zarathustra 
the will to power receives its first mention amongst Nietzsche’s works, and much like the Zen project of 
transcending the duality of ego, Zarathustra’s “will to power is conceived of as the will to overcome 
oneself.” Zarathustra is of course not explicitly a Bodhisattva, and is engaged in a political context and 109
philosophical project that is far divorced from Liang Dynasty China, but the comparison provides an insight 
into Nietzsche’s project to overcome dualism, and serves to provide an anchor point for his most thoroughly 
non-dual concept, the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence.  
Eternal Recurrence: Non-duality in Time and Self  
The ontological awareness of time is central to the production of the human ego, having been a component in 
Schopenhauer’s Principle of Sufficient Reason, one of Kant’s transcendental categories, and a fundamental 
metaphysical problem dating back to the Pre-socratics in Western philosophy. Alan Watts identifies time and 
memory as being fundamental to the conception of a particular and persistent self, writing that “you would 
not know that you were going to have anything happen tomorrow unless you remembered that something 
had happened yesterday … If you did not remember the past, you would not know that there will be a 
tomorrow … Tomorrow is an illusion produced by memory and so is yesterday.”  Nietzsche’s attempt to 110
resolve the duality of the Western self led him to a radical reformulation of the metaphysics of time, which 
would eventually be deployed as the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence. Kauffman claims that “The crown of 
Nietzsche's philosophy is the dual vision of the overman and the eternal recurrence; its key conception is the 
will to power.”  It should come as no surprise that the interpretation of the capstone concept of one of 111
modernity’s most controversial philosophers is the subject of debate.  
 The primary dividing line of these interpretations is the question of whether to read the doctrine as 
cosmological or ethical in its purpose. Such a debate separates into summative and normative readings, 
which in some sense perpetuates the duality which Nietzsche is attempting to transcend. Any reading though 
should begin with what Nietzsche directly wrote of his own philosophy. The Eternal Recurrence is first 
mentioned in aphorism 341 of The Gay Science (1882), under the title of ‘The Heaviest Weight’, which, 
Kauffman notes in his translation, is a reference to the sporting category of ‘heavyweight’ as well the 
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intellectual profundity of confronting this thought.  Nietzsche implores the reader to consider a demon 112
appearing and informing the reader that every minute detail of their life would be relived innumerable times, 
in the exact same formulation for all of eternity, “the eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down 
again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!”  The thought would elicit one of two reactions initially, 113
either hopeless despair, or divine reverence. Nietzsche continues, 
If this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or 
perhaps crush you. The question in each and every thing ‘Do you desire this 
once more and innumerable times more?’ would lie upon your actions as the 
greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become to yourself 
and to life to crave nothing more fervently that this ultimate eternal 
confirmation and seal?  114
The two competing visions of Nietzsche’s doctrine can be seen in this passage. As a summative claim, the 
Eternal Recurrence is a description of the metaphysical structures of the universe and our place in it; one’s 
self is totally overcome by the enormity of this callous necessity. Ethically, however, a test of one’s 
behaviour is offered. If one is faced with a choice, which option would you relive time and time again for 
eternity? These two conceptions are somewhat contradictory. In the summative reading, the universe is 
broadly deterministic, in that one’s actions are set in place on the rotating wheel of existence, while the 
normative reading implies that choice is at the heart of the doctrine, that one should act ‘as if’.  
 However, one must read Nietzsche’s conception in context and that is within the project of 
transcending dualities. The Eternal Recurrence must be seen as simultaneously ethical and cosmological, at 
once normative and summative; it must be conceived of as a physiological experience which is translated 
into the terms of a thought-sign. For this reason, Nietzsche has formulated the idea as a drive rather than an 
imperative. The Eternal Recurrence is also a complimentary idea to the Will to Power, which invites the 
question as to what role willpower would have in a universe determined by eternally returning necessity. Two 
points arise to explain these apparent contradictions. Firstly, on the question of ethical interpretations, 
Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence is a rejection of the idea that the world can be improved, or that there is some 
 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 273 (note 71).112
 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 273.113
 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 274 [emphasis in original].114
 43
final goal to which we are moving. As such, “particular actions seemed much less important to Nietzsche 
than the state of being of the whole man—and those who achieve self-perfection and affirm their own being 
and all eternity, backward and forward, have no thought of the morrow. They want an eternal recurrence out 
of the fullness of their delight in the moment.”  This stands in contradistinction to Kant’s Categorical 115
Imperative, wherein the purpose of moral being, and indeed, of all of the subject, is oriented by and for the 
functional category of reason. Instead, Nietzsche aims at re-orienting the project of life from the Good, the 
Rational or the Just, to the transformation of one’s physis to self-perfection, and in doing so, one becomes an 
affirmation and justification of life and the world, past, present and future. The use of moral principles to 
control and equalise people is an affront to Nietzsche, as it precludes the development of natural power, 
suppressing the spontaneous activity of the drives and weakening the whole person by putting them at a 
distance from the lived world. The Eternal Recurrence is meant to bring one to oscillate between their 
symbolic and natural functions, to collapse and unify them, so that without surrendering symbolic thought, 
one is forever returned to the natural ground of being. Melanie Shepherd explains that “the eternal return as 
an experienced event is a return of the impulses that disrupts the identity of the self-possessed subject that 
would be the ‘author' of thinking, but insofar as its occurrence is one of intelligible thought, it requires that 
the moments of identity be held together in some coherent way."  This notion of an ‘experienced event’ is 116
again remarkably similar to the doctrine of sudden enlightenment in Zen Buddhism, wherein one enters into 
Nirvana only through the subjective experience of satori. Compare Nietzsche’s Eternal Recurrence to this 
description of satori:  
Satori may be defined as an intuitive looking into the nature of things in 
contradistinction to the analytical or logical understanding of it. Practically, it 
means the unfolding of a new world hitherto unperceived in the confusion of a 
dualistically-trained mind … Logically stated, all its opposites and contradictions 
are united and harmonised into a consistent organic whole. This is a mystery and a 
miracle, but according to the Zen masters such is being performed every day. Satori 
can thus be had only through our once personally experiencing it.  117
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 Like satori, the Eternal Recurrence is a subjective, personal experience with a profound, 
transformative effect on one’s relationship to the world. Both experiences are equal parts spiritual and 
metaphysical, disruptive of the dualistic ego and affirmative of the spiritual unity and sublimity of the 
integrated, holistic universe. Suzuki goes so far as to describe satori as a ‘revaluation’ of oneself as a 
spiritual entity.  The linguistic, perceptual and experiential similarities between these two philosophical 118
concepts suggest that satori can be used as a tool to better understand Nietzsche’s most challenging concept. 
While Nietzsche acknowledges having encountered the concept of Eternal Recurrence in Greek and Indian 
literature, particularly having included the subject in his lectures on Pythagoras,  his own formulation of 119
the phenomenon has a distinctive difference, as does satori from the Vedantic theory of rebirth. The core 
difference is the radical re-orientation of the individual into the living moment, and thus the Übermensch, 
like the Bodhisattva, realigns the Will to the moment, rather than existing among the ghosts of the past or the 
pretensions of the future, in effect returning to the primal agency of spontaneous being. 
 The Eternal Recurrence is thus a resolution to the problem identified in The Birth of Tragedy (1872), 
that is, the question of how to justify life. In the transformation accorded by these deeply spiritual and 
metaphysical experiences, one becomes a living affirmation of this life as an immanently immersed and 
spontaneous will, rather than an external judge of the value of life as an abstract concept. Further, life in its 
totality cannot be reduced to any single experience, suffering or otherwise. The shift to tragedy from 
pessimism is a move from monistic reductionism to a non-dual metaphysical and ethical framework. 
Suffering is merely a precondition to Power, a destabilising and disquieting drive that, if not suppressed by 
the rationalisations of the dualistic mind-body divide, is the primary motivator towards self-perfection, the 
Will to Power.   
Conclusion: Nietzsche’s Legacy  
If one were to look to Nietzsche’s philosophy for a direct description of what was needed for an individual or 
society to surpass the malaise of nihilism, one would be met by inevitable disappointment. However, his 
published works in conjunction with his notes, correspondence and lectures, point to a fragile foundation on 
which to move forward. The fragments which we do find are distinctly removed from the authoritative rule 
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of a master race, as was attempted by the Nazi regime in the mid-twentieth century. But as was discussed in 
the previous chapter, the project of Nazism was founded on a distorted interpretation of Nietzsche’s work. 
This chapter has shown the Hellenic and Vedantic influences that pointed Nietzsche towards a possible 
solution to European nihilism. This has been predominantly viewed through two primary lenses: Firstly, the 
re-centralisation of the body as the site of knowledge and philosophy, and second, the metaphysic of non-
duality, a method to syncretise the apparently opposing forces of philosophy, politics and cultural life. 
 This was initially discussed in terms of Nietzsche’s doctoral thesis, The Birth of Tragedy (1872) and 
the syncretism of the Apolline and Dionysian forces in Hellenic tragedy. Further, we know from Nietzsche’s 
correspondence and lecture notes that he was acutely aware of the porous distinction between Greek and 
Indian cultures. In conjunction with the influences of a German climate of excitement for ‘Oriental’ 
literature, the chapter discussed some of the relative merits and errors of Pagan and Buddhist attitudes that 
Nietzsche thought could be incorporated into his new philosophy. Some speculative correlations were made 
between Nietzsche’s criticisms of the limited Buddhist texts he had available to him, and the more explicitly 
bodily and martial forms of Buddhism from China and Japan. Finally, these disparate elements of 
philosophical archaeology were related to Nietzsche’s cosmological and ethical formulations of Eternal 
Recurrence, a philosophical account of our relationship to temporal existence which seeks to break the 
notion of a soporific, idealist history. 
 This study will proceed by examining the continuation of one aspect of Nietzsche’s thought, that is, 
the aesthetic re-orientation of metaphysics and ethics, and the deployment of a non-dual aesthetic perspective 
to transcend nihilistic, hierarchical dualism. To further explore Nietzsche’s philosophical footprint, this 
discussion will turn to those who directly confronted the encroaching nihilism of the rapidly industrialising 
continent of Europe, the modernist artists of the avant-garde. Focussing on the competing visions of the 
Surrealists and the Futurists, we will explore the dualistic and authoritarian tendencies that undermined these 
early attempts to intervene in the dissolution of modern culture.  
Chapter 3: False Prophets of the Avant-garde 
Following Nietzsche’s descent into madness and eventual death at the turn of the Twentieth Century, the 
creeping influence of nihilism was embedding itself more substantially in European society. Wars were 
becoming increasingly mechanised and ignoble, employment was shifting to repetitive and bureaucratic 
busy-work and secular, authoritarian regimes were overthrowing the Divine Rights of Europe’s monarchist 
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past. This chapter will discuss two competing visions of Nietzsche’s philosophy which attempted to respond 
to these shifting social conditions. Both these philosophical responses came from among the avant-garde 
artists of the early modern period. Surrealism and Futurism are two of the most prominent and significant 
trends in early Twentieth Century art, and both had profound effects on the political and social landscape of 
modern Europe. While both movements set out faithfully to overcome the challenges of nihilism, they 
detached from Nietzsche’s projection of the Übermensch and Eternal Recurrence in their adherence to 
dualistic ideological regimes. Surrealism, which submitted to the dialectical materialism of Trotskian 
communism, and Futurism, which eventually came to provide the aesthetic underpinning of Italian, and later 
German, Fascism would come to further the entrenchment of nihilism, rather than averting it. Rather than 
affirming the value of life in the industrial age, the projects of Surrealism and Futurism would give primacy 
to the dream and the machine, not in a non-dual affirmation of life, but  would always put these values as a 
hierarchical master of the modern lived experience.  
Nietzsche, Freud and the Aesthetics of the Dream-World  
Surrealism occupies the space of one of the most recognisable movements within the project of avant-garde 
art. As a whole, the school of Surrealism is primarily concerned with the aesthetic impulses that lie beneath 
our formal and conceptual interpretations of reality. André Breton, the founder of the surrealist movement of 
the European avant-garde, was undoubtedly aware of Nietzsche’s philosophy although perhaps late and 
indirectly: his friend and colleague Michel Carrouges had written a book on Nietzsche in 1948.  However, 120
the most visceral impact of Nietzsche’s thought came to surrealism through the interpretation of Sigmund 
Freud, who, even if not explicitly, widely diffused many of Nietzsche’s observations through the 
methodology of psychoanalysis. Of notable interest, Freud had largely adopted Nietzsche’s notion that 
“every person is an artist in their dreams” and integrated the idea into his theories and clinical practice.  121
While Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (1899) does not directly reference Nietzsche, there are many 
obvious similarities. Like Nietzsche, Freud associates the intense sensations of the dream to corresponding 
physical sensations of the body, though Freud attributes this observation to Aristotle;  much is made of the 122
prophetic logic the ancients applied to the dream state;  and several references are made to German literary 123
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figures Friedrich Schelling and Friedrich Schiller, who had featured prominently in Nietzsche’s writing.  124
Conceptually, the Super-Ego mirrors the Übermensch image of the artist, at the very least in its situation as a 
metaphysical “higher self”. Further, Nietzsche’s identification of the symbolic middle world as the 
psychological space wherein the art symbols of tragedy existed, has a continuity reminiscent of Freud, as 
Julien Levy explains, “asserting that dream and the subconscious have existence and are interactive with 
reality.”   125
 Freud would have encountered many of the theories presented in the last two chapters when he 
participated in the “Reading Club of the German Students of Vienna”, in which the works of Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche were regular topics for discussion.  In some ways, his admiration for empiricism and the 126
scientific method brings Freud closer to the physiological aspects of Nietzsche’s work, but the extent to 
which Freud participates in the ongoing non-dual aesthetic revaluation is minimal, as he engaged in the 
hierarchical arrangement of the drives, placing in particular the sexual drive above the others as the central 
principle dictating people’s unconscious behaviour. Nietzsche had repudiated such a reduction early in 
Beyond Good and Evil (1886), claiming that the Will to Power was present in all drives, and “each one of 
them would be only too glad to present itself as the ultimate goal of existence and as the legitimate master of 
all the other drives."  This differentiation can be seen in each thinker’s approach to the tragic stage. Freud 127
turns his attention famously to the Oedipal plays, the crowning jewel of Attic Tragedy, although contrary to 
Nietzsche’s assertion of coalesced and highly intricate symbol histories, Freud asserts “the profound and 
universal validity of the old legends is explicable only by an equally universal validity of the … hypothesis 
of infantile psychology.”  Jettisoning the Apolline and Dionysian aesthetic principles, the Oedipal tragedy 128
is explained in terms of the wish fulfilment of the dream, whereby the child-poet simultaneously resolves the 
desires to kill the father and bed the mother, “the deepest stratum of impulses in the mind of the creative 
poet.”  The artwork, or other higher cultural attainment, is considered by Freud a sublimation of these 129
sexual and destructive impulses, though his methodology leaves very little distinction between genius and 
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neuroses,  whereas Ken Gemes notes, “the Nietzschean solution to the problem of differentiating 130
sublimation from pathological symptoms may be summed up in the slogan that sublimations involve 
integration or unification, while pathological symptoms involve splitting off or disintegration, as we might 
call it,”  The links between the Id, Dionysus and sublimation were identified early in the literature of 131
psychoanalysis,  but the failure in Freud’s account is inherent in Nietzsche’s rejection of a priori 132
universalism, that is, the assumed universally valid outcomes of the static theory. Nietzsche’s non-dual 
account of aesthetic and social phenomena explicitly indicated that sublimation would perpetually change, 
merge and divide the drives of the individual, in a constant flux of competing drives carried by competing 
people.  
 However, the absence of Nietzsche’s genealogy of Classical Greek art, played a distinct advantage 
for the disciples of Freud’s psychodynamics, the surrealist artists of the European avant-garde. Free from the 
associations of moral and aesthetic inheritance, the surrealists were able to actively and experimentally 
investigate the human condition through the direct application of consciousness and cleaved through many of 
the West’s assumptions about the divide between objective and subjective truth.  
To live as we dream 
The Surrealist movement took up the challenge Nietzsche offered:  “Either we have no dreams, or our 
dreams are interesting. We should learn to arrange our waking life in the same way: nothing or 
interesting.”  From the salted earth of the Dada revolution, the Surrealists arise to affirm the primacy of the 133
moment over history, intuition over logic and metaphysical abandonment in the face of a society enthralled 
by materialistic causation. André Breton contended that Freud’s analysis of the unconscious processes of the 
mind provided a foundation for the human experience that could take precedence over positivist realism, 
which “stultifies both science and art by assiduously flattering the lowest of tastes; clarity bordering on 
stupidity, a dog’s life.”  Breton’s conception of the dream symbol is derived from the unconscious, the 134
immediate linguistic revelations and dream images produced by the uninhibited and unrestricted mind. 
Trained in medicine, Breton’s experiences with traumatised soldiers from the First World War led him to the 
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practice of psychoanalysis and after adopting Freud’s methodology, Surrealism grew as a scientific, medical 
study to discover the nature of inspiration.  Among these scientific experiments was the practice of 135
automatic writing, in which symbols of significance are derived by the “marvellous” effect of unprompted 
linguistic juxtaposition.  The parallel to Nietzsche’s aesthetics is clear: Breton had sought to discover 136
opposing aesthetic symbols and of their beauty “poetically speaking, what strikes you about them above all is 
their extreme degree of immediate absurdity.”  Breton’s surrealist practice seeks to defy the view that no 137
rule can be given to art, and to develop methodologies that give form to unconscious will.  
 Breton was consistently authoritarian as “he maintained the surrealists as a functioning group, a 
political, aesthetic, creative social organism.”  In some ways his obsession with keeping the movement 138
pure to his own aims became fractious, but with the Dionysian genie out of the bottle, surrealist artists such 
as Salvador Dali, Rene Magritte and others expanded the influence of the group outside of his control.  139
Nevertheless, Breton’s manifestoes and poetry exemplify the role of art as a direct philosophical practice. 
This philosophical practice of surrealism was a dialectical challenge to logical positivism, using image and 
symbol to depict the illusory nature of realism grounded in historical, mechanical causation. By giving form 
in material space to perceptions which are internal and subjective, “surrealist painting and construction have 
now permitted the organisation of perceptions with an objective tendency around subjective elements.”  In 140
considering the art object as a direct representation of subjectivity in terms of objectivity the surrealist calls 
on the similar subjectivity inherent in our perception: just as that which is internal can only be externally 
represented in external forms, externality can only be internally represented with internal forms, prejudiced 
by our inherent perspectival limitations. Philosophically, Breton sees ‘Surrealist Objects’ as “dialectically 
reconciling these two terms - perception and representation.”  This dialectical reconciliation is not spelled 141
out in the logical progression of linguistic definitions, but is argued through phenomenological art practice, 
which can be clearly elucidated in the representative forms that the movement adhered to. 
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 This dialectical reconciliation was attempted by surrealist artists with two distinct, broad approaches 
to the practice. The first of these two techniques attempts to sublimate perception and representation by way 
of exploiting the conventions of visual representation in painting or sculpture, and then to use these illusions 
to undermine the perceptual primacy of realist representation, giving form to surreal or unconscious 
perceptions.  The surrealist painters, while using the representational techniques of realism, the image of 142
natural beauty and harmonious forms are jettisoned, preferring to “teach us to interpret the world through 
different eyes, to enjoy a return to archaic or esoteric models, the universe of dreams."  The superiority of 143
this method over the traditional logical-linguistic path to truth, is that it does not derive meaning but rather 
demonstrates it directly in terms that do not depend on, but subvert concepts. The representational surrealists 
conflate beauty and grotesqueness, form and concept, inner and outer, and confound the reason of the 
audience by clarifying truth and meaning through contradiction, using nonsensical imagery to produce what 
they considered to be existential certainties.  
 This philosophical approach can be contrasted with “the second type of surrealist practice [which] 
has no clear representational function but is, rather, the use of materials by artists either during a trance or 
without a clear representational plan.”  This kind of focus is more consistent with Breton’s early 144
experiments in automatic writing, but like the movement of Surrealism itself, the technique found a life of its 
own. One of the clearest examples of this kind of art practice is the Found Object, historically associated 
with Marcel Duchamp in relation to the surrealists. “Of course, underlying such selections there is an 
intention to provoke, but also the persuasion that every object (even the lowest variety) has formal aspects 
that we rarely pay any attention to. As soon as they are singled out, ‘focused’ and offered to our attention, 
these objects take on an aesthetic significance, as if they had been manipulated by the hand of an author.”  145
This type of art practice seeks to force the audience to confront their culturally inherent assumptions about 
beauty, representation and the role of art, highlighting the preferential treatment attached to art as a 
historically loaded phenomenon. Another example of this can be seen in the paintings of Yves Tanguy, which 
are reminiscent of “little windows opening upon an immense and desolate desert-landscape of dream.”  146
Tanguy’s paintings call attention to the perception of object through the surreal counter-representation of 
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space. These representations are of course loaded with diverse historical, social and personal concepts, as 
“whereas space for Dali became terrible, for Tanguy it is both intimate and eternal, consoling and 
inevitable.”   147
 In both classes of surrealist painting, pro- and counter-representational, the significance of the 
artwork is a naturalistic phenomenon. Further, Surrealist art dispels the inherited associations and concepts of 
history, replacing them with a meaning that is consistent with the needs and drives of the present moment. 
The next section will discuss how these artistic elements of interpretation and representation were developed 
into an attempt at a cohesive philosophy for both politics and people.  
Philosophical Surreality 
The philosophical intent of the Surrealist movement is explicitly expounded in Breton’s Surrealist 
Manifestoes. In the first manifesto of 1924, he includes a general definition of the term, followed by an 
‘encyclopaedic’ definition of the movement’s philosophy. The general definition is noted as a noun, and 
describes the state of psychic automatism itself, much like the contemplative attitudes of religious practice, 
such as devotional prayer, or the Buddhist mental state of Nirvana. It is within the context of this 
psychological openness that automatic writing was taking place, emulating the selfless, Buddhistic absence 
of ego which in turn signals “the absence of any control exercised by reason.”  Formally, the comparison is 148
purely illustrative, but the taste for ‘Oriental and Primitive’ modes of knowledge was far-reaching. However, 
Surrealism, is not an attempt to Orientalise the world of Western Art, and it would be a speculative 
extrapolation to assert Nirvana and Surrealism as analogous, especially when Breton had declared all 
instances of absolute surrealism as the acts of modern Europeans. The mental state of surrealism is notably 
not a contemplative state, but an attempted communication of a pure subjective experience beyond the scope 
of language. Levy contends that “The function of the poet or artist is to communicate the immaculate 
primary concept. He cannot attempt to explain his intuition, but by means of the appropriate, penetrating and 
poignant symbol he arouses a corresponding intuition in others .” The rote rendering of harmonious or 149
precise representation does nothing to arouse the passionate drives of the audience, and as Breton argues, it 
betrays direct intersubjectivity for “aesthetic or moral concern.”  In freeing art from the historical baggage 150
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of formal aesthetics, Breton envisages the end of artistic elitism, as the illusions of morality are stripped 
down before the eyes of the people.  
 This leads into Breton’s encyclopaedic, philosophical definition of Surrealism which outlines the 
metaphysics of surrealism as “the superior reality of certain forms of previously neglected associations, in 
the omnipotence of dream, in the disinterested play of thought.”  The reference to disinterestedness is a 151
clear parallel to Kant’s desire to affirm an absolute quality as the foundation of artistic judgement, but this 
absolute quality differs from Kant’s on the basis of it’s naturalism. While it is fair to say that “Surrealism is 
inevitably opposed to naturalism, the pedestrian rendering of tangible fact”  this is only true aesthetically. 152
To say that the surrealists did not consider the dream a “natural” phenomenon is an assumption that lies 
beyond their methodology. With the notable exception of the absolute primacy of the dream, the Surrealist 
metaphysic is more akin to Nietzsche’s non-dual, physiological naturalism, which incorporates psychology, 
spiritualism and abstraction as part of natural phenomena. The surrealists who “valued literary and visual 
representations based on hallucinations, dreams, nightmares and other manifestations of the unconscious”  153
took the first of these significant manifestations from a physiologically based version of psychiatric practice.  
 When Breton makes reference to a superior reality it is not in the sense of a mythological realm or 
otherworldly dimension, but the superiority of the immediacy of internal experience over mediated sense 
experience. Surreality is exalted for the same reasons the Greeks had distrusted music, the direct experience 
of emotion, desire and drives; “the involvement they imply in the soul of the listener."  In this way, the 154
movement of Surrealism was a largely phenomenological philosophy, concerned with the nature of 
experience, both prior to and beyond an external codified reality. Realism is the assumption that the world 
itself is objectively true, while philosophical “formulations [of surrealism] basically express the same idea 
that a theory is successful because the world behaves as if it is true.”  Contrary to object-ontological 155
perspectives, surrealism is defined as a behaviour itself and Surrealists would argue that the perception-
representation of ‘reality’ is also itself a behaviour. Surrealism as a philosophy seeks to identify, through 
juxtaposition, subjective perceptual notions, in a kind of aesthetic project with a similar purpose to the goal 
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orientation study of German-English bilinguals discussed in Chapter Two.  Unlike the reflective method of 156
logical-positivism, surrealism is an active, praxis based philosophy pursuing sublimation of subject-object 
relations through a dialectical resolution of representation-presentation. This leads to the role that Surrealists 
saw themselves playing in the project of revaluating all values, to restore meaning to the lives of 
industrialised subjects.  
Surrealism and the Project of Revaluation 
While there are evidently critical similarities between Surrealist practice and the image of Nietzsche’s 
‘philosopher of the future’, there are also immense failings in the transformation into a non-dual aesthetic 
perspective. The movement clearly interacts with aesthetic principles of opposing forces, and reconciles 
them into an image that destabilises the objectivity of the ego. It validates the truth value of subjective 
experiences, the dream world and implores us to see the aesthetic activity inherent in our every day 
perception. The Surrealists had declared an aesthetic and intellectual war on the orthodoxies of traditional 
knowledge. However, Breton’s authoritarian tendencies undermined the apparent freedom of expression that 
Surrealism proposed to expound. At the outset of the Second Manifesto of Surrealism (1930), Breton asserts 
the following: 
 
In spite of the various efforts peculiar to each of those who used to claim kinship 
with Surrealism, or who still do, one must ultimately admit that, more than 
anything else, Surrealism attempted to provoke, from the intellectual and moral 
point of view, an attack of conscience, of the most general and serious kind, and 
that the extent to which this was or was not accomplished alone can determine its 
historical success or failure.  157
 At face value, this view conforms largely to the revaluation project, in that it has as its central goal 
the disruption of habitually instituted orthodox truths, and certainties about the moral and objective truth of 
shared waking reality. Further, the claim is made that the test of this project is in its historical impact on the 
lived world. One can see parallels to aphorism 220 in Human, All Too Human (1878) where Nietzsche levels 
a similar criticism at the great artists of history as the Surrealists, arguing that “artists glorify mankind’s 
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religious and philosophical errors, and they could not have done so without believing in their absolute 
truth.”  However, Breton condemned the Surrealists to the same glorification of error, as he attempted to 158
manipulate and control the terms of artistic expression, and to bring about the same mode of consciousness 
in all modern minds. In this sense, the surrealist project aimed not so much at the generative power of 
aesthetic conflicts, but rather attempted to subsume the rational into the surreal as a resolution of that 
conflict.  
 This instigation of a universal rule of art is the undoing of non-duality in Surrealist practice. The rule 
in question is an adherence to the principle of dialectical materialism, partly due to the counter-traditional 
drive “to put an end to idealism properly speaking.”  The means of production that Breton wishes 159
Surrealism to seize is the production of aesthetic realities, within the new materialism of historical necessity. 
Breton saw himself as a pillar of certainty among the drifting currents of French Communism, and like a 
Party Czar, he was ruthless in suppressing any deviation from the official line. He wrote explicitly that 
“Surrealism considers itself ineluctably linked … to the movement of Marxist thought and to that movement 
alone,”  breaking the reflective cycle of self-affirmation in the Eternal Recurrence and subsuming the will 160
into theoretical ideology. The revolt in Surrealist practice is ultimately a revolution in that it attempts to 
substitute a new social order for the one that it overthrows: such a practice is antithetical to the Übermensch, 
as it seeks to establish a rule to direct a person’s life, rather than allowing them the freedom to affirm, 
overcome and actively create their own existence. Thus Surrealism is posited against the lived world, and if a 
contradiction arises, it must be resolved in favour of the ideological proclivities, and further institutionalises 
nihilism by separating the living person from meaning and abstracting it to the level of history. This life-
denying tendency is not limited, however, to Breton’s Surrealist movement. Another movement of the avant-
garde gave form to the tenuous link between Nietzsche’s thought and the Nazi political party. The mediation 
came through Italian fascism and the attempted revaluation project of the Italian Futurists.  
Futurism: the End of the Past 
Surrealism developed concurrently alongside another European avant-garde movement which came to be 
known as Futurism. Founded in 1909, this socio-aesthetic political force was constructed on the profound 
social influence of industrialisation and the advent of the machine in the early Twentieth Century. Filippo 
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Marinetti, “an avid reader of Nietzsche”  and sheltered by his family’s nouveau riche status, he enjoyed 161
some success as a poet but came to resent the political obstructions to Italy’s languishing imperial and 
industrial development. Seeking to overthrow the echoes of the Roman Empire, Marinetti plotted his course 
to a bold, modern Italy through the trajectory of the aesthetics of the machine, namely speed, dynamism and 
violence. These attributes, along with a dismissive attitude towards the past, passivity and femininity, formed 
the core ideology of the futurist artists. Aesthetically, the Futurist artists were strongly influenced by the 
French Cubists  but the politics of the Futurists leapt into confrontation, and Marinetti’s Founding and 162
Manifesto of Futurism (1909) was an attempt to reclaim Italy’s former prestige as a cultural power. Breton’s 
approach to governing the Surrealist movement seems to have provided a model for Marinetti; that is, his 
authoritarianism and political ambition, the deployment of multi-lingual manifestoes, as well as the poetic 
beginnings of a movement which would come to be dominated by the visual arts. Further, the Futurists’ 
grounding of their art in the sciences of physics and mechanical engineering mirrors the Surrealists drawing 
on scientific expansions in psychology and anthropology. Critically, both sought to artistically represent the 
emerging experiences of the modern world.  
 Futurism, like its European avant-garde rival Surrealism, adopted aesthetic principles with an 
approach of philosophical-artistic praxis, and anchored their machine modality in a foundational 
phenomenology of temporal experience. This phenomenology was further influential on Marinetti’s political 
ideals, prompting him to call for his own overthrow, “When we are forty, other younger and stronger men 
will probably throw us in the wastebasket like useless manuscripts, we want it to happen!”  Italy’s political 163
glory was historically tied to the Roman Empire, and after the embarrassing loss of Italy’s colonial imperial 
holdings in Ethiopia, the memories of Rome faded into mythology. Marinetti and his Futurist artists sought 
to abandon this existential reliance on the past, declaring that “Futurism, the rebellion of the life of intuition 
and feeling, quivering and impetuous spring, declares inexorable war on doctrines, individuals and works 
that repeat, prolong or exalt the past at the expense of the future.”  These extreme, anti-traditionalist 164
politics reflect a metaphysical shift away from a relativity in relation to a defined reference, and towards a 
contextual relativity, as “Futurist time is dependent less upon an observer than on a sense of collective 
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experience.”  While such a conception of time is a radical break from the a priori driven metaphysics of 165
the European Enlightenment, it puts Futurism largely in line with other prominent movements of the 
European Continent in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Foucault and Derrida, revolutionary thinkers who believed that the fluctuating nature of experience required 
a constantly self-redefining, contextually relative vocabulary. The Futurists present a demonstration, as the 
Surrealists did, that “the founders of the historical avant-gardes were aesthetic ironists, and they proceeded 
much in the way that Rorty’s post-Hegelian philosophers do. They began by articulating a vocabulary, one 
they viewed as innovative, original, dedicated to self-creation, and aimed at overcoming the ‘anxiety of 
influence’. This vocabulary almost always preceded and oriented the production of art, rather than the other 
way round.”  This shows that while arguing for an engagement with physiological sources of meaning, the 166
avant-garde movements were in fact invoking pre-conceived and reactive values, silent premises that 
underpinned their aesthetic projects.  
 While Marinetti’s aims were largely political and his philosophy revolutionary, he aimed to use the 
Futurists as an artistic front to culturally disseminate his confrontational doctrine. Futurist paintings 
categorically reject the notion of portraying a singular moment of time from a privileged perspective, opting 
rather to construct images which represent motion and speed, such as Umberto Boccioni’s ‘The City 
Rises’ (1910), or to confound the individual subjectivity of perspective as in Gino Severini’s ‘Visual 
Synthesis of the Idea “War”’ (1914). These paintings combine and radicalise many existing aesthetic 
techniques and synthesise unique innovations, “They took the Impressionist preoccupation with the machine, 
the railroad and the industrial transformation of the urban/suburban environment, and combined it with the 
pictorial inventions of the Cubists to invent a synthetic urban art that is highly rhythmic and infused with the 
energy of rapidly moving time.”  The ability to translate poetic conceptions of ontological and 167
metaphysical experience from their origins in manifesto into visual representations would be replicated 
further into other forms of political and aesthetic expression,  demonstrating a clear ambition to translate 168
phenomenological experience into a semiotic representation. Futurist time is akin to Surrealist 
consciousness, or Nietzschean history; not an a priori or definite singular experience, but rather responsive 
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phenomenologies, contingent on context and reactive to human input. The relativity of time was established 
in the field of physics at the dawn of the Twentieth Century, and Futurist temporal relativity was similarly 
framed by Marinetti in terms of speed: “Time and space died yesterday. We already live in the absolute, 
because we have created eternal, omnipresent speed .” The relativity of time is of course not a unified 169
theory across physics and art, but even as an everyday experience, the rapidly industrialising societies of 
Europe were in transition from intercontinental travel taking a matter of months to hours. Scorning the 
theorisation of relativity into an academic system, Marinetti and his Futurist followers entreated the public to 
utilise this and other evolving industrial experiences in aesthetic terms translatable into political affirmations.  
Movement, Dynamism and the Machine 
To understand the form that this Futurist modality took, one need only look at the aesthetic representations in 
Futurist art. Marinetti’s poem Zang Tumb Tumb (1914) uses the imitation of machine phenomena to construct 
a hymn to the new machine. According to Robert Brain, “Onomatopoeia emerged as the unavoidable 
medium of dictation from the technological soundscape. Following the laws of onomatopoeia, the material 
body of the word mimicked the essence of the referent—this was the passage through the door opened by the 
phonetic investigations of the vers-libristes."  If poetry could take on the likeness of a referent by 170
mimicking that referent’s characteristic phenomena, a physiologically oriented phenomenology would seek 
to extrapolate this process to other conceptual and abstracted frameworks, such as the ego-self or the state. In 
diverse forms of representation, Marinetti’s movement sought to infuse Italian society with a fundamental 
unified symbol: “The Futurist’s mischievous modernism was not only a brash enthusiasm for machinery, it 
embraced everything which augmented, or came with, the machine.”   171
 In ‘Dynamism of a Dog on a Leash', 1912, Giacomo Balla uses the traditional visual medium of 
painting to interpretively reference chronophotographic studies of movement by Etienne-Jules Marey. These 
chronophotographs of human locomotion illustrate a very scientific perception of people and their behaviour, 
which Balla extracted to convey a newly emerging and mechanical sense of bodily function and movement. 
Christine Poggi states that, “the artist wanted to engage in specifically modern subjects, and to do so in 
visual terms that were informed by science.”  The subject of this painting, the dog, was considered a very 172
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modern luxury during the time. Thus Balla begins to instil a sense of the mechanical in bodies previously 
perceived as organic and, as Poggi continues, “introduced a distinct element of mechanicity and repetition to 
his art.”  173
 Central to the Futurist conception of the value and power of the machine was speed, strongly tied to 
the metaphysics of time and the accelerated industrialisation of Europe. “We affirm that the world’s 
magnificence has been enriched by a new beauty: the beauty of speed.”  In his 1913 ‘Dynamism of a 174
Cyclist’, Umberto Boccioni uses the interaction between the body and the machine to convey the experience 
of movement and velocity. The bicycle was seen as a liberating device that embodied freedom and individual 
judgment; it was a type of hybrid between the human and the machine. A sense of this hybrid is evident in 
the work’s preliminary sketches where the cyclist and bicycle are recognisable, yet partially fused together. 
However, in the conclusive painting it is almost impossible to distinguish not only the master from his 
machine, in the aesthetic and metaphorical sense, but also the subject from the energy it emits. Poggi states, 
“The volumes of this body generate smaller currents and flows of air”  and through this, the figure and its 175
surroundings inevitably become unified. The finished work is so abstract, it becomes dependent on contrast 
of colour and varied tone to maintain a conceivable figure and action.  Boccioni’s work embodies the 176
sensation of speed and movement in a more exhilarating manner than Balla’s, further detaching from the 
traditional aesthetic of painting and embracing the mechanical form.  
 As the First World War took hold of Continental Europe, the futurists became increasingly enthralled 
with masculinity, heroism, machinery and the exhilaration of battle. Gino Severini was particularly 
enthusiastic about celebratory representations of the aggressive connotations of war. One such painting, 
‘Armoured Train in Action’ (1915), was derived from a photograph of a Belgian armoured train which 
depicted an overhead view of the train and its soldiers’ aiming rifles towards an unseen enemy. The thrills of 
speed become subordinate to these more base and all too human impulses, but as the industrial machine 
changed the face of warfare, the masculine underpinnings of war mythology are also incorporated into the 
machine aesthetic. Severini repositioned the train in his painting slightly to portray a “distinctly phallic 
shape.”  In altering the photograph, he also eliminated any soldiers not actively participating in the action; 177
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for those who are, Severini melds them together with the train. The soldiers and their rifles become 
appendages of the train, following a trend of fusion between man and machine. The train adopts phallic 
imagery and the soldiers become uniform and mechanised, thus becoming participants in an exchange 
between organic and mechanical.  Similar to the Boccioni, the train’s energy and movement engulfs its 178
environment in resonating expulsions of energy. It becomes rather an atmosphere of speed and adrenaline, 
and physicality becomes exempt from the experience.  
Aside from this privileged depiction of the machine, the painting itself originates from a photograph, as 
product of a machine. The technology of the camera influenced painters in how they perceived time and 
space,  and Severini is actively bringing to prominence the perspective of a machine through the artistic 179
depiction of a photograph, but of course the humanly ideological elements of the painting are given 
precedence over the machine created image. Crouch states, “Photography was to alter both ways of seeing 
the world and the way that it was represented in the arts and sciences.”  It is evident in discrepancies 180
between Severini’s ‘Armoured Train in Action’ and the photograph from which it was derived that there are 
distinct differences between the realistic portrayal of the world in photography and subjective foundations of 
painting. The Futurists however were more concerned with the interaction between humanity and the world 
of machines than with absolute imitation, and indeed the privileged concepts in Futurist philosophy and art 
are significant for their metaphorical resonance rather than their formal accuracy. Further, the depiction of 
the present (or arguably the past) as through the use of the mechanical photograph was antithetical to the 
future oriented political ambitions of the movement.  
Machine Being and Italian Fascism 
The machine aesthetic employed by the Futurist artists had been consciously constructed with the intent to 
rouse Italy into an imperialist fervour. Marinetti’s political ambitions were parochial, in both a historical and 
geographical sense, seeking to have his own glorious new Italy destroyed by a newer, more powerful 
machine, generation after generation being an improved and refined model of empire. Marinetti used the 
aesthetics of Futurist Art to inject the energy of industrial growth into Italian society and his motivations 
successfully infiltrated and united sympathisers from across the political spectrum and subsequently was the 
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catalyst in crucial changes at the highest levels of the ruling elite.  The movement would come to be 181
hijacked and subservient to Italian Fascism under Benito Mussolini, much as Nietzsche had been by the 
Nazis in Germany, and this stigma remained to suppress inquiry into Futurism.  The violence with which 182
Marinetti approached both art and politics made it particularly susceptible to nationalistic fascism, even in its 
earliest founding manifesto “Except in struggle, there is no more beauty … Poetry must be conceived as a 
violent attack on unknown forces.”  However, Marinetti’s political ambitions were categorically separate 183
from the Italian Fascist government, and the intoxicated frenzy with which Futurism embedded itself in 
Italian politics was equally an intoxicated lack of control. While Marinetti was not a Fascist, the Italian 
Fascist Party fulfilled the revolutionary overthrow of Futurism, enacted the conquest of Rome’s former 
colonies in North Africa and wholeheartedly dispensed with stifled tradition. 
 The professed aims of fascist culture in Italy were almost indistinguishable from those of the 
Futurists: Fascist proponent Balbino Giuliano, who wrote a book on Italian Fascism in 1929 thought that “to 
animate Italians with Fascist culture meant, … to compel them to recognise that what the new Italy required 
was accelerated capital accumulation, industrial production, economic modernisation, effective access to raw 
materials, colonial expansion, and the creation of enhanced defence capabilities.”  This call to arms is 184
hauntingly similar to the dreams of Marinetti’s founding manifesto, but it is worth mentioning that while 
prominent Futurist Renato Bertelli produced an official portrait of Mussolini, professing an allegiance or 
affinity to Futurism was at no point a requirement in Italian Fascist society.  One could say that Marinetti 185
fell into the same trap which Nietzsche saw ensnaring the proto-Nazi nationalism of Wagner, in that 
“Marinetti was utterly manipulated by the Fascists, promoted, used and finally discard when the complete 
machinery of their ideology took hold of the country.”  Within this institutional manipulation, the central 186
point of interest is the link between the fascist citizen and the physiological performance of the machine 
aesthetic. In 1905, four years prior to the founding of Futurism, Mario Morasso wrote a text in which he 
“could only envision the revival of a preindustrial notion of heroism, of ‘antica virtus,’ through an embrace 
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of the machine as a model of self-transfiguration.”  The Futurist aesthetic and political vision is based on 187
merely a subset of machines although it silences the attributes of, for example, static or computational 
machines, giving preference to those machines which exemplified war and speed. This interplay of silence 
and privilege resulted in a social and political context whereby justice became subservient to power, as in 
Marinetti’s declaration that: “injustice, strong and sane, will break out radiantly in their eyes. Art, in fact, can 
be nothing but violence, cruelty and injustice.”  The Futurists used this ideological foundation to posit the 188
Man-Machine hybrid as equal to Nietzsche’s Übermensch.   189
 The Man-Machine of the Futurists is embodied in the physical concept of a human fused with 
machine, the will and ego of an organic being incorporated into the indestructible form of steel, exemplifying 
power and speed, an immortal and future-oriented entity. While predating the widespread deployment of 
Freud’s psychodynamics, the Futurists shared a belief in a projected ego-entity which was at once physical, 
psychic and cognitively active.  The principal danger involved in adopting a performative philosophy with 190
predefined ideological privileges is that creeping influence of the connotative and hidden influences of the 
associated metaphor. In the case of the Futurist Man-Machine, the silenced machine characteristic of 
automation is unaccounted for, as are the consequences of becoming an individual in the violent and speed-
oriented “automatic” incarnation of the self. The effects of automated thinking through obedience and the 
exportation of action and violence to mechanical mediums can be viewed by illustrative analogy to the 
infamous Milgram Experiment (1963), wherein authoritarian pressure and material distance were shown as a 
powerful inducement to extreme acts of violence.  On Italy’s doorstop in Continental Europe, the lengths of 191
mechanised warfare were pushed ad absurdum in the event which came to be known as the Holocaust, 
whereby “Italy is placed in an ambiguous position, since Italian Fascism stands as the principal precursor and 
model for Nazism and indeed for all modern totalitarianisms.”  As in the Milgram Experiment, where an 192
individual adopting the performative role of experimental subject abandons agency, the Holocaust showed 
the extent to which whole societies will abandon agency under the auspices of a nationalistic totalitarianism. 
Intended to return Italy to a new imperial glory, the Futurist obsession with a selectively interpreted model of 
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industrial machinery was a spiritual successor to systemic and industrially powered mass murder. This is of 
course not to say that Marinetti and his Futurist compatriots were proponents of, or even envisioned the 
possibility of industrial genocide, and the same reductive charge of proto-Nazism has already been discussed 
in relation to Nietzsche. But this does highlight the profound ramifications of a powerfully enacted 
performative philosophy, to the point that even if one dismisses the writings of Elizabeth Förster-
Nietzsche,  Marinetti helped forge yet another unintentional link between the Übermensch and the 193
Holocaust.  
 While the Futurists were a political art movement in their own right, separate from the core of 
Fascism in Europe,  their pursuit of a physiologically performative philosophy inspired by the aesthetics of 194
the machine and speed inevitably came to a violent overthrow. The Futurists were ‘tossed into the 
wastebasket’ as they had wished, but the imperial fervour, anti-traditionalism and bloodlust that their work 
aimed to instil in the Italian cultural psyche became the foundation for first Italian Fascism and subsequently 
Nazism. The Machine-Man came to embody the automated factory worker more so than the glorious engine 
hero, to the detriment of not only the Italian peninsula but also the broader world community.  
Conclusion: Revaluations and Devaluations 
This chapter has sought to present the modernist avant-garde art movements as both a reaction to, and 
complicit in, the development of the nihilist age in Europe; Surrealism and Futurism engaged with a 
disconnect from traditional values and shifted into an aesthetic philosophy of performative and physiological 
value structures. However, due to their inability to externally justify these values, and the drive to establish 
them by authoritarian power, enabled the self destruction of these movements, and in highlighting the 
dissolution of traditional culture, they came to accelerate the dissemination of nihilism in the modern 
European consciousness.  
 Surrealism engaged with many of Nietzsche’s prominent ideas, often through the distorted lens of 
Freud’s implicit inclusion of Nietzschean psychology in his works. The Surrealists took up Nietzsche’s 
emphasis on the primacy of the dream as a source of meaning, as well as a broadly physiological account of 
psychology and a significant engagement with individual perspective. The Futurists encountered a different 
version of the Nietzschean project of revaluation, focussing on the development of a physiologically 
mechanised ‘new man’ for the developing age of industrialisation. Attaching to Nietzsche’s philosophy of 
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power and advocation for warlike cultures, the Futurists took these aspects out of their non-dual context and 
were eventually subsumed and dissolved into the destructive regimes of European fascism. Both Surrealism 
and Futurism betrayed the self-affirmation of the Eternal Recurrence by submitting themselves to ideological 
regimes. While many other avant-garde movements had a profound aesthetic impact on Europes’ modern 
age, and ostensibly all could be considered responses to nihilism, the revaluations attempted by avant-garde 
aesthetics were positioned in terms of historicist and absolutist dialectics, rather than the non-dual 
‘generative opposites’ of Nietzsche’s philosophy. In this sense, they came to be a part of the dialectical 
progression to nihilism, rather than a bulwark against it.  
 The revaluation of values was seen by some within the avant garde as required to overcome the 
advent of the nihilistic age during, and immediately after the horrors of World War Two. This study will now 
turn to a European outsider, a spiritual successor of Nietzsche who embodied the values of the ancients and 
embraced the potential value generation of a faithful encounter with the Absurd condition of nihilism. Albert 
Camus, as a fiercely independent thinker, will be discussed as the exemplar and torch-bearer of Nietzsche’s 
call to self-affirmation in the Twentieth Century.  
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Act 2: The Immanent Metaphysics of Albert 
Camus 
 
Chapter 4: Christian and Pagan Souls 
Religion plays a contentious role in Camus scholarship, a side of his thought which is often left untreated in 
favour of his more active, political and historical themes. Often teetering between dismissive repudiations 
and an endearing nostalgia, his writing on the topic is seemingly fraught with contradiction and sweeping 
generalisations: for example, in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), Camus both repudiates the faith of 
Kierkegaard as a betrayal of absurd reason, and in a later chapter presents the possibility of a logic that 
connects suicide to the divinity of Christ.   This does, however, present a vacuum of understanding in an 195
area which preoccupied Camus greatly.  Camus’ view of religion presents genealogically, in which 196
symbolic narratives serve to disclose moral knowledge within a culture, and much like Nietzsche’s 
revaluation of values, his study of the topic aimed to elaborate precisely what it is from the history of 
religious thought that can serve humanity in a time very far divorced from its mystic origins. I have chosen 
to begin this discussion of Camus on the topic of religion for several key reasons. Firstly, theology and 
religious thought more predominantly occupy his early writings, including his own thesis Christian 
Metaphysics and Neoplatonism (1935), and religious themes and language are foregrounded in his earliest 
lyrical essays, including the collections The Wrong Side and the Right Side (1937) and Nuptials (1938). 
Further, the demystification of society and the lack of a moral foundation without religion was the driving 
motive which spurred Nietzsche’s revaluation of values, and it is under these conditions of an ‘Age of 
Nihilism’ that Camus sees the moral landscape of the modern world unfolding. Finally, many of the themes 
of this non-dualist study are more clearly delineated in religious terms, notably in Eastern phenomenological, 
praxis-based traditions. This chapter will argue that Camus envisioned religious discourse as conforming to 
interdependent metaphysical polarities, for example the contestation between piety and heresy, or the 
relationship between the immanent and the transcendent or the mundane and the divine. The non-duality of 
classic religious discourse will be presented as a model for Camus’ later philosophy and political activism.  
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 To explore these topics, the current chapter will begin where Camus’ own academic work did, on the 
theme of Christian metaphysics and its relationship to Greek thought, with a particular focus on the emergent 
interdependence of faith and knowledge, as well as the introduction of the concept of incarnation as a 
mediator between the ineffable and the concrete. With a growing case for a neo-Hellenic synthesis, the 
chapter will elaborate on  the thought of Camus’ academic mentor, Jean Grenier, who distilled and 
synthesised Taoist metaphysics into Western philosophical terminology. These Taoist principles will be 
shown to underpin Camus’ methodology and ethics, and to be incorporated into his neo-Hellenism and 
asceticism. Following these discussions, the chapter will move to analyse Camus’ work more closely, first 
discussing the relationships among religion, Void and The Absurd in the evolution of his philosophy, and 
then provide an assessment of his insistence on the existence of ineffable phenomena as a barrier to any 
totalising or absolute philosophy. This chapter will conclude by elaborating on Camus’ views on spiritual and 
abstracted values, opening the way for Chapter Five, which will move on to the role of body as a creative 
conduit for these values into the lived world.  
The Pagan-Christian Synthesis 
From the earliest written records of Pagan societies, through to imperial pantheons, Roman Christianisation, 
the Islamic conquests and on to the seemingly endless slaughter of The Crusades, the Mediterranean 
Crescent which Camus called home was soaked in rivers of holy blood. And of course, given that this violent 
history had progressed largely at the hands of religion, it seemed only natural that the philosophy which 
described our modern world would be equally embroiled in theological concerns as the history it grew from. 
While his works would come to engage with the messianic tendencies of Marxist thought and the faith-
imitating ‘leap’ of his contemporaries, Camus’ earliest philosophical writing was much more directly a 
critique of religious ideas. Matthew Sharpe notes that “in 1935–’36, Camus wrote his thesis for the Diplôme 
d’Hautes Études on no less a topic than the monumental cultural transition between paganism and 
Christendom at the end of the antique world.”  Titled Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism (1965), the 197
thesis acknowledges the impact of Christian thought on Europe’s intellectual lineage from the Greeks. The 
primary concern for Camus in this essay is to identify that which is unique to Christian metaphysics, and to 
separate those concepts from the rational philosophy of Ancient Greece. Posing the two systems as a 
contestation between reason and faith, Camus seeks to determine the interplay between these cultures, and to 
show that the spirit of Hellenic rationality was adopted, rather than discarded by the Church. This discussion 
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will continue to investigate faith and reason as a non-dual polarity  of thought, mediated and limited by the 198
passions.  
 Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism (1965) is a text partitioned into four chapters, each 
progressively investigating the incorporation of Hellenic thought into the emergent system of Christian 
dogma which came to dominate Europe for over a thousand years. Beginning with the particularities of 
evangelical Christianity, Camus continues on the topics of gnosticism, mystic reason and finally, the 
philosophical synthesis which occurs in the writing of St. Augustine. The central aim of the text is to bring 
Christianity from a mere faith and present it as a fully-fledged philosophy, positing systems of metaphysics, 
ethics, epistemology and even aesthetics. Camus presents Christianity as the vehicle which propelled Greek 
wisdom into the modern world, and the primary source of the contestable notion that the Modern West is the 
spiritual descendent of Hellenic Greece.  Rather, as the text subtly argues, Western philosophy and culture 199
is more accurately a coupling of Christianity and Hellenism, a synthesis of faith with the worldly experiences 
of passion and reason. Throughout these early pages of Camus’ writing, two major themes arise: the first is 
the unique contribution of the Christian faith to western philosophy, and secondly is the common problem 
shared between Neoplatonism and Christianity, namely the problem of evil, which brought the two systems 
into coalescence.   
 To start with the first of these topics, Camus establishes the concept of Incarnation as being  the 
primary contribution of Christian metaphysics to European consciousness.  Incarnation stands in stark 200
contrast to other conceptions of unity between humankind and divinity, dispensing with representation, 
possession, pantheism and euhumerising,  instead positing the concrete invocation of the eternal, 201
omnipresent God into the concrete, particular and contingent flesh and blood of Jesus Christ. Both 
Christianity and Neoplatonism offer a view of the universe which is dependent on a universal, essential, 
higher-order unity. The difference arises in how this unity proceeds to give rise to existence: in the case of 
the Christian faith, the unity is a universal and incorporeal consciousness who willed the world into 
existence, whereas Neoplatonism conceives of reality as being a series of necessary emanations of form (or 
hypostases), with the original Unity leading to intelligence, on to soul and finally material existence, in a 
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manner not unlike the emanation of heat from a light source. The introduction of a divine incarnation 
highlights the division between these concurrent philosophical schools, namely, to what extent can the 
original One, and the philosophical consequences which arise from such a unity, be considered problems of 
the flesh. Incarnation, in the face of imminent death, unites the eternal with the contingent worldliness of 
humanity, “that is to say, the meeting of the divine and the flesh in the person of Jesus Christ; the 
extraordinary adventure of a God taking responsibility for the sin and the misery of man, the humility and the 
humiliations, are presented as so many symbols of Redemption.”  In addition to the amelioration of the 202
totality of death, Incarnation heralded a second ripple in the currents of western philosophy, namely the 
introduction of a progressive view of history. The Incarnation plays a particular role in a series of historical 
events, and is both an effect and a cause in this progressing chain. This linear concept of time stands in 
contrast to the cyclical nature of Greek history and literature; Camus sees “the evangelicals’ notion of history 
as moving in one direction from creation through fall, incarnation, towards redemption, [and] is foreign to 
Hellenistic culture.”  This introduction of an incarnated divinity which originated outside the world stands 203
in stark contrast to the spiritual practices of Hellenistic culture.  
 As discussed in Act One, the Greeks had seen their gods as living through the embodiment of 
worship, whether that be through the austere practices of the Doric and Apolline ascetics, the orgiastic 
revelry of Dionysian festivals, or the theatrical spirituality of Attic Theatre. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his 
seminal work The Phenomenology of Perception (1945), notes the embodied consciousness which arises in 
Dionysian worship, wherein “the faithful, in the Dionysian mysteries, invoke the god by miming scenes from 
his life… The god is actually there when the faithful can no longer distinguish themselves from the part they 
are playing, when their body and their consciousness cease to bring in, as an obstacle, their particular 
opacity, and when they are totally fused in the myth.”  The act of incarnation then, in Pagan Greece, was 204
achieved through the enactment of ritual, behaviour and the body, in which the body-consciousness of the 
human subject became the gateway of divinity into the world. Conversely as well, the incarnation of evil 
would be conceived as enacted through the consciousness of the human subject and in the Socratic 
understanding, equated with acts motivated out of ignorance.  By contrast, the Christian view, in which the 205
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very totality of God’s divine  constitution comes to be incarnated in the body of Jesus Christ, the act of 
incarnation is performed from the outside, with the divine and the fallen existing eternally separate from 
temporal reality, and a part of the self independent of action, present in the soul from before birth. This 
question of incarnation, being either intrinsic or external to the human consciousness, and especially through 
the introduction of the conception of original sin to the Hellenistic philosophical landscape, opens the central 
conversation of the majority of Camus’ philosophy, that is, the problem of evil.  
Evil and Divinity 
Camus’ contention in Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism (1965) is not that Christianity replaced and 
stifled all the vibrancy of Hellenistic culture, but rather that the two philosophies merged in the crucible of 
intellectual debate in early Rome, finally combining through the innovative work of St. Augustine. 
Neoplatonism and Christianity came together in their grappling with a common problem which threatened 
the moral consistency of each system, namely the problem of evil. The question of the relationship between a 
perfect, supreme being and the apparent presence of evil in the world is captured within a field of thought 
called ‘theodicy’ and it broadly distinguishes between two kinds of evil. The first of these, moral evil, 
concerns itself with the actions of individual people, while the second is categorised as natural evil, or the 
wrongs that arise independent of human action, from the indiscriminate forces of nature . An example of 206
the former would be the act of murder, while the latter may be collapsing of a tree onto a child: both posit the 
unnecessary loss of life, though clearly the moral circumstances of each scenario vary widely. It is this 
presence of evil, in a world apparently derived from a being of perfect internal unity, that dominated many of 
the early interactions between Neoplatonic and Christian thought.  Ultimately, given the similarity of these 207
thematic propositions and the general structural agreement of the metaphysics in which this philosophical 
issue arises, both systems of thought came to merge, eventually articulated in the Greco-Christian works of 
St Augustine.  
 The earlier stages of this interaction are best displayed in the esoteric schools of Gnostic Christianity, 
and further in the works of Plotinus, a highly regarded figure of Neoplatonic philosophy. To a large extent, 
the role that evil plays in the world for these early Greco-Christians is informed by their Hellenic heritage 
and their conception of the being or principle which takes supremacy within their worldview. Basilides and 
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Valentinus were both religious philosophers of the gnostic tradition, and considered to be heretics by the 
Catholic authorities in Rome. Debate exists between contemporary scholars of Christianity and scholars of 
religion, with the former considering gnosticism to be a heretical form of Christianity, whereas the latter find 
the gnostics to be an independent religious movement in their own right.  The Gnostic Christians, in any 208
case, displayed traits of the Hellenistic tradition insofar as they emphasised the rational in their theology, 
though the belief system “is Christo-centric: Christ delivers spiritual man from the world and reveals to him 
the Unknown God and his deepest Self.”  The Gnostics share the Christian concern for salvation, although 209
achieve it in thoroughly pagan fashion: it is knowledge, rather than faith, which separates humanity from the 
evils of material existence, and unites their souls with the perfection of God. It is in their belief that the 
material world is inherently evil, that the gnosticism of Basilides and Valentinus achieves consensus, a 
heresy to both the Hellenic and Christian doctrines, and the point of interest for Camus’ study. The path from 
a perfect being to an intrinsically wretched world, and the role of knowledge in reconciling the self with an 
original state of perfection, will be discussed in terms of duality and non-duality.  
 Some gnostic groups used thoroughly Neoplatonic methodology to draw a distinction between the 
perfect supreme being, the One at the foundation of existence, and lesser entities, or ‘archons’ which 
accounted for the evil of material existence. This continuum from higher metaphysical states to the lower 
material states of existence was explained by “figures like Marcion and Basilides by positing that this 
material world was evidently the creation of a malign lesser God or Deities.”  It should be noted that a 210
dualism of supernatural powers has been present within Jewish and Christian literature both prior to the 
gnostics and further into contemporary Christianity: the most obvious parallel in mainstream Abrahamic 
theology is the Devil, who like the Great Archon, was given dominion over the realm of material existence. 
However some distinction should be drawn between the absolute evil embodied in the Devil of contemporary 
Christian theology and the creator figure of the gnostics: “The cosmic Archon is not a malevolent figure … 
and cannot be represented as an ‘evil World-demiurge’. [However] he does suffer from ignorance and, 
consequently, from overestimation of his powers."  This association of evil with the results of ignorance is 211
squarely within the Hellenic tradition, echoing both Socratic virtue and reflecting the role of reason and 
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knowledge in the gnostic initiation. While the gnostics differed on the diversity of their systems of 
demiurges, they were all similarly characterised by this fundamental dualism , a belief in the fundamental 212
division between the divine world and the mundane, which by the ignorance of intermediary beings has led 
to the sinful nature of humanity, hypnotised by the material and only offered salvation through the secret 
knowledge of God as revealed by Jesus Christ.  One can already detect the early shades of Cartesian 213
dualism, including a scepticism about the material realm and a longing to elevate oneself to the 
transcendence represented by God’s immaterial unity.  
 While Plotinus agreed with the assessment of gnosticism as a heresy, much of his thought is engaged 
in many of the same problems, notably the presence of evil, and the gradations of existence from a Supreme 
Being to the pluralistic variations of the material world. That Camus saw a thematic continuation between 
the Gnostic thesis and Plotinus’ works is reflected in the broader scholarship of the period: “the conception of 
God in Basilides is very similar to the Plotinian One, in spite of the different level of complexity in the two 
authors. We cannot state if Plotinus depends on Basilides, but because Plotinus was living in Alexandria only 
several decades after Basilides did, we can suppose that they were in some way connected to a similar 
philosophic milieu.”  What is of interest in this continued transition is the elevation of transcendence and 214
the devaluing of immanence, a chasm which divided to accomodate the introduction of the Christian value of 
moral evil into the ontological world of the Pagan Greeks. The interest in Plotinus specifically seems to arise 
from the fact that he is the most thoroughly Platonic of the early Greco-Christian thinkers, and provides 
something of an exemplary ‘transitional form’ in Europe’s road from paganism to rationalist Christianity.  
 Plotinus identifies evil as being present in the world of matter, as the furthest point from the original 
One, the unified being that underpins the plurality of existence. Like the Gnostics before him, Plotinus is 
concerned with rational explanations of the fate of the soul; unlike them, he identifies evil in the experienced 
world, rather than as a precursor to it. Plotinus sees the solution to evil in the turning of the self back to the 
light of the One, resolving the nostalgia that the soul feels for unity as it is cut off in its material prison from 
the One. Camus’ interest seems to be in this singular aspect of Plotinian thought, and like Camus, Plotinus 
displays a sensual or aesthetic understanding of intelligibility and reason , and this appears to prefigure 215
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Camus’ understanding of the Absurd. Further, both of these North African philosophers agreed that the 
human condition is categorised by desire and division: “desire is in this way frustrated by the world … To 
desire is to love what is absent from us.”  While Camus would find this desire to be answered only by the 216
silence of absurdity, Plotinus saw salvation in releasing our hold on this material world, and returning to the 
unity of the One. In a sense, this idea follows the thesis of non-duality, given the unified state of the One and 
multiplicity. However, that one can escape the material world and “return to that homeland” arises as a 
fundamental dualism, and a necessity for Plotinus to keep evil at a distance from the complete perfection of 
the One.  
 This apparent conflation of themes is identified by Camus as the point of conflict between Plotinian 
and Christian thought. The function of this conflict is to raise Christianity from its roots in Jewish culture , 217
to strip it down to its metaphysical necessities for inter-cultural export.  Rather, Plotinus affirms the 218
Hellenic worldview in his path to God, captured by the inherent beauty of the world which he must turn 
away from. As an interesting aside, this is the very same conflict that Camus would go on to describe, in the 
essay Helen’s Exile, which defines the condition of Modern Europe as anti-Greek, that is, as counter-
intuitively prioritising history over beauty. Despite his apparent distaste at having a body at all,  Plotinus 219
appeared to consider evil to be a function of the soul, rather than a direct function of matter. Further, as a 
distancing point from Christianity, Plotinus considered the evil of the soul to be an outcome of choice, rather 
than an inherent, ‘original sin’. In the tradition of Socratic rationalism, the Good is a product of knowledge, 
and Evil a product of ignorance, and so “the whole fragrance of the Plotinian landscape is this: a certain 
tragedy in this attempt to cast emotion in the logical forms of Greek Idealism.”  This separates Hellenic 220
Christianity from the ‘leap’ of Abrahamic faith, instead positing the evidential, rational ‘mystic reason’ 
present in the shared, communal experience of beauty. It is through beauty that we are introduced to the 
desire for unity; desire being the longing to integrate into the self what is absent from self. Plotinus cast this 
in terms of the Desire for God, to return to a state of perfect unity with the One. Camus puts this directly in 
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terms of immanence and transcendence, arguing that “The One does not exist locally and that in a certain 
sense it is both transcendent and immanent to all things."  This non-duality stands at the heart of the Pagan 221
aspect of Hellenic Christianity, and further, the worldliness of the religious experience itself. Here also, we 
find the first explicit whispers of the non-dual revelation of Camus’ work, the ethic of transcendence through 
immanence described as such: “In our view, God is therefore immanent. Desire demands it. And furthermore, 
we carry within ourselves the three hypostases, since it is through inner meditation that we attain ecstasy and 
Union with the One.”  The last vestiges of Hellenic non-duality are clear in Plotinus’ work, in that the 222
subject is a part of the One, and the One is is the source of the subject. However, this was not to be the form 
in which faith and reason reached the modern world. The model adopted by the Roman Empire and exported 
to Europe was one in which duality was entrenched in an ontology of divinity and negation.  
  At the culmination of the synthesis of Neoplatonism and Christianity stands a philosopher who, like 
Camus, is a Latinised North African. St. Augustine remains one of the seminal figures in Christian thought, 
laying the foundation for Catholic dogma in what Camus refers to as a ‘Second Revelation’. Well-educated 
by a middle-class family, and further by patronage, and with a religious mix of a Pagan father and Christian 
mother, Augustine was well-versed in the vast philosophical landscape of the Late Roman Empire. Augustine 
almost explicitly follows the pathway of Neoplatonism and Christian Metaphysics in his own theological 
journey, adhering to Manichaeanism, broadly a variation on Gnosticism,  and moving onwards to the more 223
rigorous reason of Plotinus. However, he is more definitively Christian than Greek in his final conversion; it 
is Grace through faith that leads him to the experience of transcendence, rather than reason.  It is in this 224
that Augustine presents the final synthesis of Neoplatonism and Christianity, in which the themes of 
Hellenism are totally removed from immanence and, through Christ, questions of reason and truth are 
transported into the transcendent realm of heaven. 
 It is clear that Augustine agrees with Plotinus that God is both immanence and transcendence, 
however, particularly though the problem of evil, immanence is subordinated as secondary to transcendence. 
In his Confessions, Augustine argues that it is only in relation to the eternal permanence of God that material 
existence draws its meaning, stating that “what remains constant is better than that which is changeable.”  225
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The good is itself transcendence, while evil is not immanence, but rather the lack of transcendent good.  It 226
is impermanence itself, that which gave tragic beauty to the limited existence of the Greek soul, that 
constitutes evil in this world, the corruption and degradation of the Good in that which is. “The conclusion 
then must be either that corruption does no harm - which is not possible; or that everything which is 
corrupted is deprived of good - which is beyond doubt.”  227
 Evil is accounted for in terms of knowledge and history; evil in nature is merely apparent due to our 
inability to understand the greater good of God’s transcendent plan, while moral evil is entirely the 
proscription of human free will. The suffering which we experience at the hands of evil, symbolised in the 
impermanence of death, is something for which we are wholly and eternally responsible, and “Augustine 
maintains that, after the fall, human beings cannot but choose the evil for which they shall also be judged and 
punished.”  The human subject is thereby cut off from their own salvation and, by default, deserving of 228
their inevitable torment. Indeed, this must be true, insofar as it is the reality which God created, and 
inherently good by association with His transcendence. The Hellenic objection on the side of reason is not so 
much satisfied as negated, as “the only intelligent reason is the one that is enlightened by faith.”  It is here 229
that Augustine, and the future of the Western dialectic, is detached from the discourse of Greek aesthetics. 
The extreme emotion we find in Plotinus appears to be suppressed in what Camus sees as Augustine’s 
justification of the damnation of innocent children.  
Grenier and Eastern Thought 
Given an apparent distaste for divine solutions to problems of evil, and in his conviction that the world is 
absurd, it is obvious that Camus was no Christian. He did however remain engaged with the vestigial 
concerns of Europe’s religious past, and often referred to himself as a kind of Pagan,  invoking an image of 230
religiosity grounded in the immanent experiences of flesh and nature. Camus’ thesis supervisor at The 
University of Algiers, Jean Grenier, had suggested that the dissertation take a focus on Hindu philosophy, 
rather than Christianity, though evidently Camus chose the topic closer to home.  Before exploring the 231
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parallels between Camus’ thought and the religious themes of the East, it will be illuminating to first consider 
how Grenier’s interest in Eastern Philosophy may have impacted on the former’s literary career. This is 
particularly important, as Sharpe notes that much of Camus’ early encounters with ancient and classical 
literature came under the tutelage of Grenier,  and one can infer the inheritance of a certain sensibility in 232
approaching the themes of the classical world.  
 Grenier himself had drawn on the pantheism of the Upanishads in his own writing,  and much of 233
his work engaged heavily with themes from Eastern philosophy and mystical traditions. The most prominent 
aspects of his work are the notion of indifference, as well as the relationship between the contingency of 
everyday experience and his intuition of the Absolute. Indifference can be read as both a moral and an 
ontological category; this philosophical disposition arises from a phenomenology of mystical experiences in 
parallel with the writings of the ancient world. Indeed, Grenier engaged in a more explicit exploration of an 
East-West synthesis than Camus’ more subtle construction. Grenier found himself intrigued but ultimately 
disappointed by the mystical claims put forward by Abrahamic faiths; however, “his study of Taoism 
encouraged him to explore elements of more accessible Western traditions that showed similarities with it, 
especially in the areas of an immediate contact with the Absolute and of an accompanying attitude of 
indifference to the world.”  Of particular relevance is the notion of ‘an immediate contact with the 234
Absolute’ which very closely mirrors the non-dual model of transcendence through immanence that this 
study has been following. 
 Grenier’s interest in Taoism, as previously mentioned, is founded on the phenomenological 
awareness of the interplay between the contingency of ordinary reality and the underlying intuition of an 
Absolute. A description of this interplay is given in cryptic, mystical terms in the first verse of the Tao Te 
Ching, commonly translated as The Art of Harmony (2009) by Laozi:  
  Ways can be guided; they are not fixed ways. 
  Names can be named; they are not fixed names. 
  “Absence” names the cosmic horizon,  
  “Presence” names the mother of 10,000 natural kinds. 
  Fixing on “absence” is to want to view enigmas. 
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  Fixing on “presence” is to want to view phenomena. 
  These two, emerging together, we name differently. 
  Conceiving of them as being one: call that “fathomless”. 
  Calling it “fathomless” is still not to fathom it. 
  … the door to a cluster of puzzles.   235
  
 This opening passage gives the clearest description of non-duality, even in the enigmatic language 
used. The text is a comment on the open void that is the expansive cosmos beyond our perception, and its 
opposite, the concrete presence of diverse phenomena; to view the world through the prism of one or the 
other is to bind oneself to that prism. However, as Laozi points out, presence and absence arise 
simultaneously and contiguously. Crucially, each concept is contingent on the other. This leads to the 
intuition of the non-duality of presence and absence, that is, the ‘fathomless’ Absolute. The contradiction 
arises when one attempts to view the Absolute through the prism of presence, that is, by naming, classifying, 
describing or otherwise codifying the experience. Such would preclude the absence of the Absolute, and thus 
inherently negate it. It is in the doorway to this puzzle that Grenier’s thought resides.  
 Grenier never directly converted to Taoism, nor did he commit himself to the dogmatic adherence of 
any religious code.  Nevertheless, his ethical disposition and a clear understanding of indifference can only 236
arise in the light of Taoist thought. What Grenier distills from the Absolute is “an attitude of complete 
indifference in the face of life and death, fortune and misfortune.”  The attitude of indifference is a 237
consequence of the non-difference of life and death, the non-difference of fortune and misfortune. This is not 
a devolution into nihilism, but rather an understanding that value exists well beyond the superficial and 
illusory notion of personal preference. This sets up a Mediterranean humanism which stands in contrast to 
the individualist, liberal, Enlightenment humanism that arose in Europe. The basic idea of an individual ego 
making an informed, ethical decision that is best for Self and Other, becomes a nonsensical and impossible 
task in the context of a worldview where all contingent choices are lost in the ineffability of the Absolute. It 
is simply impossible to know, or even consider the totality of the effects of one’s actions, and Grenier asks 
“whether it is not possible to consider le mal and le bien as necessary and complementary aspects of the 
whole of existence. What is good for one person is bad for another … the extension of something which is in 
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itself good may produce a bad effect; and so on.”  This treatment of the problem of evil is inherited by 238
Camus, as is a confrontation with the Absurd scenario that humans find themselves in; the absurdity of being 
demanded as a consciousness of limited perspective and understanding to act morally towards an absolute, 
unending reality. 
  
Religion, Void and the Absurd 
It would be a mistake to describe Camus as a religious thinker, or a theologian in the orthodox sense of the 
activity. Rather, his interest lies in the mystical origins of our valuations and devaluations in a rapidly 
secularising world. The inherent tension of non-dualism that can be found in ancient and classical 
philosophies is a window into a fundamental experience which dualistic and transcendental philosophies 
attempt to subjugate, silence and eliminate. This experience, the transient fluctuation between being and non-
being, allows one to engage in becoming, the transient process of meaning-making and self-causation. 
However, given the move by Augustine to identify with the permanence of being in the soul, rather than the 
transience of becoming in the world, the aesthetic tragedy of the Hellenes was lost to the faithful authority of 
the new Christians. That permanence is superior to transience is an axiom rather than an inference, and this 
hierarchical imposition ensures that the reason of Greek Idealism would be grounded in Christian faith rather 
than Hellenic beauty. “We have exiled beauty,” Camus writes, defending the non-duality of Hellenism 
against the totalising authority of the Logos in the modern West, “The Greeks took arms for it. A basic 
difference, but one that goes far back. Greek thought was always based on the idea of limits. Nothing was 
carried to its extremes, neither religion nor reason, because Greek thought denied nothing, neither religion 
nor reason. It gave everything its share, balancing light with shade."  For Camus, as for the Hellenes, the 239
limit of any idea is the boundary of its opposite. Reason ends where faith begins, and faith ends at the bounds 
of reason. The moral error arises when this limit is viewed as an opposition rather than a relationship. There 
is no need in Greek thought for reason to conquer faith or vice versa, as there is no need for the tide to 
conquer the shore.  
 This proclivity to see pluralities as generative relationships rather than destructive oppositions has 
antecedents in the thought of Camus’ mentors. Nietzsche argued in The Birth of Tragedy (1872) that the 
diametric principles of Apollo and Dionysus could only bear their aesthetic offspring by coupling, as the 
offspring of a biologically dimorphic species can only be produced by the coupling of the dimorphism. 
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Grenier, from his studies of the Classical East, theorised this phenomenon into the ethics and metaphysics of 
indifference, positing that pluralities are the result of our spatially and temporally limited perspectives, and 
requiring the negations to be constituted in the Absolute, rather than excluded from it. In this sense, Camus 
stands both within and against the ‘secularisation thesis’ of modernity. The negation of traditional religious 
sources of meaning is clearly a driver of the experience of Absurdity in Camus’ work, but at no point does 
this imply that we should reject religious values, faith or spirituality, even if we should reject the hierarchical 
structures that they were originally predicated on. The advent of a scientific and technological society has 
simply destabilised the totality of the Logos, and in rejecting faith and beauty, fractured the appearance of 
unity which had stood as an a priori justification and answer to evil. It is not the role of either faith or reason 
to be agents to unite and justify the universe, and “that nostalgia for unity, that appetite for the absolute 
illustrates the essential impulse for the human drama. But the fact of that nostalgia does not imply that it is to 
be immediately satisfied.”  Rushing from one totalising unity to another merely entrenches another set of 240
fictitious absolutes, as Camus continues, “if, bridging the gulf that separates desire from conquest, we assert 
with Parmenides the reality of the One (whatever it may be) we fall into the ridiculous contradiction of a 
mind that asserts total unity and proves by its very assertion its own difference and the diversity it claimed to 
resolve.”  The yearning for unity reveals the inherent plurality of the subject’s encounter with the world, 241
making one a Stranger to their own environment. Taking their model from the sovereignty of God over 
nature, the modern secularised subject attempts to usurp the unity of God by conquering the natural world.  
 Secularisation has not, however, successfully decoupled faith and knowledge. Rather than ending the 
enforcement of knowledge in the light of faith, the Age of Nihilism can be characterised by the application of 
faith to knowledge. “In our wildest madness we dream of an equilibrium we have lost,” observes Camus, 
“and which in our simplicity we think we shall discover once again when our errors cease.”  When reason 242
and grace are inverted, the problem of evil moves from being a lack of understanding about the nature of 
God, to a lack of faith in the apparent ‘disinterested good’ of reason. Camus repudiates the modern 
philosophers and the errors of absolution that remain after the Death of God. He writes, “Now that God is 
dead, all that remains are history and power. For a long time now, the whole effort of our philosophers has 
been solely to replace the idea of human nature with the idea of situation and ancient harmony with the 
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disorderly outbursts of chance or the pitiless movement of reason.”  In this sense, reason is not returned to 243
a  contemplation of the nature of things, but rather replaces divinity as the authority that sanctions the 
inexorable processes of history. Reason no longer attempts to ameliorate the conditions of suffering and 
direct the subject to the ‘good life’, but instead is charged with justifying suffering as a necessary step on the 
road to the End of History.  Camus was vehemently opposed to any philosophy, politics or religion which 244
sanctioned the denigration of humanity or instituted its suffering, and “as we have begun to appreciate, it is 
above all at the ethico-political level, ‘as a religion of injustice’ that Camus takes his distance from 
Christianity, ‘even if’ its Theistic claims could be somehow agreed upon.”  Secularisation is not a process 245
that has led to the dissolution of theological problems, but has merely removed the aesthetic justification 
which was provided. Camus’ closing remark to his thesis, Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism, is that 
“Christian thought had conquered through its universality”  and after the death of God, humanity must take 246
up that mantle of universal conquest.  
 The Absurd actively rejects this extension of reason into the stratospheric heights of the 
transcendental Good, positing the moment of Absurd awareness as marking the limit of reason, the immanent 
forge of confrontation where meanings are generated. It is here that the Void becomes integral to Camus’ 
philosophy, in a relational tandem with the world, a kind of Dionysian chaos of ineffability injected into the 
knowable, Apolline, concrete world of matter and forms. The Void, however, is not a negation proper, but 
rather the necessary counter-point to all existent things. Eastern philosophies have often emphasised the 
metaphysical necessity of the Void, as Alan Watts writes: 
Thus the yin-yang principle is that the somethings and the nothings, the ons and the offs, 
the solids and the spaces, as well as the wakings and the sleeping and the alternations of 
existing and not existing, are mutually necessary. How, one might ask, would you know 
that you are alive unless you had once been dead? How can one speak of reality or is-ness 
except in the context of the polar apprehension of void?  247
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The radical alteration of awareness when one perceives that the world is constituted by the relationship 
of opposites, that what is depends on what is not, is properly the experience of the Absurd. Camus 
comments on a person responding ‘nothing’ when asked what they are thinking, reasoning that “if that 
reply is sincere, if it symbolises that odd state of soul in which the void becomes eloquent, in which 
the chain of daily gestures is broken, in which the heart vainly seeks the link that will connect it again, 
then it is as it were the first sign of absurdity.”  The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) presents the Absurd, the 248
loss of immediate and coherent meaning, as a pathway to suicide, if it is pursued to its logical extreme. 
But if one tempers reason with the tragedy of Hellenic beauty, then one can enter into the non-dual 
interplay of the Absurd, and in complement to the metaphysics of the Tao, how can one know 
absurdity unless one had already known meaning? This is beyond a mere rhetorical exercise, and 
appeals to the aesthetics of contrast, much in the way that the foreground and background of a painting 
provide a necessary distinction which allows the appearance of a scene as a whole. “Happiness and the 
absurd are two sons of the same earth. They are inseparable. It would be a mistake to say that 
happiness necessarily springs from the absurd discovery. It happens as well that the feeling of the 
absurd springs from happiness.”  The confrontation with a meaningless universe is necessary as a 249
contrast to the very possibility of meaning. One need not transcend this contrast through faith or 
reason, but rather should limit these by the absurd, allowing meaning to always remain immanent to its 
generative negation. If Sisyphus concludes that ‘all is well’  it is because it is only against this 250
background of anxious longing and futile action that a necessary complement of wellness can begin to 
take shape.  
Conclusion: Neo-Pagan Metaphysics 
Camus neither advocates a return to our Pagan roots nor a pathway to a utopian, secular future. His 
sole concern is the spiritual crisis of the here and now. Like his spiritual predecessor, Nietzsche, 
Camus recognises the need for the modern subject to engage a source of meaning that is born out of 
the very emptiness that constitutes their experience. Both thinkers are engaged in ‘overcoming’ the 
void that remains after the Death of God. This chapter has engaged primarily with Camus’ formative 
studies in religion, beginning with his baccalaureate thesis on the marriage of Greek reason to 
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Christian faith. The primary focus of his studies in this area is the problem of evil, a moral question 
that would remain fundamental to his philosophy, fiction and theatrical works. The conclusion of his 
thesis is that the creative, aesthetic spirit of Hellenic Greece is compromised by the authority of 
dogmatic faith. In Augustine’s final synthesis of reason and divinity, original sin is invoked to ensure 
that God’s will is kept separate from the evils of humankind, and that the creative enterprises of 
humanity must conform to that will or assume responsibility for the proliferation of evil. In this way, 
reason is isolated from contemplation of the good life in its Greek heritage, to being restricted by the 
authority of the One True Good. The chapter then considered the influence of Camus’ thesis 
supervisor, Jean Grenier, who maintained a lifelong interest with the philosophies of classical India 
and China, importing many ethical and metaphysical structures from the East into his own works. It is 
contended that these importations may have provided a sensitivity to non-duality, and informed the 
development of the concept of absurdity. The Absurd is then presented as both a consequence and 
response to the spiritual crisis of modern nihilism. Camus further emulated Nietzsche in the insistence 
that physiological experiences are necessary to the constitution of healthy spirituality. It is in this 
context that the next chapter will explore the generative creativity of the body in Camus’ philosophy.  
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Chapter 5: Return to Earth: Meaning in Nature and Immanence 
“If the world were clear, art would not exist,”  Camus boldly claims in his philosophical essay The Myth of 251
Sisyphus. This claim sits among many proclamations of the absurdity of the world which we encounter, but 
also reminds us that art is not a refuge from the Absurd, but rather another absurd phenomenon, the attempt 
to create an authentic, internally unified representation of an unintelligible reality. However, art is not to be 
dismissed and it evidently takes a prominent role in Camus’ work, both as a medium of philosophical inquiry 
and communication, as well as a theme to which he continually returned. For Camus, the absurd artwork is 
born from the refusal of lucid and intelligent thought to add any illegitimate deeper meaning to the 
representation of concrete experience. In other words, art is conceived of as the faithful representation of 
one’s limited interpretation of the world, an always incomplete image which hints at the fluidity of the living 
world. Through this conception, the artist and philosopher are divided in that the former stands before the 
limited artwork, while the latter is rendered within their totalising system.  While maintaining the 252
separation of philosophy and art, Camus’ dichotomy deviates from Nietzsche’s division of these 
metaphysical activities. Nietzsche sees the artist as representing the primal experience of dreams, while the 
philosopher accounts for waking reality,  but both thinkers clearly still maintain the view that these 253
metaphysical activities are thoroughly entwined. Far from a divine gift of genius, the artist is presented in 
Camus’ work as a being born of experience, distinguished only by their lucid interpretation and 
representation of life itself. Departing from the discussion in Chapter Four of religion and spiritual 
experience, Chapter Five will elaborate on art and experience of the external world.  Camus, having spent his 
youth in the colonial setting of French Algeria in North Africa, developed a characteristically distinct view of 
the world from his French contemporaries and much of the European philosophical canon.  
 The discussion of Camus’ metaphysics will begin with his unique interpretation of worldly 
philosophy, a neo-Hellenic way of life, which he describes in his early essays as the Mediterranean 
temperament. This attitude of Mediterraneanism involves the direct experience of the body within both a 
physical and historical environment, and is developed as a counterweight to the intellectual decadence of the 
Europeans to the north, particularly the pervasive influence of Idealism and German philosophy. A natural 
consequence of Camus’ conception of the world as the forge of philosophy is the need for an insightful and 
authentic interpretation of reality. Rather than propose a system or methodology of thought, Camus continues 
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in the spirit of Nietzsche’s philosophy by instead laying out a mental state, a mode of receptivity 
characterised by direct lucidity. Lucidity is presented as a highly immanent state of consciousness, a present 
and immediate awareness that rejects ‘leaps’ into transcendence or eternity. As a non-foundationalist and 
non-transcendent mode of thought, lucidity is accessible to all thinking beings, as much a possibility in the 
mind of a desk clerk as the philosopher or mystic. Finally, this chapter will discuss the role of ecological 
philosophy in Camus’ rejection of transcendental and absolutist ethics, with particular reference to the eco-
feminist work of Val Plumwood. 
 
Mediterraneanism 
One of the few points of agreement within Camusian scholarship is that of personal experience, particularly 
sensual, bodily experience, as the core foundation of value throughout his work. John Foley characterises 
this core as a kind of negative necessity, in the amoral nihilism of the Absurd “the intensity and frequency of 
enjoyable experiences appears to be the only available determining standard with which to ascribe value to 
experience.”  This conception does homage to the precedence of the body, although it unduly favours 254
pleasurable experiences and ignores the influence of the tragic. Compare this view to that of Stephen 
Bronner, who considers Camus as part of a trend of ‘religious atheism’ along with the likes of Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and Jaspers, a trend which “emphasised the role of personal experience and the responsibility of 
the individual in shaping his or her fate.”  This is a reasonable and common interpretation, of course 255
supported by the analysis of the above thinkers and others in The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel; however, 
it serves to shift Camus further into the school of existential philosophy, which he adamantly resisted, 
although it is perhaps a more plausible reading than Foley’s ‘utilitarian’ values of pleasure. Elizabeth Ann 
Bartlett’s study of rebellious feminism, perhaps in its aim to view Camus’ work as a methodology for action 
rather than a metaphysic or belief system, succinctly explains the complementary knowledge of the body: 
“Tastes, sights, sounds, the pains and pleasures of the flesh, the wisdom of stones and sun and sea all ground 
his thought in the concrete realities of the body and the earth.”  Inevitably, whether one chooses to consider 256
Camus politically, metaphysically or historically, as one continues to explore the breadth of Camus’ works, it 
becomes ever clearer that the body constitutes the foundation of his philosophical ethic. However, the body 
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cannot exist in a vacuum, and its experiences are not in isolation. In order to establish the conditions of 
bodily existence, the stage must be set and examined.  
 To explore the development of this theme throughout Camus’ work, it will be helpful to consider his 
early works, which exalted a sensual relationship with the natural world. Matthew Sharpe highlights that 
“His early essay collection Noces’ [Nuptials’] title refers to the hieros gamos  at the heart of pagan 257
myth” , essentially linking Camus’ work to the ritual sensuality of the Ancient Greeks. The essay collection 258
Nuptials, originally published in 1938, and only reluctantly reprinted later in his life, is a collection of four 
essays which present a powerful vision of the life and country of French Algeria. The primary theme of the 
essays, as the title may suggest, is the “wedding of man and earth.”  Individually, the sketches are titled 259
‘Nuptials at Tipasa’, ‘The Wind at Djemila’, ‘Summer in Algiers’ and ‘The Desert’. Immediately an 
impression arises, images of the earth and sky, scorched cities and the oceans of sand which characterised the 
North African landscape. As one wades into the shimmering mirage of these sensuous texts, one could feel 
almost intellectually obstructed. Indeed, while poetic, on the surface the essays appear to offer little more 
than highly detailed and quasi-spiritual observations of everyday events. Nevertheless, what is revealed 
throughout Nuptials is a form of embodiment which had been absent from modern, western philosophy, 
which arises as an indigenous temperament from the concreteness of our worldly reality and enriches our 
personal stake in the narratives of culture and history. 
 A somewhat anti-transcendental evolution reaches its epitome with Camus’ entry into the Western 
Canon. This development is not unique to wartime Europe, and Camus had identified similar adjustments in 
the disparate flourishing of tragedian art and culture. In an address given in 1955 titled On the Future of 
Tragedy, Camus signalled his intent to be a part of a drive to a new culture of tragedy. The most prominently 
known instance of this artistic development had been documented by Nietzsche in his seminal work The 
Birth of Tragedy (1872). However, Camus notes a second European flourishing of the tragic art form, that 
had gone unnoticed due to its progression through different cultures and language groups. The inception of 
this post-Medieval aesthetic shift was the work of Shakespeare and his reinvention of the tragic stage. “Too 
little has been made of the fact that the magnificent explosions of the Elizabethan Theatre, the Spanish 
theatre of the Golden Age, and French seventeenth-century tragedy are practically contemporary with one 
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another.”  Camus continues by noting that there is no more distance in time between Shakespeare and 260
Racine than between Aeschylus and Euripides.”  Camus draws from the historical contexts of these 261
dramatic evolutions that the Tragic arises when a people collectively break their shackles to an older form of 
civilisation, without yet having a clear picture of what culture they are moving into.  Such a social 262
revolution is entirely present within the development of European nihilism and the ‘Death of God’. Camus’ 
approach to aesthetics presents a transition from a world constituted through the divine, to one characterised 
by the very constitution of one’s own immanent experiences. In relation to Camus’ own work there arises the 
clash of history and landscape which give rise to the ‘Mediterranean Temperament’, a sensibility which 
despite the inheritance of the French language, remained a point of difference from other French thinkers 
throughout Camus’ work. Discussing Camus’ early essay collections, Bronner describes the divide as “the 
tension between a ‘western’ interpretive quest for meaning and a ‘Mediterranean’ emphasis on physical 
reality.”  In a sense, western Camus scholarship continues to demonstrate this difference, particularly 263
through the agreement on his foundations of sensuality, while the debate over where his work relates to the 
wider conversation of philosophy remains a fractious one. Nevertheless, this ‘Mediterranean temperament’ is 
evinced throughout his early work, written in the sunbathed years in his native Algeria. The thought is at 
least partially derived from the adoration with which his mentor and high school philosophy teacher, Jean 
Grenier, treated the art and philosophy of the Greeks, the apparent antithesis of European decadence. “He 
[Grenier] provided his student with an exhilarating insight into the ‘pagan’ heritage of classical Greece and 
saw a source of renewal in what Camus would later call the Mediterranean temperament’.”  Grenier’s 264
influence continued to echo throughout Camus’ work, particularly in relation to the tragic beauty of a finite 
existence, and the vitality of the human experience in the physical world.  
Much like Grenier’s Islands, which “blend a simplicity of form with the illumination of personal 
experience”,  Nuptials is a series of essays, which through the subtle presentation of sensual images, 265
reveals truths which may be denied to those who seek only the explanations of historicist and mechanical 
philosophies.  Camus came of age far from the centres of arts and knowledge, surrounded by the parochial 
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concerns of colonial labourers, but under a sun which warmed him against the cold hostility of oppressive 
class relations; his literary works naturally speak through the visceral language of personal experience, 
against the cumbersome contrivances of social discourse. In the essay ‘The Wind at Djemila’, amongst the 
vibrant descriptions of the dunes and classical ruins, Camus writes that “Everything that is simple is beyond 
us. What is blue, and how do we think ‘blue’? The same difficulty occurs with death. Death and colours are 
things we cannot discuss.”  One cannot learn what a colour is from reading it in a book, nor discuss it in a 266
meaningful way, without having first experienced colour; likewise, one of the great, persistent mysteries of 
all human cultures is death and the after-life, which by its very nature is non-experience. Inevitably, formal 
descriptions of experiential events are inadequate to characterise these seemingly straightforward concepts, 
and dialogical philosophy is certainly inferior in bringing a ‘confrontation’ with these experiences than 
would be artistic or spiritual methodologies. Through the body, experience and sensual knowledge contribute 
by any measure as much of a foundation for history and philosophy as any transcendental property could. 
Camus elaborates on this point in Summer in Algiers (1938), again making the link between the New 
Mediterranean and Classical Greece: “Today, reaching back over this history, young men sprinting on the 
Mediterranean beaches are rediscovering the magnificent motion of the athletes of Delos.”  Like the 267
athletes, orators, actors and heroes of Hellenism, Camus saw in the rancorous lives of the Algerian proletariat 
the very lifeblood that drives a culture: “Living so close to other bodies, and through one’s own body, one 
finds it has its own life, and to venture an absurdity, its own psychology.”  What Camus brings forward is 268
an individuality born of unity, a non-duality of body and environment, self and society.  
What is at stake in Nuptials is the crisis of sterility, the inhumanity of the religious and philosophical 
West, which like “the mystic who has no part in the earthiness and allure of nature is sterile rather than pure, 
… who lives in a world of ideas without concrete meanings.” . The single-minded focus on one side of the 269
metaphysical equation is what separates Neo-Classical and Modern Europe from its Greek forebears. The 
bland, boxed, numeric and codified world of the industrial civilisation stands opposed to the vibrancy of 
Hellenism and the Orient, a vitality which Camus will recall through the ‘Ethic of Quantity’.  
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Lucidity and the ethic of quantity  
It is for both its heritage and its environment that the Mediterranean provided the foundation for Camus’ 
philosophy and ethics: the fertile crescent which cradled the infancy of Western history, a geographical and 
historical apex soaked in equal parts of salt and sun, blood and sweat. The geographical intensity and cultural 
heritage of North Africa is an integral foundation stone, framing Camus’ work for decades to come. As if 
Camus was a living rejection of Roland Barthes' claim that the author is dead,  Sharpe argues that 270
“Understanding the kind of Hellenic or Hellenistic impressions Camus received as a young man, as he grew 
up in the fierce sunlight of colonial Algeria, is vital to understanding the shape of his mature oeuvre, his 
identity as a philosophe and his distance from almost all other 20th century French thinkers.”  Camus 271
presents a striking example of Nietzsche’s ‘experimental philosophy’, his works drawing on the intimate 
details of his experiences, yet his life was also devoted to the invocation of his philosophy.  
 The Mediterranean Temperament is characterised by a visceral awareness of one’s setting, and the 
passionate, committed action one puts into living. This blend of action and lucidity has increasingly come to 
be known in contemporary Camus scholarship as an ethic of quantity,  and is particularly identifiable in 272
Camus’ first major philosophical work, The Myth of Sisyphus. The chapter ‘The Absurd Man’ contains 
illustrations of characters who display an ethic of quantity, but one must not take them as a series of didactic 
instructions. As Camus qualifies at the beginning of the chapter, “A sub-clerk in the post office is the equal of 
a conquerer if consciousness is common to them.”  The ethic of quantity draws on the principle of lucidity, 273
to oppose blind, unconsidered and rote action, such as the habitual mode of everyday life, or the frenzied 
mob consciousness of the ideological extremist. It is not so much motive and success which distinguishes a 
person’s ethic, as a lucid, clear-headed awareness of the interplay between self and setting. This section will 
begin by discussing this state of lucidity, before moving on to the Hellenic influences on Camus’ ethics.  
 The notion that, particularly in the earlier phase of his writing, Camus’ works contain a consistent and 
applicable ethic, is one that is heavily disputed among Camus scholarship. For one example, Foley claims 
there is a contradiction between the notion of the Absurd, which is the primary thematic focus of The Myth of 
Sisyphus, and an ethical framework: “Read in the context of the absurd, Letters to a German Friend displays 
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a conscious effort, motivated by the experiences of occupation and resistance, to move beyond a discussion 
of the absurd itself to a discussion of the possibility of ethics.”  However, the Absurd is the only legitimate 274
grounding for ethics, as it is the only true description of the condition of subjective existence in the living 
world. The idea that the Absurd represents a division from, or of the world, goes back to the very earliest 
analyses of Camus’ work, in an essay written by his contemporary Jean-Paul Sartre. Having addressed the 
feeling of absurdity in his novel Nausea, Sartre wrote of the Absurd that it is a “cleavage between man’s 
aspirations to unity and the insurmountable dualism of mind and nature.”  This obviously goes to the core 275
of the non-dual themes of this thesis. Sartre’s analysis takes the basic elements of the Absurd, yet his 
conclusion appears to inject an illegitimate addition to the equation, that is, the belief “that life is tragic 
because it is wretched.”  However, a life unified by wretchedness is still a life unified. The difference 276
between Sartre and Camus is that Sartre injects a judgement into the Absurd realisation and universalising it 
as ‘insurmountable’. This, in effect, turns the Absurd into Anguish, a fear of our obligation to take 
responsibility for freedom that is made terrifying by the yawning gap that separates us from the world. Sartre 
of course was heading to the right conclusion, but perhaps should have continued to highlight Camus’ thesis 
that the dualist divide of mind and nature is a product of philosophy, rather than an essential truth.  
 This is the crux of Camus’ break with phenomenology, saying that the divide between phenomenology 
and the Absurd comes when metaphysics are introduced into the system of thought: the Absurd mind is 
purely psychological, without appeal to unifying metaphysics. In reference to Husserl’s concept of 
‘intentionality’ Camus argues that in proposing ‘extra-temporal essences’, Husserl abandons the 
psychological description of experience, and engages in a metaphysics of consolation.  He says that “if one 277
attempts to extend and give a rational basis to that notion of truth, if one claims to discover in this way the 
‘essence’ of each object of knowledge, one restores its depth to experience.”  What Camus is saying is that 278
by diminishing the psychological nature of knowledge in favour of the metaphysical nature of it, knowledge 
is no longer a subjective, fleeting experience, but rather something that could be considered part of the ever 
elusive “Truth” of Western Philosophy in its eternal, immutable sense. Philosophical dualisms had already 
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played a role in Camus’ early essay writings: “Camus believed that neither can ever abolish the other. These 
essays already make clear how ‘lucidity,’ in Camus’s views, calls for remaining aware of the tension between 
opposing attitudes and preserving a sense of balance.”  This remains a guiding principle in Camus’ 279
interpretation of the Rational and the Absurd, or Rebellion and Oppression, prominent political and 
philosophical dualisms which he explores, in effect, as precursors to the non-dual discourses on power 
relations in post-structural thought. The use of opposing attitudes to curtail and limit each other provides a 
grounding methodology for the adoption of harmonious ethics. These structures will be discussed in more 
detail throughout the thesis, particularly in relation to Camus’ political thought. Before dualisms can be 
brought into a tenuous balance, an honest and vivid description of their nature must be illustrated. This 
requires the mental attitude of lucidity, Camus’ epistemology of immanent, psychological knowledge.  
 Lucidity is a state which features prominently in Camus’ works, and one that plays a fundamentally 
integral role in the way the world is to be interpreted, considered and interacted with, in that “The mind’s 
first step is to distinguish what is true from what is false.”  It is indeed the job of the mind to do this, not 280
merely to understand the mechanical operations of nature and society, but to take that further step into the 
heresy of challenging all of one’s deeply held truths. In any case, an inquisitive mind of good faith would at 
the least have to make the admission that knowledge and truth must remain in a state of flux to remain 
applicable to an evolving reality. Between the passionate responses of the body and the enduring 
rationalisations of the mind, the the direct experience of self-in-the-world arises as the only test of truth in a 
living existence. Without lucidity, in the false hopes and eternal deceptions of metaphysical interpretations, 
“So long as the mind keeps silent in the motionless world of its hopes, everything is reflected and arranged in 
the unity of its nostalgia.”  Nostalgia is an attempt to secure the world in a lost sense of unity, to deny its 281
multiplicity, unpredictability, indifference and evolutions. It is lucidity which allows an awareness of the 
Absurd and leads to a truly ethical state. Lucidity is also a call to intellectual responsibility, whether 
confronted with promises of divine reward, the industrial claims of the capitalist factory owner or the grand 
political machinations of the Soviet empire, the thinking individual is responsible for separating immutable, 
eternal totalities from the fluid realities of the living world. Standing apart from philosophical suicide, which 
Camus defines as “the apparent paradox that leads thought to its own negation”,  lucidity pursues a thought 282
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to its limits. Whether that be the Absurd at the limit of reason or Rebellion at the limit of power, it is only 
within the bounds of limit that a thought can achieve unity, as separate from the destructive force of totality, 
as in the consequences of unlimited totalitarian power. In the essay ‘Helen’s Exile’, Camus asserts “Greek 
thought was always based on the idea of limits” , while Modern Europe pursues thought to excess in the 283
drive to totality.  
 Much like the Mediterranean Temperament, the mental state of lucidity is drawn heavily from neo-
Hellenism. It is the pursuit of historical totality, a unifying narrative that stands above and justifies our own 
individual experience, for which “the world has been deliberately cut off from what gives it permanence: 
nature, the sea, hills, evening meditations.”  A divide appears between the Mediterranean worldliness of the 284
Greeks and the abstracted and transcendent civilisation of European philosophy. “Central to his concept of 
‘limits’ is the notion that any value held absolutely, unbalanced by its complement, ultimately contradicts 
itself.”  Whether expanding the limits of empire, economy, or the limits of nature in the manipulations of 285
technology, post-Renaissance philosophy in Europe was a defiance, rather than a rebirth of Greek thought: 
“The Greeks never said that the limit could not be crossed. They said that it existed and that any man who 
dared ignore it was mercilessly struck down. Nothing in our modern history can contradict them.”  Like the 286
paradoxical negation of philosophical suicide, Camus would see the political challenges and catastrophes of 
Modern Europe as philosophically generated nihilisms, the result of an imbalance which attempts to exceed 
its natural limits into totality.  
 Camus’ metaphysics are primarily a system of aesthetics; that is to say, it takes as its primary point of 
concern the judgement of an experience. This shifts Camus’ methodology from being epistemological to 
being explicitly axiological, that is, the study of structures and experiences of value. This becomes clear 
when Camus’ primary metaphysical description, the Absurd, is considered as an aesthetic principle. To 
demonstrate this conception, the Absurd will be compared to the contemporary movement of eco-feminism, 
in particular the non-difference of self and ecology in the work of Australian philosopher Val Plumwood. 
Both Camus and Plumwood will be shown to oppose the universalisation of ethics in terms of rational 
egoism. 
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Eco-Feminism and the Immanent Sublime 
The relationship between Camus’ work and the ethics of modern feminism has been documented in Elizabeth 
Bartlett’s text, Rebellious Feminism (2009). A broader discussion of Camus and feminism, in terms of the 
intersubjective aspects of gender relations, will be explored more fully in the following chapter on the 
metaphysics of the body. In regards to Camus’ philosophy of nature, this chapter will consider the 
overlapping of feminist and ecological concerns, primarily as represented by the eco-feminist writings of Val 
Plumwood, and their relation to the metaphysics of Mediterraneanism and cosmological absurdity. It is 
important to clarify that Camus did not ostensibly see his philosophy of nature as relating to the persistent 
difficulties of gendered hierarchy, however, much like the formal relation between Camus’ work and Eastern 
philosophies, some structural similarities arise between these two divergent projects. Of significant interest is 
the correlation between relationships in nature and the formation of ethical virtues, and the application of a 
metaphysic of non-difference between subject and nature. Further, symbolic equivalences can be found, such 
as between Camus’ criticism of the universalist view of reason and Plumwood’s rejection of 
phallogocentricism, the social and moral imposition of dualist mythologies, and the critical importance of the 
irrational in the construction of an attitude of ethical responsiveness.  
 Plumwood provides a definition for the broad range of works which have been collected under the 
label of ‘eco-feminism’, writing that it is “a body of literature whose theme is the link between the 
domination of women and the domination of nature.”  In her own work on this topic, she has drawn a 287
parallel between the application of universal reason in the history of Western philosophy and Kant’s writing 
in particular, and the denial of these faculties of reason to women and animals. While it is possible to 
reconstruct Kantian faculties of reason and judgement in a way that recognises women and people of colour, 
and many contemporary authors do, Plumwood notes that “Kantian ethics makes these assumptions about the 
distribution of reason, [and] the construction of reason as oppositional to nature and its human and non-
human representatives which is built into the framework is the key to the anthropocentrism of the western 
tradition.”  It is arguable that Kant’s use of the Sublime to establish a universality of experience to mediate 288
natural beauty through anthropomorphised judgements a priori not only separates the subject from nature, 
but also has the effect of denying subjectivity in that which is contemplated as beautiful. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the dynamic sublime is represented as a confrontation with the ubiquitous incomprehensibility 
of nature and regarded as a pain due to its opposition to ‘human purposiveness’. Camus’ environmental 
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philosophy anticipates the eco-feminist critique of absolute reason and the ethical consequences of pitting 
universal reason against nature.  
 Plumwood frames the problem of moral universalism as delegitimising the personal, immanent and 
emotional aspects of moral thinking and feeling. She writes, “The universalisation framework fails to capture 
the most important elements of respect, which are not reducible to or based on duty any more than the most 
important elements of friendship are, but … are rather an expression of a certain kind of selfhood and a 
certain kind of non-instrumentalising relation between self and other.”  This speaks to the importance of 289
considering one’s own passionate and embodied needs and how they may impact on our ability to form 
‘disinterested’ judgements at all, while simultaneously highlighting that the invocation of a universal 
purposiveness is in practice a totalitarian ethic. Those who are not seen as contributing to the progression of 
an a priori justified historical project, which has typically been people of colour and women within the 
domains of western philosophy,  are deemed worthy of moral consideration only in relation to their 290
proposed rational ability. Like Plumwood, Camus sees the tradition of European ethics as having actively 
ignored the immanent concerns of lived experience and the disregard for those who are instrumentalised by a 
civilisation which denies them reason. Camus also recognises the link between oppressed social groups and 
the disregard for nature as something to be conquered in the services of historical civilisation, however he 
frames this convergence in terms of his own immersion in class relations. While the discursive lens may be 
framed differently between Camus and eco-feminism, these differences are not exclusive: the relational 
ontology implied in a counter-absolutist ethic of nature is, as Camus notes, militantly inclusive: “But if one 
single human being is missing in the world of fraternity then this world is immediately depopulated.”  291
These ethics can be conceived as non-dualities, not a rejection of the role of reason, but a temperance of the 
rational ego with immanent experiences of the body as situated in an environment. This framing allows a 
contrast between the holistic ethics proposed by Camus and Plumwood, against the universalist ethics of the 
Kantian tradition.  
 In Kant’s philosophy, the functional categories of reason and judgement are unified by a foundational 
principle, the transcendental unity of apperception. Apperception is the psychological activity by which 
perceptions and experiences are incorporated into the already existing schematic of ideas. The mental 
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categories of human reason (categories of relation, quality, quantity and modality/being) are given to be the 
prerequisite factors which allow this assumption to function.  The unifying element of Kant’s principle 292
aims to show that synthesis is a necessary condition for the aforementioned apperceptive aspect of self-
consciousness,  which is to say, that the unity of apperception allows an individual to “take ownership” of 293
their mental categories. The experience of one’s thoughts, judgements and reasons as being unified is in itself 
an object of experience, and thus to Kant, establishes the existence of transcendental a priori precursors that 
underwrite the ability to think at all.  It is precisely this claim to universality which is engaged as problematic 
by ecologically based ethics, as it imposes a limited, historically contingent phenomenology as the only 
necessary source and beneficiary of ethical concern. Plumwood writes that “problematic theory making 
usually emerges from privileged western perspectives and uncritically extends those perspectives and 
experiences universally in hegemonic ways. Western culture has long encouraged such imperialist 
extensions, and theorists from privileged backgrounds at the centre, even radical ones, often are not well 
enough informed to notice the conflict or do not care enough about indigenous and other justice issues to 
rethink their theories when conflict becomes evident.”  Some of these same criticisms can be levelled 294
against the ethics of Camus, given that his relative silence on the role of Arab and Berber people in his 
writing has been a point of contention throughout the scholarship of his work.  But for the purposes of this 295
section, an important focus should be given to the resistance against ethical universalisation and the basis of 
this resistance in the syncretic relations of the natural world.  
 Camus’ account of the Absurd, in contrast to the Sublime and its related a priori faculties of 
judgement, is proposed as a universal possibility rather than an essential pre-requisite of ethical 
consideration. It necessarily arises from a confrontation with otherness and is sustained by an acceptance of 
the divorce between one’s reasoning faculties and the dynamic unreason of the world as experience.  This 296
presents a model of ethical decision making which not only accepts the incomprehensibility of the Other, but 
is explicitly grounded in our unknowingness. The alienation of the ego in the Absurd is correlative to 
Plumwood’s relationally ontological ethics, wherein “Respect for others involves acknowledging their 
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distinctness and difference, and not trying to reduce or assimilate them to the human sphere. We need to 
acknowledge difference as well as continuity to overcome dualism and to establish non-instrumentalising 
relationships with nature, where both connection and otherness are the basis of interaction.”  It might be 297
said that Camus’ critique of the existential philosophers in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) is equally applicable 
to Kant’s account of aesthetics, though on the axis of axiology and judgement, rather than epistemology. 
When encountering the first stage of the Sublime, the intellect is confounded by the sheer scale of the 
experience. This correlates broadly to the awareness of the Absurd, which Camus intimates in the theories of 
existentialist philosophers, writing that “the theme of the irrational, as it is conceived by the existentialists, is 
reason becoming confused and escaping by negating itself. The absurd is lucid reason noting its limits.”  298
The second stage of the Sublime is a retreat into the absolution of reason itself, a denial of the threat of the 
concrete-infinite, by virtue of an appeal to knowledge and the conceptualisation of this conflict is taken as its 
own resolution. This leap from the irrational to the rational is the same movement as the 'nostalgia for unity’ 
that characterises the proof of the transcendent for Jaspers or Kierkegaard. It is only by appeal to 
transcendental faculties and the superiority of the rational ego-subject that one escapes the apparent horror of 
non-purposiveness in the sublime. Alternatively, Camus would seek to describe the sublime in terms of 
immanence and the conflict which arises when reason attempts to comprehend the overwhelming scale of 
nature, noting the limitations that arise without claiming the discovery of these boundaries as a form of 
conquest.  
 Another author who is concerned with the non-dual syncretism between humanity and our natural 
setting is Alan Watts, who was briefly addressed in the previous chapter. Watts describes the limitations of 
the rational ego in its project to conquer and understand nature in his text Nature, Man and Woman (1958), 
writing that “Understanding nature by means of thought is like trying to make out the contours of an 
enormous cave with the aid of a small flashlight casting a bright but very thin beam. The path of the light and 
the series of ‘spots’ over which it has passed must be retained in memory and from this record the general 
appearance of the cave must laboriously be reconstructed.”  For Camus, to whom all phenomena are 299
privileged and all perspectives imbued with value, the experience of the Sublime is not an escape into the 
transcendent superiority of human reason, but rather an immanent acceptance of the cold indifference of 
totality, but also the openness of this negation. Describing the Absurd person as closer to Plato than the 
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modern philosophers, Camus writes “to be sure, transcendency had been eliminated. But a sudden shift in 
thought brings back into the world a sort of fragmentary immanence which restores to the universe its 
depth.”  In the above metaphor  from Watts of the spotlight in the cave, from the standpoint of Absurd 300
immanence, each moment of light is a totality in itself, and as an artwork is enclosed in a frame, the limits of 
experience make possible the very conditions of meaning. It is only by the very nature of contrast, of 
particularity and immanence against totality and transcendence, that a point of revolt can be found. In his 
early essay, The Wind at Djemila (1938), Camus discusses this ontological moment: “There are places where 
the mind dies so that a truth which is its very denial may be born … in the great confusion of wind and sun 
that mixes light into the ruins, in the silence and solitude of this dead city, something is forged that gives man 
[sic] the measure of his identity.”  How could the very same cool breeze and the warm sun that gently 301
caresses the skin be the very same forces that bring the greatest of cities to ruin? How trivial it must have 
appeared, to consider transcendence of Hegelian dialectical necessity in the ruins of the desert, where it 
becomes obvious that “the world always conquers history in the end.”   302
Conclusion: At the edge of the world 
So far in Act II, we have explored the world of spirit, and now the world of contingent experience. These 
metaphysical explorations are fundamental to underpinning Camus’ ontological discussion of the living 
subject. This chapter has explored Camus’ external world metaphysics through the prism of an aesthetically 
focussed phenomenology. This began with a discussion of Mediterraneanism, the concept which 
encapsulates Camus’ differentiation from his existentialist peers, and European philosophy more broadly. 
This attitude of the Mediterranean is described as a ‘temperament’ which elevates the primacy of the physical 
world over the illusory permanence and truths of historicity. This temperament naturally leads to a 
psychological mode of lucidity, the grounding of Camus’ ethic of quantity. The ethic of quantity establishes 
value in immanent experiences over transcendent ones, and the lucid mind is responsible for identifying the 
boundaries of the immanent, to stop one short of inferring transcendental categories, meanings or objects. 
The combination of these philosophical principles leads to the conclusion that the only reality one can 
participate in is that which is directly experienced, and the lucid awareness that any theological, political or 
historical unification of these experiences is based in either a desire for nostalgia or an appeal to infinity. In 
either case, the illegitimate attempt to explain away the limits of experience by positing these limits as 
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transcendent faculties constitutes an act of philosophical suicide, and diminishes the value of subjective 
experience. These principles of Camus’ aesthetic metaphysics were then utilised to discuss the Absurd as an 
immanent and lucid inversion of Kant’s account of the Sublime. This is not to deny that the sublime 
experience takes place, but rather that the extension of that experience into a transcendental rule is an 
illegitimate leap. Rather, by accepting the Absurd condition as it is, Camus’ advocates a sublime experience 
of the earth, free of judgement, authentically indifferent and returning the profound depth to immanence.  
 This now concludes the discussion of the anti-transcendental trends in Camus’ account of both 
spiritualism and the lived world. These sketches have illuminated some of the fundamental structures of non-
duality that can be elicited from Camus’ work, such as the imposition of conceptual limits and the balancing 
of opposing forces. The final chapter of this section will move on to the body as the nexus point which lives 
the tension between the narratives of the spirit and the world, the point of contact to which all meaning is 
referred. 
 96
 Chapter 6: Embodiment and Life-Value 
Camus’ philosophy is undoubtedly physiological in character, engaging with embodied problems such as 
suffering, murder and suicide. Bodily experiences were just as formative to Camus’ thinking as the ‘hang 
ups’ of religious thinking. The body is the most obvious and immediate limit to experience, the self and 
action. By presenting the body as an instrument of philosophy, Camus rejects the hierarchical organisation of 
Cartesian dualism. To separate the mind from the body is merely to cleave it at the point of its limit. Camus 
continues to engage in the Nietzschean paradigm by making the reference point of philosophy the body, 
rather than the mind. This is a philosophy that is lived, a philosophy of experience embodied in a world with 
all its beauty and suffering, which serves no higher principle, ideal or certain future. Some of the principles 
of the body from Camus’ philosophy have been discussed in relation to religions of immanence in Chapter 
Four, but its role as the primary site of perception and the tool through which we enact our being, invites a 
deeper critique of this oft-diminished philosophical topic. The body has become a prominent topic in 
philosophy since Camus’ death, in fields as diverse as feminist philosophy, the philosophy of science, 
political philosophy and ethics. The body was on the rise as a subject of thought in the works of Camus’ 
phenomenologist contemporaries, but in Western Europe, the body had been condemned to the realm of 
immanence, subordinate to the mind as in Descartes’ dualism, or a mere function or illusion of mind or soul. 
Camus’ work stands amongst a broad re-engagement with the body as a site of philosophy, but unlike the 
‘bracketing’ of the body from the world, as in the mind-body dualism of Descartes or the escape from 
immanence in Sartre’s ontology, Camus returns to the Hellenic celebration of the living body, its tragedy and 
beauty, as it hurtles in full force towards an inevitable demise.  
 This chapter will explore the role of embodiment in Camus’ ethics, aesthetics, ontology and 
epistemology. This discussion will begin with his experiences as a child and a young man, the lessons of 
solidarity from his days on the sports field, and the diminishing of his life through the crippling effects of 
tuberculosis. These formative aspects will then be viewed through the prism of theatre, the field of work in 
which Camus’ legacy continues to enjoy a lasting impact. The theatre will be seen in Camus’ philosophy as 
an expression of the Absurd par excellence, as well as a demonstration of the constructive discourse of being 
and self-knowledge. Finally, this theatrical ontology will be compared to the mind-body non-duality of Yoga, 
to further demonstrate the development of this principle in Camus’ work.  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Physiological Knowledge 
The concept of physiological knowledge is a theory that has been dismissed in Western philosophy for some 
time. From Aristotelean Scholasticism to Cartesian dualism and the still-emerging popular philosophy of 
scientism, matter has been viewed as essentially inert and in need of a form or external intelligence to 
manifest any meaningful behaviour. However, the Twentieth Century experienced a resurgence of interest in 
the philosophy of the body. Notable contributions include Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of 
praktignosia,  Franz Fanon’s theorisation of ‘black bodies’,  and Luce Irigaray’s emphasis on the 303 304
maternal body.  Camus can be comfortably considered within this ‘bodily renaissance’ of modern European 305
philosophy. In an interview given in the early 1950s, Camus established the primacy of his sporting 
experiences, saying “After many years during which I saw many things, what I know most surely about 
morality and the duty of man I owe to sport and learned it in the RUA [Racing Universitaire Algerios].”  306
These lessons, like Camus’ view of ethical principles as a whole, were revealed through lived experience, 
rather than derived from abstracted logic or inherited from authority. The proper operation of one’s mind is 
put down to physical conditions for Camus, and he notes in conversation with Jean-Claude Brisville, 
“Physical life in the open air, in the sun, sport and a proper balance in my body are, for me, the conditions 
under which I do my best intellectual work … in any case I know that creation is an intellectual and bodily 
discipline, a school of energy.”  Sport, for Camus, takes on Nietzsche’s notion of the moral significance of 307
physiological self-improvement as discussed in Chapter 2, although unlike the personal discipline of 
Japanese Zen and the Overman, competitive team sports further develop this bodily discipline into values of 
solidarity and communitarianism. Even while playing the relatively solitary role of goal keeper in his youth, 
Camus gained an appreciation for the interdependence of the team to achieve positive outcomes, as well as 
the honour of sportsmanship in dealings with the opposing side. Noting his commitment to the sport, 
biographer Olivier Todd describes that Camus had once blocked a goal by taking a shot directly to his chest, 
which had caused him to faint under the goalposts.  Further, his dedication and skill were noted by the 308
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community, being singled out for praise in the team bulletin.  Matthew Sharpe contextualises these 309
experiences within his youth in Algeria, writing that Camus’ “fundamental sense of natural ‘plenitude’ which 
Camus received in his formative experiences growing up bathing on the Mediterranean coasts, basking in the 
sun, admiring the half-naked beauties, keeping goal in the local football team, and tasting for the first time 
the joys of sensual love, lies at the heart of his lifelong resistance to being dubbed an ‘existentialist’.”  310
Camus sees the nostalgia of his childhood innocence as an ‘essence’ which precedes his current existence 
and it is perhaps the early loss of this enjoyable, communal experience of camaraderie, particularly in sport, 
which cemented a nostalgic intuition in his approach to the world.  
 This disruption of his youthful enjoyment of life came during the early days of his tutelage under Jean 
Grenier. It is remarkable, given the condition of poverty he had grown up in, that Camus could have survived 
the onset of tuberculosis, in a frontier colony in the 1930s. Treatment options were severely limited, and it 
was widely considered to lead to certain death.  As with his education, Camus received healthcare on 311
behalf of the state due to his status as a war orphan.  The pain this illness brought was a stark contrast to 312
the bodily pleasures of an active physiological engagement with the world and society. Indeed, it is for 
precluding this engagement that the illness of tuberculosis was such a diminishing experience. Having been 
ousted from the sports field by the betrayal of his own body, Camus turned to that other wellspring of 
meaning, the collective wisdom of philosophy. The consolations of the stoic philosopher, Epictetus, were of 
particular interest, in that illness was viewed as a mere obstacle to the body which the will could overcome. 
Choosing to take up the stoic challenge, Camus endeavoured to affirm the positive in his illness, considering 
it as a first step on the road to learning to live under the shadow of death. Sharpe highlights that “Camus’ 
experience from this time was coloured by an unusually intimate sense of the proximity of death, 
periodically heightened by his relapses of the disease.”  What more visceral lesson in the absurdity of all 313
contingent action could there be, than the immanent and lifelong threat of immediate death?  
 For Camus, all serious problems, and indeed the most “serious philosophical problem”  of suicide, 314
are understood in terms of the rights of the body. For Camus, the drive towards suicide is a response, whether 
legitimate or not, to the realisation of the Absurd. In The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) he defines the conditions 
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through which the problem of suicide arises, when “people have played on words and pretended to believe 
that refusing to grant a meaning to life necessarily leads to declaring that it is not worth living."  This 315
makes the value of life nothing more than its logical or analytic conclusions. Such a worldview is inherent in 
Cartesian discipline, which dictates that the mind or soul is an exclusively thinking thing which is separate 
from the physical world and limitless in its capacity to engage in thought and imagination.  Within 316
Augustine’s ethical preference for permanence, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Cartesian cogito 
assumes the role of one’s permanent self. Under the auspices of Grace, the dualistic subject is absolved of the 
need to find a ‘meaning to life’ in the contingent sense of justifying one’s time and suffering in the lived 
world. But following the collapse of divine meaning through the European enlightenment, and the rise of 
secular and materialist accounts of the subject and the state, the necessity for a worldly meaning becomes 
pertinent. This recalls aphorism 80, on ‘The Old Man and Death’ in Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human 
(1878). Nietzsche discusses the case of an old man who is prolonging his life despite the exhaustion of age 
and continuous humiliating medical interventions. “In this case, suicide is quite natural, obvious, and should 
by rights awaken respect for the triumph of reason” he argues, continuing to conclude that “Religions 
provide abundant excuses to escape the need to kill oneself.”  In this way, suicide is the act of the will 317
breaching the natural limits of the body, a pitting of reason against the conditions of material necessity. In 
Camus’ philosophy, suicide is an affliction brought on by a dualistic division between mind and body.  
 Camus sought to articulate a response to this absurd confrontation, which did not exceed the limits of 
what can be known and what can be felt. The Myth of Sisyphus (1942) explores the routines and social 
constructions which serve to keep the subject from the uncanny, inhumanity of absurd realisation. Camus’ 
philosophy stands as a phenomenological account of breaking with the ‘simulated realities’ which came to be 
theorised in Jean Baudrillard’s Simulation and Simulacra (1981). In the constructed environments and 
authoritative structures of civilisation, the subject takes on the ‘simulation’ of being human. “Weariness 
comes at the end of the acts of a mechanical life, but at the same time it inaugurates the impulse of 
consciousness. It awakens consciousness and provokes what follows. What follows is the gradual return into 
the chain or it is the definitive awakening.”  The language of ‘awakening’ directly mirrors that of the 318
Buddha, and suggests a similar reintegration of one’s self as organism and one’s self as behaviour. The 
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parallel to the beginnings of Zen philosophy is even clearer, with D.T. Suzuki noting “The coming of 
Bodhidharma to China early in the sixth century was simply to introduce this satori element into the body of 
Buddhism, whose advocates were then so engrossed in the subtleties of philosophical discussion or in the 
mere literary observance of rituals and disciplinary rules.”  Camus describes this awakening as the 319
perception “that the stage sets collapse”  wherein the role one has become accustomed to playing ceases to 320
take on meaning beyond the arbitrary social conditions or cultural narratives which demand the role to be 
played. Unlike the Futurists or Surrealists, who attempted to define a rule for life and sanction meaning 
within it, Camus chooses to confront the problem directly, to justify the value of a life within the conditions 
of absurdity. Having been active in the theatre for much of his adult life, Camus likened this to the actor who 
steps off the stage and returns to being their own self, no longer bound by the rules of the stage or the 
dictations of the script. The absurd reasoning merely takes this one step further to realise that the self is as 
much a role as any fictional character.  
Theatre  
Just as theatre lay at the heart of Hellenic life, philosophy and spirituality, it too was a unifying structure 
throughout Camus’ oeuvre, playing varied roles from a form of philosophical expression and inquiry, to its 
use as a broader analogy of ethical and meta-ethical concerns. Given this prevalence of theatrical form and 
content, it is hardly difficult to see the bemusement Camus must have felt with the obsession philosophy has 
entertained for the ‘truths behind the curtain’. Having all the wondrous appearance of existence before them, 
who would seek to establish value in the cold, mechanical structures of ‘backstage’ metaphysics? Often cast 
among the ranks of the existentialist philosophers, and reduced to a dialectic of revolt and the absurd,  321
Camus’ work engaged primarily with the theatre and the theme of theatricality endured as an essential 
characteristic of his philosophy. The remainder of this chapter will be centrally dedicated to this principle of 
a ‘performative philosophy’ and the constructive ontology of drama, which unifies and underpins the non-
dual outcomes within Camus’ philosophy. In describing Camus’ philosophy as performative, I mean not only 
the subtle metaphysic derived from his immersion in theatrical arts, but also more direct factors such as the 
emphasis on praxis, the derivation of meaning from action and in the mimesis of character and person. Much 
of the significance of theatricality is explored in Camus’ illustration of the absurd qualities of the Actor in 
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The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), as well as his 1957 lecture, ‘On the Future of Tragedy’ delivered in Athens. 
These primary texts, along with contemporary commentary, will begin to draw the dramatic curtain to reveal 
the non-dual principles of Camus’ philosophy and art.  
 The ‘Absurd Man’ is a collection of theoretical, or archetypal, phenomenologies individually titled 
‘Don Juanism’, ‘Drama’ and ‘Conquest’. To begin, these are characteristically masculine descriptions, 
leaving Camus open to the charge of misogyny or patriarchal thought.  However, I would offer two brief 322
defences. First, these phenomenologies are not intended as an exhaustive or totalising description, and 
secondly, ‘feminine absurdity’ is not actively precluded as such, but one may infer that the 'Absurd Woman’ 
is more aptly theorised and documented in women’s writing, such as the character Cecile in François Sagan’s 
fictional novella, Bonjour Tristesse (1954). On the role of women in Camus’ works, it is worth noting the 
view that “his use of predominantly female characters to represent nurture, compassion, care, and 
embodiment, while predominantly using male characters to represent action, logic, and adherence to attract 
principles of justice … has its tendency to lend itself to dichotomous thinking.”  However, Bartlett does 323
note that Camus engages with ‘gynocentric values’,  and further, that any oppositional tendency would be 324
an outcome inherent in dualistic language and culture;  and despite the passionate responses of Albert 325
Camus the man, his non-dual philosophy as a whole would inevitably encourage freedom and inclusion for 
all. A woman is indeed as capable of rebelling as a man is.  
 The section Drama begins with a discussion of Hamlet, specifically where a play is used within the 
play, in order to ‘catch the conscience of the king’, thereby showing theatre in theatre to examine the 
intersection between drama and ‘conscience’. In much the same way then, a man acting as Man will tell us 
much about the intersection between Man and consciousness, and it is this practice which forms the very 
core of the art of theatre. Drama then becomes a key tool in Camus’ description of The Absurd, however that 
is not to say that all dramatists, actors, theatre-goers and critics are inherently aware of this absurd potential. 
It is not some secret club, ephemeral knowledge for the in-crowd: rather, it is within the structures of theatre 
that one can “enter another life” or “experience the eternal” without sacrificing one’s grounding in the real, 
immanent world. The character which the actor is playing, and the everyday ego of the actor are both equally 
imposed and freely chosen, constructed realities, rather than innate identities. Theatre shows the non-
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essential facet of human nature. A character can equally be played by many bodies and a body may play 
many characters. While the character and actor are essentially separate, that is, they are both capable of 
existing independently of one another, in praxis they are of an interdependent field, in that one is defined in 
terms of the other, and both are only ontologically realised at the moment of praxis. A sudden realisation by a 
particularly lucid actor, of the arbitrariness of ‘self’ and the unclear distinction of the ‘character’ from that 
self could produce a sense of egoless-ness indistinguishable from Buddhist satori, the striking moment of 
non-self or non-being which precipitates the state of Nirvana as described in Chapter Four. This is to say that 
the moment of absurd awareness in the actor is essentially one of realising the enactment of a microcosmic 
version of the performativity of being.  
 The stage actor is unlike the advent of the cinematic actor, or the author, or the recorded musician, in 
that the significance of their profession, the measure of their art, lies only in the immanent moment of the 
performance to the audience. No future generations will empathise with this gesture or that inflection with 
which a line was delivered. Necessarily, for the character or the play to have transcendent meaning it must be 
embodied by another actor, whose body would gesture a little slower or with a stilted repose, to be one 
among the many actors who will sacrifice their body in the service of bringing the eternality of the character 
to life. This conception of the actor and their art is reflected again in Camus’ early essays, writing in Nuptials 
at Tipassa (1938) “There is a feeling that actors have when they know they’ve played their part well,  that is 
to say, when they have made their gestures coincide with those of the ideal character they embody, having 
entered somehow into a prearranged design, bringing it to life with their own heartbeats.”  This idea 326
displays by analogy the limitation of time which is imposed on each living organism and felt in the mortal 
self-awareness of the human mind. The stage too comes to perform as analogy to the limitations of the 
concrete world, the stage actor having to learn to act within the restricted confines of the rules and setting of 
the play.  
 Camus’ fascination with the stage arose from the coalescence of the mythical or metaphysical with the 
material, an enactment which draws a non-duality out of this and many other dichotomies, such as the eternal 
and the immanent, the subject and the spectator, and the known with the acted. The actor “abundantly 
illustrates every month or every day that so suggestive truth that there is no frontier between what man wants 
to be and what he is.”  This experience of the actor demonstrates the implications of Camus’ theatrical 327
worldview and the role of embodiment in a particularly contemporary problem, that is the advent of the 
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‘digital self’ and the ethical implications of being an online actor, an effectively disembodied ego on a digital 
plane. Social media has rapidly become one of the preferred and most central mediums through which the 
individual connects with other people, but also through which they discover, define, construct and project the 
self. Social media profiles become static, amalgamated representations of the self, while simultaneously 
functioning as the interface for dynamic and evolving social relationships. One might conceive of the 
emergence of digital reality to be as profound a societal shift as from the spoken to the written word.  
 However, the digital reality is disconnected, or in Platonic terms, removed from the material world. 
Research by Andreassen, Pallesen and Griffiths, suggests that aggressive social media use can reflect a need 
to feed the ego and to immunise against negative self-evaluation.  Negative self-evaluation is uncommon, 328
especially in a medium defined by public forums; however that same environment, combined with 
anonymity, has given rise to prolific negative evalutation of the Other. In its attempt to capture a snapshot of 
the self, social media has succeeded only in presenting the most superficial view of personhood, 
inadvertently reopening superficial modes of thinking and encouraging tribalism, confirmation biases and 
artificially demarcated social groups. The digital interface which is interposed between the mind and the 
world functions as a contemporary Platonic Cave, wherein people’s experiences are merely disembodied 
reflections, drawing the gaze away from the complexity of a living universe. While clearly the medium of 
our deception has evolved from the traditions of the Ancient Greeks or Brahmans or the theological 
deviations of medieval churches, to the wartime propaganda of Camus’ own time, and onwards to the digital 
sphere, the Hellenic call remains immanent: to bring humanity back into the world. Of course, this is not to 
suggest that the carte blanche removal of social media would liberate humanity, nor that such a liberation is 
possible nor even desirable. Many of France’s post-war philosophers would go on to refine the inherent 
pervasiveness of superficial realities, hyper-realities and even the Derridean double-fold of philosophy’s own 
blindspots.  The linear, dialectical attitude of an ‘End of History’  depends on an ideal, perfect state of 329 330
humanity, but such a stasis would be unrecognisable as human much as a system of biology that no longer 
procreates, grows and evolves would cease to be understandable as biology.  
 The theatre, and Camus’ broader philosophy, recalls the centrality of the body to human existence, a 
seemingly fixed viewpoint in a state of constant flux. In a sense, Camus has taken the human self back from 
the realm of the transcendental, dispensed with essential and immutable categories of experience, showing 
 Andreassen, Pallesen, and Griffiths. "The Relationship between Addictive Use of Social Media, Narcissism, and 328
Self-esteem: Findings from a Large National Survey." Addictive Behaviors 64 (2017): 287-93 (291-292).
 See: Jacques Derrida. Dissemination. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. 329
 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Press, 1993.330
 104
instead that it is the things that change, more so than the things that are static, which define our humanity. 
What we define to be human all too often can be reduced to a set of accidental properties, some privileged, 
others diminished, of the political realities of the time. “No art can completely reject reality,”  and the 331
theatrical can induce a feeling of absurdity, in that the stylisation of the stage is indistinguishable from the 
stylisation of the self: people build their environments, choose their costumes and learn their lines in order to 
live out the set-piece narratives demanded of modern existence. However, the impulse to integrate one's 
mind and body into a syncretic unity has found expression throughout cultures external from industrial 
modernity. This chapter will now move on to exploring the relationship between the ‘Absurd body’ and the 
immanent performativity of Yoga, a primarily bodily system of philosophy.  
Yogic and Absurd Philosophies 
The correlation between the practice of Yoga and the production of theatrical arts is already a well 
established one. While the meditative aspect may be easier to associate with the performance of music or 
dance, the role of the ego, or rather the pseudo-ego in dramatic performance involves a more immediate 
demonstration of the transcendental activity of the body. A study by Sergei Tcherkasski has sought to 
demonstrate the historical influence of Yoga on Russian theatre, and the Western psyche more generally. In 
Fundamentals of the Stanislavski System and Yoga Philosophy and Practice (2013), Tcherkasski explores the 
physiological and psychological elements of inner creativity and the cross cultural understanding of the 
unconscious, as they relate to Stanislavski’s method for adopting the psychological mode of the performed 
character. In this way, and in the artificially bracketed context of the theatre stage, the impact of the body on 
the ego can be correlated to the mystic practice of Yogic philosophy. Tcherkasski writes that “Yoga provided 
Stanislavski with precise techniques to develop these qualities of an actor."  The Stanislavski system is a 332
formula by which the interactions of muscular tension, the breath, attention and intention, and psychological 
phenomena are correlated into a practical method, that is, method acting in and of itself. Through these 
physiological and psychological techniques, the actor is able to correlate the relationships between mind, 
body and metabolism into contingent being. That is to say, the embodiment of the character is neither a 
phenomenon of the mind, or the body, or even an activity, but rather the interplay of all these factors. 
Through yoga and drama, we can begin to correlate the concepts of lucidity and mindfulness, particularly in 
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the context of Camus’ interest in Eastern mystic practices, and further, to the total correlation of mind and 
body. One example of this is the use of speculative imagination and the creation of mental images and 
scenarios, “lures the students’ imagination into the territory beyond the limits of their personal experience, 
into the world unknown to them which they would not be able to explore otherwise than through their 
imagination and visions.”  333
 Yoga as a practice is comprised of many aspects of various performative artistic disciplines, yet 
without reference to the creation of anything outside of the limits of the body. Hindu scholar Gerald Larson 
proposes that the philosophy underpinning the practice of yoga can have constructive input on the Western 
conceptions of the mind-body problem. Larson claims that Yoga is “one of the oldest experimental, 
empirically based research programs regarding mind-body interaction known to the human species, and it 
deserves to be taken seriously as an important chapter in the quest for human understanding.”  Beyond its 334
purely spiritual application, the practice of Yoga is undoubtedly physiological, a form of exercise which 
explores both the limits and interactions of the body and emphasises the performative nature of the breath as 
a unifying constant, a behaviour which both a part of, and conceptually separate from the body, as the mind 
is in Western dualism. It is important to consider the cosmological foundation of Hindu philosophy to 
properly situate Yoga as a philosophy of mind. This cosmology proposes a kind of conscious materialism, 
wherein a primordial energy arranges itself by internal principles into the material reality we encounter, and 
this “primal material energy can activate or externalize itself (rajas) in a manner that is transparent or 
intelligible (sattva) and substantial or determinate (tamas), and all manifestations of primary material energy 
are, therefore, purposeful (rajas), coherent (sattva), and objective (tamas).”  In this sense, the structures 335
which we associate with consciousness are considered to be primary functions of the primordial substance. 
As a material expression of this primordial energy, subjective consciousness is not unique to the human 
entity, but rather the unique consciousness of that human entity is a limited perspective of the universal 
consciousness of the cosmos. Alan Watts further articulates the Hindu cosmological system as a grand 
dramatic narrative where “Brahman, the self in the Hindu worldview, plays hide-and-seek with itself forever 
and ever. How far out, how lost can you get? According to the Hindu idea, each one of us is the god-head, 
getting lost on purpose for the fun of it."  This presents a picture of a universe that is monistically idealist 336
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while simultaneously being pluralistically materialist. It is the ordinary, daily sense of consciousness which 
identifies with the materialism of one’s contingent place in the universe which is to be disrupted in order to 
disentangle oneself from the illusions of desire and suffering. Larson gives the basic definition of Yoga as 
"the cessation of the functioning of ordinary awareness”  which is phenomenologically similar to Camus’ 337
description of the sudden advent of absurd awareness.  338
 Both Yoga and Camus’ theatrical ontology engage heavily with bodily practices of philosophy, and 
make meaning out of the immanent conditions of the contingent self. Both systems attempt to disrupt 
ordinary consciousness by means of a performative awareness: Yoga, by the adoption of specific poses and 
the control of one’s breath as a primal constant, and Camus’ absurd by equating the performance of the self 
to the performance of any fictional character in theatrical form. This can be seen where Camus’ writes “Here 
the actor is the intruder. He breaks the spell chaining that soul and at last the passions can rush on to their 
stage.”  Notably, both of these philosophies engage with a split between ordinary awareness and a more 339
natural, authentic consciousness. Larson describes the dualism of Yoga as “interestingly different from what 
might be called garden-variety dualisms” arguing instead that it engages with a “notion of ‘consciousness’ as 
distinct from ‘awareness’,” where consciousness represents a state which “is ontologically and 
epistemologically distinct from the mind-body realm of empirical existence.”  Yoga is of course a diverse 340
set of practices, associated with the dissemination of Indian philosophy and theology into the surrounding 
regions, and the specifics of these systems are highly contingent on the cultural and theological predilections 
of the practitioners. Of particular interest to physiological forms of philosophy is Tantric Yoga. Tantra is a 
term which relates to weaving, and the practice of Tantric Yoga involves the interweaving of different styles 
of Yoga and philosophy, and aims towards the interweaving of the subject with the divine. The core of this 
interweaving is the body as a spiritual vessel, “for what is ordinarily called the body is an abstraction. It is 
the conventional fiction of an object seen apart from its relation to the universe, without which it has no 
reality whatsoever."  For example, it is not necessarily the skin of a person which keeps their biological 341
form contained, but rather the skin in relation to the fifteen pounds per square inch of air pressure. 
Consciousness resides in the spaces between the objects of intentional awareness, but rather than driving 
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these objects apart, the spaces are the unifying principle and “we need to recognise the physical reality of 
relationship between organisms as having as much ‘substance’ as the organisms themselves, if not more.”  342
The importance of this relational ontology of the body can be understood in terms of the philosophy of 
sexuality and the immanent virtues that Camus propounded. 
Consummation 
A link can be drawn here to the spiritual concerns raised in the Chapter Four, and the unique conception of 
incarnation discovered in the mythology of Jesus Christ. A fundamental principle of Hindu philosophy and 
its Buddhist derivates, is that any body is the incarnation of the divine, that the primordial void of 
consciousness creates the appearance of things and plays the role of a world expressed as distinct 
phenomena. When one practices Yoga, it becomes obvious that the names of various positions are designated 
by the ‘object’ that is mimicked in the behaviour of the pose. Through the application of these poses, one 
‘becomes’ the mountain, the upward facing dog, the warrior, or the cobra. Within oneself as an embodiment 
of consciousness, is the ability to adopt the being of the rest of the world, and demonstrates through the 
constancy of breath that one is constituted by behaviour rather than being. Compare that notion to Camus’ 
description of the dramatic, absurd subject-spectator, wherein “ceasing to admire the play, the mind wants to 
enter in. Entering into all these lives, experiencing them in their diversity, amounts to acting them out.”  343
The advanced Yoga practitioner is aiming towards the same conclusion as the absurd dramatist, the 
dissolution of the particular self as separate from that which is experienced, and the ecstatic immersion in the 
multiplicity of collective becoming.  
 The link between these two systems of bodily philosophy go further, when one considers the practice 
of sexual Yoga, as an interpretive structure for Camus’ account of absurdity in the person of Don Juan.  It 344
should be noted at the outset that Camus explicitly (if dispassionately) distanced himself from using Don 
Juan as a model of behaviour, describing both monogamy and sexual predation as denials of the absurd and 
likening them to a kind of suicide.  However, this invites the question as to why Camus would give this 345
character such considered analysis. Camus himself had been both the deceived and the deceiver across 
multiple, sometimes public, incidents of infidelity. Further, adultery has long been a very public aspect of the 
French social sphere, and in this context Camus’ early respect for Sartre and Beauvoir may have encouraged 
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him to experiment with the notion of unconventional sexual relations. While Camus’ work would later come 
to focus on more collectivist approaches to ethics (as will be discussed in Act III), The Myth of Sisyphus 
stands as an attempt to draw an ethics from the limited field of one’s own body and conscious awareness. 
This of course entails all the historical problems associated with the mythological neutrality of the white, 
male body. Without seeking to discredit robust scholarship on the intersections between historical 
objectification of women and the literary accounts of the character of Don Juan, the following is an attempt 
to charitably apply Camus’ phenomenological bracketing and separate the ontology of bodies and behaviour 
from the imposed necessity of socialised logics and moralities. To assist in this endeavour, the analysis will 
be tempered with reference to contemporary feminist scholar Luce Irigaray, who’s work on sexual difference 
has superseded the accounts of Camus and his contemporaries.  
 Much of what Camus highlights as holding importance in the myth of Don Juan can be seen as an 
thematically consistent with immanent spirituality of sexual yoga, including an engagement with collective 
meaning, subversion of the individualism of ordinary awareness and a submission to the conscious 
disintegration of difference through consummation. Part of this consciousness involves the understanding 
that bodies are not discreet entities, but rather the ‘end points’ of a relational system. “The whole is a pattern 
which remains, while the parts come and go, just as the human body is a dynamic pattern which persists 
despite the rapid birth and death of all its individual cells. The pattern does not, of course, exist 
disembodiedly apart from individual forms, but exists precisely through their coming and going.”  A non-346
dual ontology is characterised by identity being grounded in difference, such as that found in Luce Irigaray’s 
An Ethics of Sexual Difference (1993). For centuries in the West, philosophies of sexual difference have 
centred on the presence or absence of certain properties, be that rationality or biological functions, the 
identity of ‘the woman’ has been characterised in terms of lacking the positivist characteristics of the 
masculine. Irigaray rejects this historical, hierarchical notion, and instead advocates a re-imagination of 
sexual difference by account of the interval between them. “Irigaray deploys many different figures to 
represent the relational nature of the non-hierarchical sexual difference. The figures that she describes are not 
reducible to one another. Each modality of relational difference has a sense that emerges in the context of 
describing specific relationships.”  In this metaphysical framework, difference only arises in terms of 347
relationships, that is, one can only account for what is the same by excluding difference, and one can only 
establish difference by excluding that which is held in common. Further, Jean Byrne, in a doctoral thesis at 
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the University of Queensland on sexual difference and non-dual identity in the works of Irigaray, has noted 
that Tantric forms of Yoga avoid the split of mind-body dualism, in that “this split is not discernable in 
tantra, because in tantric philosophy the body is understood to be a psychospiritual centre .” This is not to 348
say that tantra involves the reduction of psychospiritual phenomena to functions of the body, but rather that 
bodies are the locus point to which our experience of a conscious universe relates. In order to comprehend 
the yogic conception of consciousness, a shift must occur from conceiving of consciousness as a mere 
accidental outgrowth of evolution, but rather to see it as a property intrinsic to the universe. “We must see 
that consciousness is neither an isolated soul nor the mere function of a single nervous system, but of that 
totality of interrelated stars and galaxies which makes a nervous system possible.”  The universe is more 349
than a sum of its parts, as consciousness is the expression of the relations that bind its particulars.  
 This question of consummation, and the relation of the sexual body to the Absurd, is reflected in 
Camus’ discussion of Don Juan as an interpretive lens for the Absurd hero. With the rise of feminist 
philosophy and the shifts in sexual politics in the years since the piece was written, Don Juan presents as a 
problematic description, perhaps even more controversial than the Conqueror. However, what must be noted 
first and foremost, is that the discussion on Don Juan is about love, and not sexuality and Camus opens his 
discussion writing that “If it were sufficient to love, things would be too easy.”  For Don Juan, love is 350
enumerated in action, rather than in the lofty, saint-like devotion from afar, which arguably reduces women 
to idols. Love is an act of the body and an incarnation of one’s desires, with each act being unique, whether 
with one partner or many. Camus notes that Don Juan is selfish in love, but denies that he is more selfish 
than the possessive monogamist.  Love need not be debased by appealing to eternal values, and to be 351
conscious of love is to be conscious of its temporal nature and its contingency on the relations of the flesh; it 
is in the flesh (la chair) that the passions of love are aroused. Camus writes of Don Juan that “He is an 
ordinary seducer. Except for the difference that he is conscious and that is why he is absurd.”  Compare this 352
to Alan Watts’ description of contemplative love in the tradition of tantric yoga. Watts describes a similar 
sexual politic, wherein the activities of the body are given their fullest respect and dignity, in effect, acting as 
a ritualistic recreation of the procreative forces of divinity. He writes that contemplative love "is simply that 
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a man and a woman are together exploring their spontaneous feeling - without any preconceived idea of what 
it ought to be, since the sphere of contemplation is not what should be but what is.”  Of course, there are 353
historical and contextual distinctions between these perspectives. Watts is writing in the context of spiritual 
love between life partners, relative to a broader discussion of Brahmanic sexual politics, while Camus is 
attempting to articulate a love which negates cultural hegemony, and is likely informed by his perception of 
sexual permissiveness in Hellenic society. For Camus, these descriptions are tied by a logic of absurd love 
not because they are a superior sexuality, nor that they introduce an orientation of justice with regard to 
gendered hierarchies: these questions would come to be contemplated by a more mature Camus in his pivot 
to political philosophy. But for his earlier, somewhat more romantic phase of writing, Don Juan is presented 
as an ordinarily problematic man, but with a lucid awareness of the limits of self and other and a refusal to 
justify his sin through the injection of any external meaning of social hierarchies, gender essentialism or 
eternal and divine narratives. As has been discussed above, it would be erroneous to call Camus a feminist, 
yet by its very nature, an ‘absurd sexuality’ lends itself to the destabilisation of traditional patriarchy, in a 
way more commensurate to the Dionysian cult than the rigour of academic ethics.  
 If Don Juan is to be judged as a misogynist, it is not for his actions in isolation, but if he engages in an 
appeal to a moral value: in Camus’ own society the act of consummation entails a responsibility for, and 
ownership of the female subject. He seeks to displace Don Juan as a pagan lover, and one who loves with a 
pagan ethic. The only one who is wronged in Camus' account of the legend is the patriarchal ‘law of the 
father’: “What else does that stone Commander signify, that cold statue set in motion to punish the blood and 
courage that dared to think? All the powers of eternal reason, of order, of universal morality, all the foreign 
grandeur of a God open to wrath are summed up in him.”  While Don Juan is not explicitly a symbolic 354
destabilisation of patriarchal culture, even as a pagan figure, bodily and spiritually immanent sexualities are 
becoming ever more central to feminist discourse. Bartlett again makes a connection between Camus’ project 
and ‘gynocentric values’, writing that “feminists are reclaiming earth-centred and female-centred religious 
traditions, often of their own indigenous origins, in which the body and women are revered, menstruation 
and childbirth are held in awe and respect, and the womb and vagina are considered sacred.”  This mirrors 355
Camus’ return to pagan roots in his consideration of Mediterraneanism, as well as the ‘fragmentary 
immanence’ by which all aspects of the world are privileged and afforded their appropriate depth. Don Juan, 
 Watts, Nature, Man and Woman, 196. 353
 Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, 72.354
 Bartlett, Rebellious Feminism: Camus’ Ethic of Rebellion and Feminist Thought, 143.355
 111
for Camus, demonstrates that the meaning of the love can be found entirely within the activity of love itself. 
The pagan Don Juan is a mythological starting point for a sexuality that reconnects with nature, reflecting the 
immediacy of immanent spirituality: Watts highlights for example, that in sexual yoga, “if these contacts are 
not regarded as leading to something else, but rather allowed to come to one’s consciousness as if the source 
of activity lay in them and not in the will, they become sensations of immense subtlety and richness.”  356
 Through this lens, of the conscious, contemplative lover, we can attempt to answer Camus’ question of 
whether Don Juan is selfish, and further, if that implies a moral fault on his part. Can one be faulted for 
participating directly in the joys of this limited and temporal existence? Yes, surely, but only if one interferes 
unduly with that right for others. Can one be faulted eternally, that is, morally damned? Such a question 
should be obviously beyond lucid contemplation. Eternal damnation is a question for the divine or history, 
whereas Don Juan exists within time, not by virtue of it. Camus sees Don Juan growing old, accepting the 
admonishments of society and the ridicule of his failing body in old age, and refusing to make a punishment 
of his fate. “That is his crime, and how easy it is to understand why the men of God call down punishment on 
his head. He achieves a knowledge without illusions which negates everything they profess.”  The Absurd 357
life contains all experiences, and once more the non-dual is expressed in the ageing Don Juan, resigned to 
self imprisonment in a monastery. “But this symbolises rather the logical outcome of a life completely 
imbued with the absurd,” Camus writes, “the grim ending of an existence turned towards short-lived joys. At 
this point, sensual pleasure winds up in asceticism. It is essential to realise that they may be as it were two 
aspects of the same destitution. What more ghastly image can be called up than that of a man betrayed by his 
body who, simply because he did not die in time, lives out the comedy while awaiting the end.”  A comedy 358
indeed, after each love had been consummated, Don Juan crept closer to the inevitable, temporal end of his 
sensual adventure, which paradoxically would be rendered eternal by death. It is only in the absurd ascesis, 
thrust upon him by the necessity of age, that he comes to fully contemplate the illusions of all the romantic 
promises made, and through the elimination of the ego behind the gestures, Don Juan’s loves take their true 
value as temporally limited, bodily experiences, unable to unite an existence, but certainly enough to expend 
a life. 
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Conclusion: The Absurd Body 
Between the absolutist aspirations of the spirit and the meaningless but vibrant world, the body lives the 
tension of existence and remains the point of reference to which all meaning must necessarily relate. It is 
through the enactment of Being that one becomes; it is by the effects on the body that one is situated in the 
world. As the limit of experience, the body too becomes the limit of knowledge. This focus on the body in 
philosophy is not unique to Camus, though he stands among a rising emphasis on direct experience and the 
physical conditions of existence. He follows on from Nietzsche’s physiological focus, and Camus agrees 
“that a philosopher, to deserve our respect, must preach by example.”  The ongoing development of bodily 359
philosophy includes much of the phenomenological and existentialist school of thought, such as the works of 
Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Frantz Fanon and Edmund Husserl. The social and political 
philosophies that arose from these foundations, such as feminist philosophy, queer theory and the 
deconstruction of racial politics, have benefitted from a kind of ‘halo effect’ of this physiological flourishing.  
 This chapter has considered the ontological truths that are revealed by the explications of Absurd 
Heroes, which are conscious to the absurd mind, but still functional in the experience of lives under the veil 
of habit. This discussion began with a description of Camus’ understanding of theatrical ontology, including 
the performative aspects of his account of being. This puts Camus’ thought as something of an antecedent to 
more contemporary understandings of performative ontology, such as the influential work of sociologist 
Judith Butler. One of the key ideas to arise from Camus’ ontology of the theatre is the importance of a 
convergence of thought and action, in that an actor is successful in their ability to make their actions conform 
to the ideal of the character. This has implications for the ‘disembodied’ manner of human interaction in the 
digital age, and suggests a need to limit the creation of an abstract self or identity which is external to the 
body. Further, this chapter has examined the similarities between Camus’ theatrical ontology and the 
performative ontology of classical Yogic philosophies. The link is exemplified by the Stanislavski system, a 
method of theatrical pedagogy which draws on the non-dual confluence of mind and body in the practice of 
Yoga. The similarities between Camus’ philosophy and Yoga are unsurprising, given the proclivity of his 
mentor, Jean Grenier, to engage with Hindu philosophy. As well as being a performative praxis of bodily 
consciousness, Yoga has a strong association with sexuality. It is in terms of ‘Pagan love’, that Don Juan can 
be seen as a parallel to the contemplative love of Tantric Yoga. These disparate engagements with bodily 
philosophy are the locus of Camus’ philosophy, emphasising a non-duality between physiology and 
consciousness. However, these observations are restricted to the consideration of the subject’s own 
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relationship with the world: the question of subjective relations with others has only been touched upon 
briefly. Act Three will now develop these metaphysical and ontological claims into the discussion 
surrounding Camus’ political activities, and ultimately his articulation of anarchism as a ‘good nihilism’. 
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Act 3: Politics in the Age of Nihilism 
Chapter 7: Poverty, Immanence and Lessons in Limits 
In 1955 Albert Camus wrote a qualifying preface to his first major work of fiction, The Stranger (1942). 
Despite an avowed preference for demonstration over explanation,  the preface served to address the 360
misconceptions of Camus’ critics, particularly those who sought to define the text through reference to the 
‘pathologising’ of the principle character, Meursault. Rather than an example of a schizophrenic or a symbol 
of the rapidly dehumanised face of the modern subject, Camus understands Meursault as a rebel who 
“doesn’t play the game”, and crucially a rebel whose orienting value has a negativist formulation.  The 361
game which Meursault refuses to participate in is the social game of polite lying and dissimulation, refusing 
both to say that which isn’t true, but also that which is more than the truth, the kind of lie which characterises 
much of our everyday experience.  Camus writes, “For me, therefore, Meursault is not a piece of social 362
wreckage, but a poor and naked man enamoured of a sun that leaves no shadows.”  Mersault is not an 363
outsider because he lacks a salary or a home, but rather that he is excluded from the morality of the dominant 
class, precisely because he speaks the truth when he is not meant to do so. This presentation of Meursault as 
the social outsider, foreign to the normative values of society, is a reflection of the lived consequences of 
poverty as a manifested structure of alienation which had featured prominently in Camus’ childhood. In this 
way, poverty becomes a social and political phenomenon, rather than an economic or material one.  
 This chapter will seek to elucidate Camus’ relationship with the concept and feeling of poverty, both 
through his lived experience and in his written works. As a pied-noir, that is a North African born of 
European descent, Camus was subject to ostracisation in both African and European communities. 
Nevertheless, despite his cultural poverty, Camus sought wealth in natural bounties which could be shared 
equally without diminishing their value, or indeed treasures which defied the very principle of ownership. 
Camus is not here advocating a fatalistic acceptance of poverty, nor endorsing the historical necessity of 
Marxist socialism. In order to understand this more subtle political ethic, it is important to understand 
Camus’ philosophy of immanence, as it stands against the European Canon, and with the traditions of the 
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pan-Classical  world. Drawing on this fundamental value of immanent experience, an alternative to the 364
wealth-expanding philosophies of Capitalism and Marxism arises; in effect a neo-Hellenic revaluation of our 
common investment in concrete experience, a call to engage with immanence and to avoid the dualism of 
wealth and poverty that arises in Western, binary thought. Camus seeks a concrete justice beyond the 
transcendent myths of theoretical opportunity or equality, and like Meursault, refuses the lying and 
dissimulation of the social game that justifies the accumulation of wealth at the cost of imposed poverty. This 
chapter will address Camus’ own childhood experience of poverty, including the class relations which had a 
formative impact on his ethics, and the related social deprivations he witnessed, including his own mother’s 
hearing impairment. The chapter will then consider the relationship between Camus’ conception of poverty 
as social deprivation and contemporary anthropological accounts of stone age and subsistence economies. 
This will aim to demonstrate a pathway out of the strategically imposed dialectic of poverty and wealth, 
engaging instead with the dynamic value of nature and the leisure afforded by working with, rather than 
against our natural environment. Having redefined the qualities of affluence, the chapter will conclude by 
drawing out the Sisyphean ethics of Camus’ attempt to overcome poverty, and his impassioned call for all to 
at least ‘come down from the mountain’ and see the truth of deprivation before one judges the equity of 
civilisation.  
Poverty in Camus’ Youth 
It is worth noting that poverty is more than an abstract or theoretical problem, despite most academic and 
policy approaches being directed by people very far from the breadline. Definitions of global and domestic 
poverty statistics play a crucial role in macro-economic responses to wealth inequality, but rarely do they 
speak to the true immensity of the condition. For example, the Melbourne Institute releases a quarterly report 
on the level of income that constitutes the poverty line in Australia.  This report identifies an adjusted 365
poverty line relative to the value of the Australian currency with differences identified depending on the 
number of parents and children in a family unit, and further incorporating assumptions including the cost of 
housing, basic goods and a level of disposable income. The report comes up with such widely differing 
definitions of poverty, in relatively affluent Australia, ranging from $414.11 to $1235.33 for varying sized 
households, or alternatively, an average  disposable income of $62.70 a week per household member.  366
 The term pan-Classical is used here to incorporate the common elements and dialogic continuities of classical Greek, 364
Indian and Chinese thought, rather than the more geographically specific classical period of Western history. 
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These statistics can be illuminating, but ultimately they remain relative to the systemic, structural narrative 
which constructs poverty in the first place; solutions proposed to the persistent problem of poverty take as a 
first assumption that the overall economic system is a permanent fixture and do not even approach solutions 
which would compromise the continuation of the structures that create this inequality.  Furthermore, they 367
afford primacy to the material and economic factors of poverty, and reject or minimise the significance of 
social barriers that prevent a full engagement with society in the present and into the future. While these 
immanent concerns are minimised in public policy debates, a broader understanding of poverty has been in 
circulation as far back as the 1970s, such as the Club of Rome’s report titled The Limits to Growth (1972) 
which elaborates on a more comprehensive understanding of human needs, noting that economic growth 
requires more than just favourable material conditions, depending on access to peace and security, education 
and employment as well as the steady advance of technological progress.  Inevitably however, a model of 368
poverty relief grounded in an exponential growth of wealth in the system is inherently unsustainable, with 
the observation arising that “the basic behaviour mode of the world system is exponential growth of both 
population and capital, followed by collapse.”  This behaviour mode of turning surplus production into 369
political power is a problematic relationship when it becomes the absolute measure of political or economic 
value: surplus can be an immanent positive, but like resources, labour comes with an opportunity-cost, 
meaning that the single-minded pursuit of surplus production, whether it builds the pyramids or a corporate 
empire, prevents an engagement with other valuable experiences. Organising our entire society around the 
principle of surplus production, as in liberal capitalism, means that the limits of natural growth found in 
systems of biology and ecology, should be exceeded, and as the Club of Rome report notes, it is precisely 
exceeding this limit that invariably leads to economic collapse.  370
 The role of limits has been discussed previously in reference to its significance within Camus’ 
philosophy, but first it is necessary to understand his relationship to poverty as a lived phenomenon and a 
concrete experience far removed from abstract models of economic and political behaviour. Until 1937, 
Camus was a member of the Communist Party, seeing it as a practical avenue to redress the social injustices 
perpetrated by the Colonial regime against the poor, Arab, and the indigenous Berber population of 
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children and the community. 
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Algeria.  However, his involvement with the communist party was short-lived, at least in part for the 371
organisation’s dismissal of intersectional race and gender concerns. Camus’ intellectual relationship with 
Marxist theory had, at best, a secondary influence on his political outlook. Claire Letemendia writes that 
“Camus named poverty as one of the initial and most fundamental influences upon his awareness of the 
world, and once said that he had learned about freedom not from Marx, but from poverty.”  The 372
bureaucratic party structure demanded adherence to policy, and one can imagine how the theoretical hair 
splitting, bureaucratic bickering and the speculative messianism of communist discourse would have been 
nauseating to a man deeply concerned with the ongoing suffering of the present. To truly appreciate the 
immediacy of the effects of poverty, it is essential to encounter it directly, “to borrow Camus' compelling 
phrase, one had to come down from the mountain to learn what was happening, and it was not enough merely 
to observe. Once you agreed that the suffering was utterly unacceptable, there was a large measure of 
hypocrisy in still doing nothing to remove it.”  It is only in this concrete encounter that the true cost of 373
poverty becomes apparent, and that superficial responses such as raising the minimum wage or providing 
work-for-welfare programs, ultimately fail to interact with the structural realities of the problem. 
 There is of course an immediate, material need to alleviate the hunger and destitution of the world’s 
poor, and while bread is necessary for survival it is certainly not the only necessity. Letemendia explains 
Camus’ discomfort with the hypocrisy of those claiming to be activists, while embedded within the very 
class structures which perpetuate poverty, writing that in Camus’ view “it was not enough only to satisfy the 
immediate physical wants of underprivileged people when they were still systematically deprived of full 
participation in society and treated, as a consequence, without understanding or respect, particularly by 
certain left-wing intellectuals who claimed to understand their best interests.”  Camus returned to critiquing 374
the logic of paternalistic responses to poverty in his later text, The Rebel (1951), particularly the Marxist 
presumption to dictate that which is universally needed for the survival of a contingent subject. In the context 
of Camus’ writing, this arises as the paternalistic withholding of ‘higher’ culture from the working class, as 
the psychological and emotional experiences offered by art do nothing to further the cause of the workers 
revolution. Given that it is the reclamation of the means of production that is supposed to lead to 
emancipating the working class, what could Shakespeare lend to this project for the bricklayer or the 
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shoemaker? Camus sees this as a dehumanisation of the working class subject, especially given “we notice, 
in fact, that in the contest between Shakespeare and the shoemaker, it is not the shoemaker who maligns 
Shakespeare or beauty but, on the contrary, the man who continues to read Shakespeare and who does not 
choose to make shoes, which he could never make if it comes to that.”  Marxist revolutionary ideology had 375
ultimately rendered the proletariat as ‘standing reserve’ to the revolution, Othered into the realm of nature as 
nothing but a material cause to the progression of rational history. The eternal vanguard state that arises to 
guide the revolution is to Camus barely distinguishable from the moral hierarchies of feudalism or bourgeois 
capitalism: the needs of the state and society are always taken in precedence to the individuals who are 
disadvantaged by or within it.  
 Camus was keenly aware of the long climb he had made from the depths of his poverty stricken 
childhood, and through this transition he discovered both the common ground and the personal nature of 
economic and social isolation. “These he described from the view point of a keen and sympathetic witness, 
rather than an omniscient outsider, acknowledging the distance that now lay between himself and material 
deprivation, and respecting the exclusive nature of every poor person's experience. For Camus was quick to 
recognise that his past provided him only with a certain sensitivity towards the misery of others, not a firm 
knowledge.”  The structures of alienation which affect the Adavasi  of India are removed from the 376 377
structures which affect the Arabs of Colonial Algeria, and again removed from the poverty of the post-
emancipation African-American. Poverty is itself contingent on the concrete facticity of particular political 
contexts, but across population groups it always manifests as an artificially imposed ostracisation from 
genuine community engagement. This keen awareness arose in particular from Camus’ own experience as a 
member of a ‘borderline’ population. “The poverty of Algerian ‘poor whites,’ … was conceived by Camus 
and others not only in socioeconomic terms but also, and perhaps more importantly, as a form of 
wretchedness that was both physiological and psychological in origin and that owed much to the complex 
and troubled relationship of the colonial settlers to metropolitan France.”  Treated as Other in Africa for 378
being a European, and conversely as Other in Europe for being African, Camus was confronted with the 
immaterial wretchedness of poverty as an outsider to both of his homelands.  
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 It is fair to say that Camus would have been aware of himself as both a subject and an outsider to 
colonial space. His reflection on the relative experience between European and Arab poverty appears to have 
solidified the role of social engagement in alleviating the suffering that accompanies material destitution. 
Camus’ own family was working class and uneducated. He had lived with his Uncle Etienne, who earned a 
meagre subsistence in barrel-making, but enjoyed certain social privileges on account of his European status. 
Stratchen notes that this observation is easily extrapolated and “when he refers to Etienne's ‘Adam-like 
innocence,’ Camus could easily be making a wider point about the seemingly carefree existence of the pieds-
noirs—in spite of their poverty—in those halcyon days of empire.”  This close association of ethnic 379
background with social freedom and affluence was reinforced within the colonial education system. In a 
clear application of Ideological State Apparatus, “in school textbooks too, degrees of poverty and aspiration 
were referred to not in strictly socioeconomic terms but rather in terms of the supposed degree of one's 
francité (Frenchness).”  In the ethnically stratified structure of colonial space wretchedness arises as a 380
condition which accounts for more than the material difficulties typically associated with poverty. Camus 
seeks to apply a new model to understanding poverty, and a resolution that addresses the injustices that 
underpin selective freedom in hierarchical societies. 
Immanence and Affluence 
Contemporary Marxist scholar Slavoj Žižek consistently argues that “it is easier to imagine a total 
catastrophe which ends all life on earth than it is to imagine a real change in capitalist relations - as if even 
after a global cataclysm, capitalism will somehow continue.”  While visions of alternative systems for 381
socio-economic relations can be found amongst the thought of many contemporary political philosophers, 
Žižek points to the limitations of the ‘economic imaginary’ in popular consciousness. Post-apocalyptic and 
dystopian fiction invariably presumes the continuation of capitalism, the buying and selling of the world’s 
depleted resources, creative forms of currency are developed and ‘the market’ remains as the only point of 
normalcy in an otherwise broken existence. Perhaps this is part of the reason that, academically speaking, 
defences of capitalist economics are few and far between: it simply seems unnecessary to justify that which 
is self-evidently virtuous in the social discourse. Despite never having actually used the phrase ‘capitalism’, 
Adam Smith is widely credited with developing the philosophical underpinnings of capitalist economics. The 
 John Stratchen, “From Poverty to Wretchedness: Albert Camus and the psychology of the pieds-noirs”, 4.379
 John Stratchen, “From Poverty to Wretchedness: Albert Camus and the psychology of the pieds-noirs”, 4380
 Slavoj Žižek. Living in the End times. London ; New York: Verso, 2011 (334).381
 120
central thesis of Smith’s argument is that ‘liberty’ is a principle in common with nature, that is, “letting 
nature take its course means letting humans act as they are naturally or instinctively prompted to do. Liberty, 
thus, is on the side of nature.”  Smith saw the satisfaction of personal desires as consistent with nature, and 382
self-interest as the path to progress. While this has all the potential to enrich the corrupt and impoverish the 
honourable, Smith argues that this is a necessary and acceptable ‘moral cost’ for the advancement of 
humankind at large.  This is presented as the “narrow but infinitely deep divide between Smith’s system of 383
natural liberty and all forms of coercive, rationalist socialism. Smith defended the low but solid base upon 
which human beings may stand to reach for higher things.”  Such a conception is consistent with utilitarian 384
forms of ethics, but runs afoul of other ethical schools, such as Kant’s categorical imperative for example. 
Further, a justification for a state of affairs which excuses the poverty and suffering of children would be 
rejected by Camus out of hand, just as Augustine’s divine explanations for natural evil should be. Smith’s 
defence of capitalist relations would have been in direct contrast to the decaying structures of feudal 
economics, but of course more recent debates around this topic, and especially in Camus’ own time, the 
predominant dichotomy would be between the capitalist and communist modes of production. 
 As briefly discussed above, one of the central conjectures of Karl Marx’s Das Kapital (1867) is that 
the liberation of humanity from oppressive economic conditions is to be achieved in the transition from 
necessary labour to surplus-value labour. He claims that there are two broad ways to increase the surplus-
value of labour, each conforming to the interests of different sides of the class divide. “The surplus-value 
produced by prolongation of the working day, I call absolute surplus-value. On the other hand, the surplus-
value arising from the curtailment of the necessary labour-time, and from the corresponding alteration in the 
respective lengths of the two components of the working day, I call relative surplus-value.”  That is to say, 385
given a worker requires at least a minimum subsistence in order to remain economically productive, to create 
a profit margin would require that the worker produces more value than the cost of the labour. This can be 
done by increasing the overall hours that a worker spends engaged in labour, or in the case of Marx’s relative 
surplus-value, the methods of production must be revolutionised to shift the ratio of necessary and surplus-
value labour. In practical terms, if a potter can make a vase in a day of labour, the employer could choose to 
extend the potter’s hours to enable a second pot, or they could revolutionise the means of production (a 
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bigger kiln, an automated potter’s wheel), then the same labour output would produce a larger value 
outcome. Marx asserts that “the object of all development of the productiveness of labour, within the limits 
of capitalist production, is to shorten that part of the working-day, during which the workman must labour for 
his own benefit, and by that very shortening, to lengthen the other part of the day, during which he is at 
liberty to work gratis for the capitalist.”  It is in the best interests of the capitalist to extract the most surplus 386
value from the labourer, while the collective ownership principles of communism would see the workers take 
home the value of the excess labour. Both capitalism and communism propose that the surplus labor gap is 
key to ameliorating poverty, if not formally eliminating, by virtue of their respective economic organisation.  
Camus however saw a division between what his Marxist contemporaries would advocate, and what the 
actual concrete manifestation of these economics would result in for working class subjects. He wrote of 
Marxism that “in its most profound principle, [it] aims at liberating all men by provisionally enslaving them 
all.”  While Marxist economics may liberate and add value to labour and the commodity, it does nothing to 387
speak to the subjective value of the person, who is reduced to an object in the chain of commodity 
production. That is to say, while the enactment of labour may create a subjective value, that value is 
displaced into the commodity itself.  
 Like the existential philosophies discussed in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), which attempt to defy 
the Absurd by breaching the limits of reason or faith, Camus sees these economic systems as avoiding a 
confrontation with the contradictions that arise at limit of their orienting values. “Marx insists that 
materialism is a methodology that enables us to explain the forms taken by consciousness and culture with 
reference to economic relations.”  When culture and consciousness are reorganised in terms of economic 388
relations, then the solutions to problems of psychology and sociology can only be approached through the 
lens that interprets them. While comparative relations may be a helpful critical tool, this presents more as a 
subordination of the non-economic to the domain of economic discourse. Before one arrives at a 
consideration of the moral problems that have been attributed to the Soviet regime, the mere rational 
justification which underpins the project of Marxism is itself a commitment to the leap of philosophical 
suicide. Sharpe writes of Camus’ discomfort, particularly that “although the young Camus briefly joined the 
Algerian Communist Party, a note on ‘Grenier on communism’ from this time - ‘should one, for an ideal of 
justice, accept stupid ideas?' - suggests that already Camus felt Marxism’s philosophical trajectory alien, 
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despite his working class allegiances.”  Camus broke with the Communist Party over what he saw as their 389
inconsistent position on indigenous and Arab rights somewhere in late 1937 or early 1938  and was more 390
interested in an immanent form of politics, of finding practical solutions to the hardships of the poor, rather 
than the bureaucratic machinations of ‘playing the long game’ with the lives of those struggling in poverty. 
This requires a radical re-imagination of the structures of value, and Camus’ ethic of Mediterraneanism 
conforms to emerging anthropological accounts of affluence and wealth prior to the advent of industrial 
civilisation. These recent studies of pre-industrial economies, which will be discussed below, present models 
for an organisation of values that remains embedded in our immanent, natural environment. Despite the long 
standing political and philosophical opinion that those living in pre-cultural societies are condemned to an 
existence which is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short”  this assessment is necessarily directed from the 391
viewpoint of societies engaged in production of surplus value. Anthropologist Marshall Sahlins points to the 
hidden social assumption of modern economic models, writing that “where production and distribution are 
arranged through the behaviour of prices, and all livelihoods depend on getting and spending, insufficiency 
of material means becomes the explicit, calculable starting point of all economic activity.”  This can be 392
seen to reveal the inadequacy of ‘reparation’ models of historical restitution, for example. The provision of 
funds to overcome historical disadvantage still presupposes the ‘model of insufficiency’ that accompanies a 
society of economic subjects, and further that the historically oppressed can only be saved through the very 
means which have served to oppress them.  
 From the worldview of the historicist progress, we have imposed a modern psychology, with all of 
its industrial age desires and fears, on a people equipped with only the barest means to achieve a life of 
material comfort. With transcendent wants and immanent means, we as modern subjects read an absurd 
hopelessness into the lives of our prehistoric forebears. However, Sahlins explains that what becomes clear 
in stone age economics “is not that hunters and gatherers have curbed their materialistic ‘impulses'; they 
simply never made an institution of them.”  The living conditions of tribal and hunter-gatherer societies are 393
pitied for their inability to accumulate more than the bare minimum subsistence, though while “we are 
inclined to think of hunters and gatherers as poor because they don’t have anything; perhaps better to think 
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of them for that reason as free.”  The economic situation of a stone age society is remarkably similar to 394
Camus’ articulation of an acceptance of the absurd, and a mirror to his conception of the Mediterranean 
temperament: “Our problems are not theirs, the hunters and gatherers. Rather, a pristine affluence colours 
their economic arrangements, a trust in the abundance of nature’s resources rather than despair at the 
inadequacy of human means.”  The ‘abundance of nature’ and ‘pristine affluence’ are descriptors which 395
would not seem out of place in one of Camus’ early lyrical essays, and a trust in the ability of the world to 
provide, even in the face of the limited capacity of pre-technical societies, displays an acceptance of a kind 
of absurdity, a revolt against one’s condition without appeal to hope.   
 This returns us to Camus’ consciousness of limits as a primary concern of ethics and their ability to 
balance the possible excesses universalist attempts to resolve the hostility of nature and the shortcomings of 
humankind. The attitude of Mediterranean Lucidity demands an honest account of both the beauty and 
tragedy of our situation, devoid of appeals to a culmination of history, whether achieved by the labour of 
humanity or the grace of God. Franco Cassano praises Camus for tempering his pessimism about history 
with an optimism about humanity itself, and his celebration of the lived condition without illusion. He writes, 
“The absence of God and the freedom from every theology or philosophy of history does not condemn men 
to an eternal state of mourning: The sun does not abandon them, and the earth is not a fallback option vis- a`-
vis the sky, but rather the true stage of man.”  The state of nature, similarly, is not a fallback position to be 396
contrasted against the progress of civilisation and history, but rather the actual, immanent condition of our 
existence. Cassano continues with a critique of the role of idealism in structuring this epistemic illusion: 
“The outcomes of idealism are necessarily totalitarian because humankind’s separation from nature situates it 
exclusively in the sphere of history, in the solipsistic kingdom of that which it itself has produced, where 
every limit becomes crossable, provisional, and surmountable.”  From the standpoint of historical idealism, 397
poverty is merely an obstacle to be overcome on the pathway to a fully liberated mankind. Camus’ attitude, 
displayed in his essay Helen’s Exile (1948), is one in which the definable limits we encounter must be taken 
as the boundaries of our approach to ethics. “For the Greeks, values existed a priori and marked out the exact 
limits of every action. Modern philosophy places its values at the completion of action.”  This is not to say 398
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that those values exist independently of human activity, but rather that they should be the starting point of 
action, rather than applied after the fact. He continues to describe the gulf between the philosophy of the 
Hellenist Greeks and that of modern Europe and the West, writing “the Greeks never said that the limit could 
not be crossed. They said it existed and that the man who dared ignore it was mercilessly struck down. 
Nothing in today’s history can contradict them.”  While this may seem to be a crude analogy for cosmic 399
justice, or a reductive version of the Vedic concept of Karma, it is not only individuals who cross limits, but 
collectives. Empires that spread their borders beyond the legitimate bounds of political will are destined to 
crumble. Modern cultures which aim for infinite economic growth experience recessions and economic 
crises, which have potentially life-ending effects for countless vulnerable people.  
 The question which Camus raises is a direct challenge to the the ideal of civilisation, and whether it 
can function outside the a priori limits of nature or indeed if it should. Sahlins also points to the blindness of 
modernity to its own conditions: “Above all, what about the world today? One-third to one-half of humanity 
are said to go to bed hungry every night. In the Old Stone Age the fraction must have been much smaller. 
This is the era of hunger unprecedented. Now, in the time of the greatest technical power, is starvation an 
institution.”  The ‘state of nature’ is thought to be the violent past from which humanity emerged, but the 400
scale of modern violence was impossible prior to the escalation of industrial military technology. What pre-
historic society could have caused starvation in the millions through the collectivisation of food production, 
or the deployment of contras to commit genocides for low cost international fruit? How, on the other side of 
colonialism, genocide and world wars, can we still maintain the fiction that historical civilisation, set apart 
from nature, is the ideal state of humanity? “Poverty is not a certain small amount of goods, nor is it just a 
relation between means and ends; above all it is a relation between people. Poverty is a social status. As such 
it is the invention of civilization. It has grown with civilization.”  What we have lost in our rush to find 401
only mechanical causes and universal outcomes is the true value of life in itself, rather than the value of the 
means to sustain it or the its productive output. The end of poverty cannot come through the deployment of 
private property or even its redistribution: as a problem of social exclusion, it must be resolved on the level 
of community. 
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For and Against: Poverty, Decadence and Transcendentalism 
As is typical of Camus’ work, there is very little by way of a linear or clearly discernible solution to the 
problem of poverty. As a consequence of dispensing with the universal, his style of philosophy demands an 
engagement with the immanent conditions of the moment and the passionate needs and commitments of the 
people who experience them. Not only would it be condescending to attempt to resolve the problem of 
people’s lives from the outside, but such an attempt grounded in universally assumed principles is bound to 
fail when it confronts the myriad, fractured perspectives of subjects in the living world. Further, it is unfairly 
demanding to insist that the poor resolve their own condition, and indeed ‘Sysiphean’ to demand that 
charitable individuals should shoulder this eternal burden, when the wealthy do not reside atop the mountain, 
but rather as the gods beyond it. In short, within the structures of idealist, historical and hierarchical 
civilisation, poverty is a necessity. It is not in gazing to the heights that we glimpse the freedom of humanity, 
but in the lucid moment of turning back down the mountain.  
 The path out of poverty cannot be through decadence, or at least not transcendent decadence: excess 
beyond the limits of nature has for too long been considered an admirable goal. The riches of immanent 
existence cannot be sacrificed to alleviate material poverty. It is rather we who must transcend the need to 
possess our environment, and this is no easy task. Camus advocated a ‘spiritual snobbery’ to distance oneself 
from the material needs of industrial civilisation  in a manner of ascesis that mirrors his influences from 402
ancient Greek and Eastern cultures. Like the Stoics and Buddhists before him, Camus demands that we 
transcend ourselves, while remaining grounded and engaged with those in the living world. It is important to 
remember that while the experience of poverty was a treasured and influential teacher for Camus, he never 
advocated that anyone should suffer through poverty. Rather, poverty and alienation find most of us at some 
point in our lives and “he was proposing that because such experiences strip our existence of its sheltering 
illusions, testing our moral fortitude as much as our capacity for compassion, they can remind us powerfully 
and directly of our shared human fate.”  While not necessarily universal, the challenges of poverty mirror 403
those of the absurd experience, and in the context of liberal capitalist mythology the vast gulf between those 
with wealth and those who work is nothing short of an absurd contradiction. It is not in poverty itself, but in 
confrontation with it that the bonds of solidarity are forged. This is a theme that spans Camus’ fictional work 
as well, such as in his allegorical novel The Plague (1947) wherein “it is precisely the desire to confront the 
truth of the plague, a desire to confront disease and death that allows human beings to rediscover themselves 
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as brothers, to form a community.”  This is where Camus’ ontology breaks vastly with that of Sartre and 404
other arguably ‘ego-oriented’ phenomenologists. It is indeed possible to transcend the Other, the potential 
subjects in one’s environment, and to reduce them to object-being in relation to one’s own ends. But as the 
famous case of ‘The Look’ demonstrates, we all know what it is to be reduced to the status of object.  It is 405
in this kind of immanent solidarity that Camus finds the true value of human nature, the simple recognition 
of empathy and the common ground of experience. Camus was justifiably frustrated with his existential 
colleagues, who lived in the image of what is contemporaneously referred to as ‘latte sipping’ activists. “His 
angry retort to his critics who had ‘never placed anything but their armchairs in the direction of history’ 
surely stemmed in large part from his frustration at hearing the working class discussed by people who had 
no more than a theoretical grasp of its problems and declared their commitment to revolutionary change in 
writing only, from the safety of cafe terraces.”  Before even reaching the point of the Soviet regime’s 406
purges and massacres, Camus was already disillusioned by the attitude that the working class should be 
mobilised to achieve the ends of philosophers, no matter how well intentioned those ends were. While there 
are many disagreements Camus would have with Kant’s ethics, at the very least he would agree that it is 
amoral to use a human as a means to an end.  
 A similar criticism is levelled at the normative role of punishment as a deterrent in his essay 
Reflections on the Guillotine (1959). In that haunting text, Camus writes “Heads are cut off not only to 
punish but to intimidate, by a frightening example, any who might be tempted to imitate the guilty.”  A 407
retributive edge is introduced to this violent example when punishment is levelled at a society’s former 
oppressors. The risk inherent in revolution is that one will end as a reflection of the power that was 
overthrown. One cannot redistribute injustice in a more just manner, and similarly a resolution to poverty 
equally must be wary of the risk that it will imitate the very structures which created it. A community of 
equals cannot be created by serving the self-interested desires of each individual subject, but all members of 
a community can be equally enriched by collective wealth. Any ‘top-down’ regime of social organisation, no 
matter the distribution of material goods, imposes a form of poverty by reducing people and their difficulties 
to object-being to which their subjectivity is rendered subordinate. Camus envisioned a world where all 
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people are empowered rather than saved, and “demanded also an awakening of consciousness on the part of 
people who did not live under the burden of poverty, so that their political actions could be informed by 
genuine moral integrity, rather than theory or self-interest.”  Here we can see the positive lessons from 408
Camus’ study of the Absurd in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), the attitude of Mediterranean Lucidity, the 
transformative power of creative struggle, and the value of immanent experience over participation in 
illusory ideals.  
 Camus’ concern regarding oppression is largely cast in class terms, seeking to legitimate the poor 
and oppressed who are ejected from the discourses of society. However, in his refusal to demand a universal 
resolution, in terms of labour production or otherwise, Camus’ approach contains shadows of what would 
develop into an awareness of the intersectionality of oppression. While he lacked the language to articulate 
the broader gender or ethnic dimensions to his project, he had a keen awareness for immanent ‘micro-
poverties’. These are evident in his ongoing support for his illiterate mother, and his early essay Irony (1937) 
in which he details the social difficulties of an elderly survivor of a stroke. Some of the most passionate 
descriptions of these experiences of impoverishment can be found in his unfinished, semi-autobiographical 
novel, The First Man (1991) which “recalled and quietly hymned the people who had made Albert Camus 
the man who he had become: the poor and semi-literate people whose world of sunlight, ignorance and 
poverty he had ardently wished to leave as a child, to which he nevertheless always longed to return, and 
which he knew all too well was soon to pass away forever.”  Poverty and alienation are experiences of the 409
body, as much as hunger or grief. But conversely, so is wealth an immanent phenomenon. These sensations 
and emotions imprint themselves on the subject and imbue a spirituality of the flesh, a covenant of 
destitution. 
Conclusion: Wealth in World and Spirit 
Like the problem of the absurd, poverty is a contradiction between what we conceive of as an ideal society 
and the reality of how social capital is distributed. In Camus’ philosophy we find an early understanding of 
poverty being the product of power relations, rather than the reductive understanding that is grounded in 
liberal conceptions of private ownership. The dynamics of how alienation and destitution can affect 
individual subjects are complex and intersect with various cultural and material restraints. What is clear 
though, is that these problems are resolvable because they are constructions of our own social behaviours.  
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 As the son of an illiterate war widow, Camus was immersed in the struggles of colonial working 
class life, and exposed to the ebbs and flows of subsistence living. Of particular interest in this chapter was 
the objects of Camus’ nostalgia, namely the simple and immanent treasures of nature combined with the 
solidarity of the commons, as seen in his lyrical descriptions of salted bodies in the sun and surf. These 
cherished memories engaged with a deeper value than the utilitarian dialectics of communist politics. In 
contrast to the material and historicist responses to poverty that have arisen from industrial civilisation, 
Camus’ theory of value engages with the economics of leisure. This has been examined in conjunction with 
anthropological discourses on stone age economies which privileged time and recreation over production and 
accumulation. Our model of surplus production is itself the causal agent of class division, and this reality 
must be accepted if we have any hope of abandoning the destructive path of consumptive growth. In this 
way, we can see that Camus’ veneration of poverty unfolds as a neo-pagan temperance that allows for joy 
while restricting excess.  
 While poverty was Camus’ first lesson in morality, it would become a nostalgic backdrop to the 
ethical challenges he faced at the end of his life. The treasured settings of his childhood memories were 
transformed into fields of bloodshed when French colonial power was challenged in the Algerian War of 
Independence (1954-1962). Camus’ professed nostalgia for his colonial childhood became problematic when 
he refused to take an overt side in the conflict. Camus’ public silence on the war and his hopes for a 
cosmopolitan Algeria will be the focus of the next chapter, as well as the relevance of these events to 
decolonial projects in contemporary Australia. 
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Chapter 8: Algeria’s Frontiers of Freedom and Justice 
Prior to the posthumous publication of Camus’ unfinished, semi-autobiographical novel The First Man 
(1994), Camus’ literary and political career ended under a dark cloud of the violence and colonialism of the 
Algerian War of Independence. This controversy over his apparent support of European involvement in the 
governance of Algeria rested on a few well-documented utterances, and some equally amplified silences. The 
crux of the intellectual backing for this view comes from two primary analyses throughout the 1970s. 
American critic Conor Cruise O’Brien, as well as the highly influential Edward Saïd, set the climate of 
Camus studies for the anglophone world as one that had a troubling silence around the issue of colonialism. 
However, more recent analyses have begun to focus on a more nuanced relationship to the political upheaval 
in his homeland. For example, in his article ‘The Trial of Albert Camus’ (2011), Russell Grigg addresses the 
question of colonialism in relation to Camus’ literary works, concluding that it was Camus’ aim to bring the 
experience of ‘Arab’ alienation to the worldview of the French and their colonialist compatriots in North 
Africa. These readings of his fictional writing, as well as private correspondence made during his self-
imposed public silence on the war in Algeria, display an awareness of the universal themes of human 
suffering and, perhaps too idealistically, a hope for a common solidarity that would bring peace.  
 It is the aim of this chapter to reconcile Camus’ literature and the political theory he outlined in The 
Rebel (1951) with the historical reality of the unfolding and continued violence in the former European 
colonies in North Africa and beyond. As has been addressed in previous chapters, one of the central features 
of Camus’ philosophical approach is the concept of limits. This remains a consistent theme throughout The 
Rebel, and provides a point of response to the lack of a clear position on the violence in Algeria. In particular, 
the values of freedom and justice will be presented as the primary limits to Camus’ ethical position, two 
limits which were constantly breached in the pursuit of the other during the ideological conflicts of the 
Twentieth Century. But these limits are not to be confused with rules to be internalised or imposed to 
regulate the lives of political subjects, and are rather to be seen as the site of metaphysical rebellion, the 
simultaneous yes/no which distinguishes the rebel from the revolutionary. Camus claims that in the 
environment of nihilism, the impulses of denial and affirmation must be tempered to prevent their drift into 
universalism and ideology.  In this sense, Camus’ ethical vision is, again, one of non-duality, a syncretic 410
harmony of competing values. The chapter will begin by investigating the foundational view of Camus’ 
politics, his critics and the contemporaneous commentary he made on the Algerian war. The analysis will 
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then progress to the renaissance of interest in his philosophy, following the posthumous publication of his 
unfinished novel The First Man (1994). Finally, Camus’ position on the war will be read through his theory 
of ideological murder, and the cosmopolitan vision of peace he hoped to achieve through the ethic of mesure. 
The chapter will aim to interrogate the ‘political’ and the ‘philosophical’ in Camus’ desire to see Algeria 
retain its link to Metropolitan France. These observations will lead into the final phase of analysis, wherein 
Camus will be positioned as conceptually consistent with anarchist philosophy in his rejection of the 
authoritarianism of cults of personality and value.  
Camus the Colonist 
In the last years of his life, and for some time after his untimely death, Camus was widely considered to be a 
proponent of French colonial rule in Algeria. There are several reasons that have been put forward for this 
interpretation, from analyses of his literary works, his relationship with French President Charles de Gaulle, 
the public comments he made on the conflict in Algeria and his problematic, self imposed silence on the 
topic of the war for Algerian independence. This reading is typical of modern textual analysis, emphasising 
the silences and gaps in literature as actively suppressing the voices and experiences of marginalised 
communities. These are of course legitimate concerns, and the wealth of literature that arose after the 
collapse of the Eurocentric, racial and hegemonic hold on education, is to be treasured as passionately as the 
cultures lost to colonisation are to be mourned. Similar silences have been highlighted previously around the 
question of Camus’ relationships to women and the roles they play in his philosophical and literary texts. In 
this sense, it is fair to say that his philosophical outlook is not distinctly or explicitly decolonial, as his works 
are not explicitly feminist, despite the underlying structures of his philosophy being productive for socially 
disruptive movements, as shown in Elizabeth Bartlett’s Rebellious Feminism (2009). The charge that Camus 
overlooked, or maliciously included silences concerning Arab people or the working class women of the 
pied-noir is a serious charge against Camus’ political outlook, and the view has been so widely adopted it 
deserves careful consideration. The first section of this chapter will focus on the varied positions surrounding 
the debate around Camus and the Algerian conflict, with a particular emphasis on the legacy of his image as 
a colonial mouthpiece.  
 The condemnation of Camus as a colonialist, in some ways, mirrors the interpretation of Nietzsche 
as a foundation of Nazi philosophy, in that the political developments after his death greatly influenced the 
cultural background against which his thoughts and writings would be considered. David Carroll rightly 
points out that from the viewpoint of decolonisation, and with the legacies of these injustices, critics “would 
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have very good reasons for attacking on political grounds both Camus’s Algeria and the ‘moderate solutions’ 
to the Algerian question he proposed both before and during the Algerian War.”  Carroll argues that the 411
Algeria which Camus engaged in his literature and politics was a broadly fictional place, and the French-
Algerian people he spoke for were a product of the mythology of French colonialism. This perspective is 
presented in response to the reading by Connor Cruise O’Brien, in which Camus is seen to engage in a 
nostalgia for a ‘hallucinatory’ Algeria, and that his blindness to the clear injustice of French colonial rule 
undermined the persona he held as a man of justice. Carroll criticises O’Brien for ascribing to Camus an 
excessive responsibility and influence over public opinion regarding the French imperial hold on Algeria.  412
Carroll agrees with aspects of the reading of Camus as a left colon, but identifies several key distinctions. 
The main point of agreement is the assessment that Camus’ vision, on face value, demands that Algerian 
Arabs and Berbers would be required to become ‘French’ in the latinised Mediterranean. This frames the 
political failure of Camus’ activism as a lack of acknowledgement of the racial dimension of colonial 
injustice. Drawing a distinction between his creative and activist legacies, Carroll writes that “having 
acknowledged Camus’s political failures, however, I would still argue that O’Brien and Said are mistaken to 
make them their exclusive concern and to treat his literary texts as if they also constituted a failure 
necessitated by the failure of his politics.”  One example of this literary critique would be O’Brien’s 413
identification of La Peste as an artistic depiction of the ‘Final Solution’ in French Algeria, wherein the plague 
is read as a metaphor for the destruction of the Arab population of Oran.  Carroll acknowledges that 414
whatever the reader’s opinion of Camus, such a literary metaphor is a step too far. However, it is arguable to 
say that La Peste is a metaphor for the oppression of political rule, and that the use of the French language 
and emphasis on French experiences is interpretively problematic. Matthew Sharpe argues that Camus is 
politically closer in thought to Foucault, and the literary use of the plague as a metaphor for totalising and 
internalising power structures, which Sharpe argues is an allegory of Nazi occupation, is directly referenced 
in Foucault’s discussion of the panopticon in Discipline and Punish (1975).  Between these metaphors of 415
totalising power, and the denouncements of racism in Algeria through his writing in Combat , it is arguable 416
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that Camus’ minimisation of the racial dimension in colonial injustice was motivated more by a drive to 
solidarity and away from tribalism, a kind of hopeful cosmopolitanism in which narratives of race would 
cease to play to the advantage of those who wield them for violent intentions.  
 David Schalk is another author who took up the question of Camus’ resistance activities in relation to 
the Algerian War of Independence, influenced by the perspective of O’Brien, and with an interest in the use 
of Camus as a model of anti-war activism for protestors of the Vietnam War in the USA. The argument 
hinged on Camus’ self-imposed silence in counterpoint to his declaration of the responsibilities of the ‘public 
intellectual’ in his Nobel Prize address.  These responsibilities are simple, cast as a kind of negative 417
formulation of Kantian imperatives, “refusal to lie about what we know and resistance to oppression.”  418
However, in light of consistent misinterpretation of his public comments on the violence in Algeria and after 
his failed attempt to broker a civilian truce in 1956, Camus chose to cease publicly speaking on the topic in 
an attempt to stop his words being used in support of violence on one side or the other in the bloody conflict. 
Schalk argued, and continues to maintain, that Camus failed in these basic principles on multiple occasions, 
to the detriment of his stature as a voice of justice and freedom for the oppressed people of the world.  419
However, soon after his 1991 paper, 'War and the Ivory Tower: Algeria and Vietnam’, Schalk moved towards 
a more nuanced position, resulting from the developing political situations in Algeria and worldwide, as well 
as the posthumous publication of Camus’ semi-autobiographical, unfinished novel, Le premier homme 
(1994). He writes, in his updated discussion ‘Was Algeria Camus’ Fall?’ (2004) that “On the vexed political 
and moral question of whether Camus retained a visceral colonialism in Le premier homme, an issue that has 
been hotly debated, I am far less certain.”  He discusses the positions of Nancy Wood and Philip Dine, who 420
take opposing views on this central question of colonial relations in Camus’ final manuscript, but who both 
see it as necessary to understanding the role of the text and its impact on Camus’ legacy. Wood argues against 
Saïd and O’Brien, to contend that Camus was viscerally aware of the violent legacy of French colonial 
subjugation of Algeria, and that the consequences of that violence were felt in the bloody conflict for 
independence which arose through this injustice. Wood argues that Camus’ politico-cultural aims were “not 
merely to claim his place in Algeria’s pioneer mythology, but to restore to the pied-noir community the 
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ambivalences of a historical memory that, to its own eventual peril, it had chosen to repudiate.”  This could 421
be read as Wood arguing that Camus’ saw the end of the pied-noir identity in the forgetting of their roots in 
Algeria, and their willingness to identify as “French” and to be on the side of Colonial rule. Wood further 
points out that Saïd himself separated Camus’ literature out from the body of ‘Algerianist’ literature that 
preceded him, in that Camus did not engage in the project of legitimating French colonial rule, but rather that 
by failing to challenge this assumed legitimacy, Camus is implicated in French colonial history by his 
silence.  Philip Dine can be broadly said to agree with the position of Saïd, contending that Camus 422
dissolves the hierarchy of social power and the impact of intergenerational trauma in his rendering of 
colonisers and colonised as equal in guilt and innocence, and in effect, this colonial mythology underpins 
Camus’ literature up to and including Le Premier Homme.   423
 Schalk asks his reader to step back momentarily from these questions, and to approach the question 
through the context of the period in which Camus’ was writing, and an interrogation of the text Le Premier 
Homme itself, rather than the suspicions about the author’s allegiances.  He points to the historical study of 424
Rapaëlle Branch, who extensively documented the practice of torture by the French colonial forces in 
Algeria, which would have been known to de Gaulle and Camus in the later years of the war and before 
Camus’ death. Another historian from the period, Sylvie Thénault, interrogated the activist judicial system 
during wartime Algeria. Ostensibly an extension of the colonial military structure, the French-Algerian 
courts were part of an undermining of justice, whereby “a ‘system of exception’ was established, with the 
mobilization of magistrates against the Algerians.”  These activities were not unique to the French, with the 425
Arab liberation movements similarly engaging in torture and summary executions. Camus saw that each 
iteration of violence and injustice would further crystallise the conflict and escalate the response. And despite 
his unwillingness to engage publicly with the debate over the fate of Algeria, he did attempt to use his 
influence on the judges and leadership of the French authorities, frequently sending letters and making 
appeals for clemency for Communists and Arab prisoners alike.  While these attempts were often 426
unsuccessful, they do highlight that his concern was for the experiences of individual people who had been 
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caught up in the violence, the impassioned cries for freedom and the development of a method of restorative 
justice, which could break the cycle of reprisal killings and create a social environment wherein French, 
Arab, Berber and all other ethnic minorities in the North African territory could live in harmony, separate if 
need be, but ultimately equal. 
 Shortly before giving his fateful address at the Nobel ceremony, Camus met with a group of 
university students, one of which was a young Arab man who demanded an explanation from Camus on his 
position regarding Algerian independence. The student was infuriated by Camus’ proclamations on the 
violence in Eastern Europe in counterpoint to his silence on Algeria, which gave the impression of 
dehumanising the victims of violence in Africa.  Camus gave a passionate response, arguing that he had 427
always sought justice and full democratic rights for Algeria’s Arab and Berber populations, and that he 
sought a state in which equal peoples could live side by side. Camus would later reveal that he felt closer to 
that Arab student than his French contemporaries and peers, seeing a common despair at the fate engulfing 
the people of Algeria.   428
 What is evident from Camus’ writing in Le Premier Homme, is that the violence on either side would 
lead only to tragedy and that justice could only be reached in the silence that follows the war. As a student of 
tragic theatre, “perhaps Camus understood the Sophoclean silence. There would be no dues ex machina, no 
Euripidean contraption to free Algeria from its paralyzing knot of opposing claims. As for the far more 
modest mechanisms of human reason and compassion, they had already been found wanting.”  Soon after 429
Camus’ death, and while Algeria attained its independence from Metropolitan France, the violence continued 
in that country well into the twenty-first century. One of the key ambiguities that arises from this uncanny 
conflation between fiction and history is on the practice of pied-noir farmers burning their crops during the 
withdrawal of the French from Algeria. Schalk points out that nearly all cases of this practice occurred in the 
years of 1961 and 1962, after Camus’ death.  While other conflicts of historical continuity in the draft of Le 430
Premier Homme revolve around events that occurred in his life and illuminate aspects of his personal 
relations, this particular example of the pied-noir farmers stands apart. The predictive inclusion of this 
practice in Camus’ fictional depiction of the French withdrawal suggests that he was aware of the particular 
logic which would drive the behaviour of the uprooted colons. This was the logic of the absolute, the 
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tribalist, zero-sum, adversarial logic of nationalism. But there is also a more subtle aspect to this fiction-
come-life intuition. It is evident here that sovereignty is conceived of as a relationship with the land, a 
cultivated relationship best presented in the image of agriculture. Camus’ use of this metaphor to show the 
pied-noir farmers symbolically uprooting their very connection to the land, came to be a very literal practice 
as one of the last expressions of this immanent sovereignty. This reading of the immanent aspects of pied-
noir identity can be understood in conjunction with the continuing, if complex traditions of French-Algerian 
cuisine, in what she describes as ‘culinary nostalgia’.  This illustrates that Camus’ concerns for the working 431
class victims of the Algerian War of Independence were grounded in questions of immanent identity and 
sovereignty, as were his concerns for the oppressed Arab and Berber populations, in contradistinction to the 
rationally principled claims of abstract sovereign rule.   
 Schalk argues that the ambiguities of Le Premier Homme leave the question of Camus’ colonial 
allegiance largely unanswered, but framed in more complex terms than the early, post-colonial critiques of 
his work.  Matthew Sharpe, however, approaches the question in terms of the competing imperatives of the 432
philosophical and the political. To Camus, totalitarian power is achieved through the application of a 
Machiavellian realpolitik whereby dialogue is suppressed in favour of a top-down sanctioned ‘noble lie’, 
designed to “conceal or misrepresent relevant information from those affected by the proposed actions, in 
order to manufacture a political pseudo-consensus.”  This kind of pseudo-consensus is commonplace in 433
partisan politics for example, or in the worldwide ‘war on terror’ wherein the world is simplistically divided 
into those for and against terror, irrespective of the vast number of casualties being civilians. This leads to 
Sharpe’s second point on Camus’ philosophical approach to politics, which is the necessity of respect for the 
other. This can be seen to inform Camus’ refusal to join a ‘side’ in the conflict that engulfed his homeland, as 
to side with one would be to implicitly deny the rights of the other. Sharpe explains the danger inherent in 
silencing the other: 
 The other may be an adversary. We may not always agree with his reasons. 
Sometimes, we will question his motives, especially when his reasons are weak, 
evidently partial, and mustered in defence of unstated interests. But to treat the 
other as an enemy is to reserve the right to not credit whatever reasons he is able to 
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give; and to license oneself to ignore, simplify or misrepresent her position and 
motivations. In short, it is to license oneself and one’s ‘friends’ to do whatever it 
takes to defeat the other: through deceit and calumny where possible, and where 
necessary through exile, excommunication or ‘physical killing’.   434
Camus’ articulation of a ‘politics of dialogue’ will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. For now it 
serves to note that Camus’ literary, political and philosophical approach to the Algerian War was not quite so 
naive as his critics have argued. Rather, his silences and interventions were designed to have impact without 
legitimising or delegitimising the claims to justice and freedom that either side rightfully had. This can be 
best understood by highlighting Camus’ concern for the Hellenic project of politics as service to the 
immanent interests of the polis rather than the machinations of historical progress. For Camus, a politics of 
immanence is founded in the love and sovereignty of nature.  
Of Land and People 
Algeria gained its independence from France following the Algerian War of Independence (1954-62), two 
years after Camus’ sudden death in 1960. These may seem like distant concerns, of a conflict long since 
resolved and political circumstances which have substantially shifted. However, the political and social 
ramifications of colonialism continue to be felt in many countries around the world, and despite the 
proliferation of ‘post-colonial’ thought, colonial activities continue to be deployed in ever more subtle forms. 
Jerry Mander argues for example, that the use of free trade to push industrial development in the third world 
imposes a western model of development in a conceptual copy of the motives of the ‘white man’s burden’.  435
Economic expansionism, resource extraction and labour exploitation are all recognisable colonial activities, 
and while formal colonial spaces are few and far between, ‘spheres of influence’ have enabled a cartel style 
division of empire, wherein proxy wars such as contemporary conflicts in Syria and Yemen are evidence of 
the violent oversight that powerful interests have in the affairs of everyday people. In Australia in particular, 
the Indigenous population continues to carry the intergenerational burden of poverty, the removal of children 
from families under the guise of state protection, and the Australian state remains the only colonised space 
that does not have a formal treaty with its indigenous people.   436
 Camus’ perspective is both compromised and constructive in engaging with the hierarchies and 
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entrenched power systems of colonial spaces, as a naturalised colonist born on the periphery of the dominant 
power group. Camus was a pied-noir, a French-Algerian of European descent, and thus a person without a 
sense of indigeneity, a foreigner to the land of his birth as well as the land of his ancestry. These conditions 
quite closely match those of the contemporary experience of anglo-Australian naturalised colonists, with 
deep links to their country of birth, a mythologised reverence for the imperial heartland in Europe and an 
uneasy, often silencing relationship with the indigenous population of the continent. The division between 
colonist and colonised subjects is perpetually unstable, and the hegemonic power of the former is implicitly 
challenged by the very existence of the latter. At the time of the Algerian civil war, the indigenous population 
of Queensland, Australia were legally barred from enrolling to vote in elections on their own land;  at the 437
time of Camus’ death, a white Australian official was still appointed as legal guardian of all indigenous 
people under the age of 21 in the state of Queensland.  Even after the end of the formal ‘White Australia 438
Policy’ and institutional control of Indigenous subjects, the indigenous population continues to be targeted by 
the law at rates that constitute a clear injustice: “Indigenous people make up 2% of the population, but over a 
quarter of adult prisoners (27%) and more than half of young detainees (54%).”  The cultural, historical 439
and geographical contexts of Algeria and Australia make for very different experiences of colonialism. 
Algeria had been a territory of many imperial powers over the history of the region, from the various 
competing powers of the Ancient era, to Rome, the Byzantines, the Muslim Caliphates, Spain, the Ottomans 
and the French. Australia on the other hand had been a largely isolated continent for much of its pre-
European history, with external contact being limited largely to Indonesian Muslim fishermen and traders 
along the northern coast of the continent.  While it may seem reductive to compare the colonial experiences 440
of these vastly separated settings and populations, these comparisons highlight that while critiques of Camus’ 
attitudes to colonial spaces and power legacies in Algeria are grounded in valid concerns, those very systems 
of colonialism are perpetuated in contemporary Australian society. For this reason, the questions that Camus 
grappled with as a naturalised coloniser remain pertinent to the contemporary anglo-Australian population. 
While in the case of Camus’ post-colonial experience there was an organised project of territorial 
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independence for ethnic minority populations, in Australia there remains little to no appetite for a return of 
the land to its traditional owners, and for major parliamentary parties, Indigenous demands for sovereignty 
remain fringe issues. As recently as 2017, the Australian government ignored a collective push from the 
Uluru First Nations Constitutional Convention to draft a formal treaty as other post-colonial states have 
done.   441
 The intersection of moral considerations in both contexts is unsurprising, yet instructive. Of primary 
importance is the conflicting phenomenology of the political claim of land belonging to certain people, 
contrasted against the ontological claim of people belonging to a land. Nancy Wood’s description of the 
“literature of the ‘Algerianist’ school which made the settlers’ lengthy struggle with the country’s harsh 
physical elements the basis of their claim to colonial rule”  could be restated in terms of Australiana 442
literature with little meaningful distinction. In both cases, the mythology of colonial rule is based on a 
silencing of the violence perpetrated against those who inhabited the conquered land, as well as either the 
ongoing suppression of colonised voices or the reframing of those voices as being resolved in the ‘civilising 
mission’ at the heart of the colonial project. The proposition of political ownership is grounded in the 
philosophy of transcendent idealism, the ‘phallogocentric’ authority of European civilisation. The contrasting 
position to this Eurocentric view is an ontological metaphysic of a subject-environment non-duality, 
reminiscent of Camus’ conception of a Mediterranean philosophy, his ‘immanent idealism’, and his nostalgia 
for the state of nature. Camus’ emphasis on a genuine connection between people and their land, separate 
from the authoritarian claims of private ownership, earned him the ire of both sides in the bloody, unfolding 
conflict in Algeria, but presents a phenomenologically receptive attitude for naturalised colonial Australians 
in relation to Indigenous claims to sovereignty. Sovereignty, for Camus, is a relationship with the land and 
not a derivative of history, but a derivative of a living environment. This is in fact consistent with the 
principles of common law in post-colonised societies, as Noel Pearson points out in his discussion of the 
application of law in Native Title cases in Australia. He writes that, despite the colonial judicial system 
requiring an unreasonable burden of proof for transcendent foundations of ownership, the very acquisition of 
the land by the colonisers required the admission that land is claimed by occupation, that “the title of the 
community as a whole, as against the world, is a mundane possession.”  Camus’ response to the Algerian 443
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war of independence, albeit from the viewpoint of coloniser, was that the two dominant sides in the conflict 
were demanding a claim to sovereignty that was unreasonable, and in breach of the mundane and just 
principle of ownership by occupation. Such an attitude can be seen as derived from his anarcho-syndicalist 
and communist activities, in which a system of economic organisation would see those who physically 
‘possess’ the means of production are the rightful, sovereign owners of the wealth that is produced.  
 When Camus attempted to broker a civilian peace treaty in 1956, Robert Zaretsky notes that “for 
years Camus had insisted that Algeria belonged to the Arab and Berber peoples no less than to the pieds-
noirs. But as he prepared to speak, he feared each side had already concluded that Algeria belonged to them 
alone.”  Camus’ essay on political philosophy, The Rebel (1951), was published some six years after the 444
end of the Nazi occupation of Europe, and the beginning of the violence in Algeria in 1945. Camus 
recognised, in his exploration of murder, authority and resistance, that political violence occurred by virtue 
of a claim to the right to take human life, in the name of abstract values such as freedom or justice. As 
contemporary social debates around security and terrorism demonstrate, the over-extension of one political 
value erodes the acceptance of others, even while proclaiming to protect them. Former psychologist and 
Australian politician Carmen Lawrence notes this effect, writing “after hundreds of years of debate in the 
West about the judicious balance between freedom of the individual and the protection of the society, we 
appear to have been panicked into the conclusion that protection of society should enjoy pre-eminence.”  445
Moral principles in and of themselves are not to be rejected on the basis of their abstracted nature; rather, as 
metaphysical abstractions, these values are easily removed from the concrete, lived experiences of the people 
they come to be applied to. Putting oneself on the side of history, rather than the side of the people who are 
right now suffering under oppression, leads to excesses and exceptionalism, and “for Camus, too many 
individuals on both sides [in Algeria] were guilty not just of murder, but also of flattening life into 
abstractions or stereotypes.”  Political violence is always aimed at these abstract stereotypes, but it is real, 446
living people who suffer the consequences, whether that be the race riots in Cronulla, Australia in 2005, 
reprisal killings and massacres in Algeria or the long track record of 20th Century genocides.  
 At the heart of Camus’ refusal to engage with either side in the bitter, sectarian war of his homeland 
is the belief that those who genuinely belong to the land, those who were born to it, those who till the soil 
and bathe in the sun, the proletariat, are separate from the political machinations of administrators, 
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ideologues, revolutionaries and historians. To put all the pied-noir on the side of the French colonial 
government would be as erroneous as to claim that all Arab and Berber people would be active supporters of 
the National Liberation Front. Camus recognised that even as these ideological movements claimed to speak 
on behalf of their representative groups, much like the Stalinist regime, it is the very people they claim to 
represent that take the brunt of the violence. The danger of rebellion spilling over into revolution, as 
explicated in The Rebel, is reflected in his anxiety around the absolutist positions that characterised the 
conflict. Both sides created an absolute goal that required the subjugation of the other, and postponed the 
need to account for justice until after the victory was won. This hardly differs from the messianic projection 
of justice in the world beyond class division, “when the bourgeois class has disappeared, the proletariat will 
establish the rule of the universal man at the summit of production, by the very logic of productive 
development. What does it matter that this should be accomplished by dictatorship and violence? In this New 
Jerusalem, echoing with the roar of miraculous machinery, who will still remember the cry of the 
victims?”  This of course would be no system of justice, but rather a faint shadow of the idea. Universalist 447
rule is a reign of terror wherein conformity, be it to the the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Nation of Islam 
under the Salafist rebels of Algeria or the crushing fist of imperial loyalty, is demanded as a price for peace; 
justice can then be wielded as a weapon, as effectively as the divine right of kings.  
 Camus saw that the only way out of the cycle of violence was through the pursuit of solidarity. This 
was perhaps too idealised a position for the historical trauma and racially grounded subjugation of European 
colonialism. Nevertheless, Camus sought to bring people together in dialogue, to find common ground as 
human beings rather than as representatives of irreconcilable historical narratives. This is what underpinned 
his attempts to broker a civilian truce, to give voice to people on all sides and those below the clamour of the 
war. It is in this non-duality of deep, thoughtful recognition of the conflicts of the post-colonial environment 
in conjunction with building on opportunities of solidarity, that we in contemporary colonial contexts can 
look to forge common, respectful and equal experience of sovereignty. By maximising freedom and justice, 
but keeping them immanent to the experiences of the living subjects in the world, Camus hoped to generate a 
politics of dialogue that could avoid the horrors of industrial warfare.  
  
Democratic Ecology 
Matthew Sharpe has artfully interrogated the narrative of Camus as a naive colon, as presented in the 
analyses of O’Brien and Saïd, and found the theory wanting. What he finds, rather, is a politics and 
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philosophical discourse that “allows him and us to change gear from abstract speculation towards political 
engagement.”  Camus’ mature and concrete political philosophy, grounded in the phenomenological value 448
of human solidarity seeks to establish the conditions for “a society founded on the principle of dialogue.”  449
Sharpe goes on to make the case that these principles are a political antecedent of Habermas’ 
transcendentally based ‘theory of communication’ , while Camus’ interest in dialogue has more in common 450
methodologically with Foucault’s emphasis on discourses of power, as an expressly politically motivated 
project. Arthur Scherr, analysing Camus’ literary and journalistic descriptions of relations between working 
class pied-noirs and Arab and Berber people, finds that Camus “opposed the continuance of French 
colonialism after World War II. He believed that democratic reform, social and political equality, and 
eventual independence should occur throughout the French Empire.”   For Camus, this involved what Saïd 451
would later come to describe as ‘hybridisation’, and he rejected racist criticism of the Arab population, 
claiming that “this people is not inferior, except for the living conditions it finds itself in, and we can learn 
lessons from them the same way they can learn from us.”  This is to say that the French and Arab people of 452
Algeria could have created a richer system of education by teaching both French and Arab philosophy as 
equal theories of knowledge, and allowed gaps and silences between them to lead children into more 
contemplative lives. Such an intertwining of ideas and experiences would not serve to make the Arab more 
French, nor the colon more like the Arab, but rather to cultivate a unique Algerian identity that made the 
most of all its constituent cultures.  
 Camus sought to not only embody a solidarity with those he saw as his Arab countrymen, but he 
further could be argued to have explicitly built this solidarity into his literary works, enumerating a 
camaraderie that his critics have typically overlooked. One prominent example of this is the short story ‘Les 
Muets’ (1958), or ‘The Silent Men’, in which working class solidarity between Frenchmen and an Arab 
worker is contrasted against the hostility towards the wealthy factory owner. The story centres around a 
group of workers who refuse to engage with their boss on a human level when his daughter falls ill and is 
taken to hospital, because they regard him in a state of resentment over an unsuccessful wage dispute. On 
 Sharpe, Camus, Philosophe: A return to our beginnings, 229.448
 Ibid.449
 Ibid.450
 Scherr, Arthur. ‘Albert Camus's L'Étranger and Les Muets: Violence and Reconciliation between Arab and Pied-451
Noir.’ Texas Studies in Literature and Language 59, no. 1 (2017): 76-105 (78).
 Camus, quoted in Scherr, ‘Albert Camus's L'Étranger and 'Les Muets': Violence and Reconciliation between Arab 452
and Pied-Noir', 78.
 142
one side, Scherr finds this narrative interesting for its inversion of Marxist ideology, wherein the bourgeois 
property owner is treated as an object by the workforce, simply as a means to their material ends.  This is 453
contrasted explicitly with the crude but genuine solidarity that the French workers show to their mute Arab 
compatriot. While the experience of the Arab man is not privileged as a subject in the story, “in some ways, 
he incarnates the reductio ad absurdum of the proletarian colon. He is slightly lower on the economic scale 
than his coworkers are … Yet he is not Other than they, except in his race, which Camus virtually ignores in 
the story.”  The French workers share their hard earned provisions with the poorer colleague in a show of 454
solidarity, declaring his humanity as primary to the material gain, in contrast to the class motivated treatment 
of their boss. When one interrogates the relations in this story as a whole it becomes evident that Camus 
thinks “class consciousness and class conflict, which unite the workers against what they view as their 
employer’s unfairness, [can] override ethnic and racial differences.”  While this is an imperfect resolution, 455
it is an important initial offering of solidarity against conflict. And further, for Camus, the conditions of a 
politics of dialogue must be painstakingly constructed, and this involves first and foremost the economic and 
material disparities of power that reinforce the dominance of a monoculture. Far from seeing political 
plurality as a collapsing of political distinctions, or the legitimation of absolute moral permissibility, “Camus 
thinks that to defend plurality in practical terms means accepting the reality, first of multi-party political 
states, in which no single group can claim an unchecked, permanent possession of executive power; and 
second, of a free press, not under the control of any single party or perspective.”  This view supports the 456
western, liberal ideas of multi-party democracy and the principle of separation of powers, yet expands it to 
ensure that marginalised groups can act as a check and balance on the political culture of any group that 
extends beyond the shared justice of a pluralist community. It is this insistence on the role of justice as a 
check on freedom that separates Camus from classical western libertarianism. Sharpe highlights that 
“freedom, Camus argues, must always be balanced against justice. This tension of freedom and justice is the 
key political instance of what he will call the kind of balance or mesure between competing demands that his 
neoHellenic philosophy extols.”  Freedom and justice for Camus are primary values, which provide a 457
moral tension that can then be the foundation of further, tertiary values. But in terms of the adversarial, 
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nihilistic political culture that characterised the Algerian War of Independence, it was this tension that kept 
Camus from committing his voice to one side or the other as an endorsement of the absolute right to rule. For 
Camus, the Arab claims to justice were legitimate, but when the means to this justice is the violent 
curtailment of the freedom of others, it is taken from the realm of morality and takes life as an 
authoritarianism, administering death at the will of those in power. Neither the Arab nor the French claim to 
freedom or justice was capable of overturning the claim of the other: it is only through solidarity, against the 
background of conflict, that these values can come to fruition in a democratic ecology of interdependent 
political dialogue.  
Conclusion: Limits in Politics and Morality 
Questions about Camus’ political positions continued to haunt his legacy, even as the violence in Algeria 
continued long after his death and the withdrawal of French colonial authority from the territory. The 
predictions he made, both in literary form and in his private correspondence, came to be borne out in the 
development of historical events. His intuition of a ‘pied-noir rage’ and the burning of crops and salting of 
soil became widespread experiences in the French evacuation. Further, the disparate ethnic minorities that 
had collected over centuries of migrations, conquests and increasing global connectivity continued to suffer 
under sectarian violence, as Algeria’s post-independence government launched a campaign of revenge 
against French sympathisers. Despite some years of steady, if authoritarian rule, Algeria saw an escalation of 
violence throughout the 1980s, culminating in a full scale civil war which shook the fledgling post-colonial 
state, and cost tens of thousands of lives. Camus’ argument was never that the pied-noir population was free 
of racist attitudes, but rather that these attitudes could be overcome with less risk than the colossal, under 
planned withdrawal that attempted to unscramble the colonial egg. Racism was merely a mode of violent 
expression, rather than the root cause of political conflict. The cause that lead to the reprisal massacres of 
Algeria was the very same as that which underpinned the industrial murder of civilians in the European 
holocaust. This culpable factor was, and remains, the internal logic of nationalism.  
 Nationalism, as both a political practice and a political philosophy, cannot escape the authoritarian 
and totalitarian logic of its foundation. Nor does it seek to: rather nationalism, seen as kind of patriotic 
supremacism, demands perpetual expansion and justifies its authority by virtue of a collective value in the 
state which is primary to any one living subject. This ‘logic of violence’ is a uniquely modern phenomenon 
to Camus, one which arises when the indifference of reasoned necessity is substituted for the lost values of 
nature, divinity and immanent experience. Camus of course did not denounce reason entirely, merely arguing 
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that it must be tempered and limited by other fundamental aspects of human experience. In the horror of the 
Algerian War of Independence, as in all aspects of Camus’ philosophy, limits are key. The absolute 
conviction in the cause of one group marginalises and silences those who live through the violence, and 
without limiting the political power of the dominant class, there can be no free and equal association. It is the 
contention of this chapter that Camus was not against the National Liberation Front, but against nationalism. 
He was not for the French colonial government remaining in control of Algeria, but for the right of French 
men, women and children, the pied-noir, to remain in the land of their birth.  
 These enduring political questions have taken on renewed importance in the contemporary world. 
Since the arrival of global terrorism in modern western societies, conflicts have been increasingly described 
in terms of cultural differences and clashes of civilisations. The President of the United States, Donald 
Trump, and the President of the Republic of Russia, Vladimir Putin, head an increasing cohort of world 
leaders who openly profess nationalist intentions. But even closer at home, in the domestic affairs of 
Australia, the continuation of material disparities from the colonial occupation of the continent can be seen 
as a problem of political absolutism. The continued interventions and paternalistic policies that are directed 
at Indigenous Australian populations has had a deleterious effect on their culture, health and material 
wellbeing. It is not within the scope of this thesis to propose a concrete solution to the problem of 
entrenched, systemic racism and it is unreasonable to think that the material disparity of communities could 
be resolved overnight. However, Camus’ conception of pluralistic politics could open space for Indigenous 
Australians and other minority groups to more concretely engage in self-governance. This leads to the final 
stage of this analysis, being Camus’ non-dual politics of mesure and his involvement with the anarchist 
project. 
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Chapter 9: Camus’ Anarchism as Good Nihilism 
Totalising systems of politics are the driving force of nihilism in the modern world, in same the way that the 
over-extension of a rationalisation into internal contradiction is the driving force of suicide, both literal and 
philosophical. The reductionism of universal history enacts the same devaluation as philosophical suicide, 
which Sharpe describes as “systems of thought which claim to explain everything in terms referring to 
human purposes, [and] rob life of the dimensions which enable its wonder to be most fully experienced.”  458
It could be said that the very risk and uncertainty of anarchic social organisation is the point in which its 
political strength lies; true deliberation does not begin with a predetermined outcome. Anarchism offers a 
method of collective governance that is inherently philosophical, in a way that eludes our current hierarchical 
alternatives. This is not to say that every person left to their own devices will become a ‘good’ person, nor 
does it mean that moral becoming is removed from the social context that one grows in. But it does return us 
to the kind of role philosophy played in the Neo-Hellenic context, the ēthikē tekhnē, or the science of living 
well. While removed from the abstract, academic philosophy of Descartes, Kant or Hegel, it does fit squarely 
with the meditative, thoughtful cultivation of virtue in the traditions of the Stoics, Buddhists, Gnostics or 
Neoplatonists. In The Rebel (1951), Camus writes that “every ideology is contrary to human psychology.” At 
the heart of the conflict between the subject and its society is the abstraction of political values from the 
discourses of philosophy, and their utilisation as sterile principles imbued with transcendent authority. In 
some sense this is an antecedent version of Foucault’s discursive critique of power, with Camus reading 
modern industrial societies as complex constructions of inherited value relations, that are ultimately intended 
to legitimise the right of the state over the lives of its constituents. This chapter will explore the divide 
between ‘historical’ and ‘natural’ politics, with an aim to situate Camus’ political engagement as the 
embodied culmination of his non-dual and neo-pagan philosophy of ethical limits. The discussion will begin 
with an outline of anarchist philosophy and the anthropological record of non-hierarchical social groups. 
With this framing, the chapter will then consider Camus’ direct involvement with anarchic philosophy and 
his support for the related syndicalist politics of revolutionary unionism. Finally, Camus’ ethic of mesure will 
be presented as a neo-pagan virtue that is the ethical lifeblood of his anarchist philosophy. 
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Anarchist theory and structures of non-duality 
Before discussing Camus’ involvement with anarchism and the political solutions he saw in the gradual 
advancement of the syndicalist movement, it is important to outline a clear understanding of anarchism as a 
practice, theory and historical project. The first step in this discussion is to differentiate anarchism with its 
associations as a form of naive, political nihilism. As a mature political philosophy, anarchism can be drawn 
from various sources, most notably the egoist works of Max Stirner and the anti-authoritarian split between 
the socialists and state communists in the First Communist International.  These theoretical expressions are 459
not the totality of anarchist history, however: in practice, many anarchist modes of social organisation have 
been prominent in places where social groups consciously organise in rejection of hierarchical power, or 
where the collapse of centralised control have left an opportunity for self-governing communities to exist in 
a largely deliberative and libertarian context. What these theoretical and practical modes of anarchy have in 
common is a vast distance from popular representations of anarchic culture, often represented as a political 
discourse of lawless murderers and rapists, or in popular culture and media, such as the film and television 
franchise The Purge (2013 - present). Hollywood and other centres of cultural power have succeeded in 
privileging an interpretation of anarchy based in the exaltation of random acts of violence. David Graeber, in 
his text Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology (2004), responds to this pervasive misunderstanding of 
anarchy by delineating the concepts of organisation and rulership, pointing to the etymology of ‘anarchy’ as 
meaning literally ‘without-rulers’.  In this way, Graeber further rebuts a common misconception that 460
anarchists are opposed to collective projects such as healthcare or community safety, that ‘anarchist 
organisation’ is a contradiction in terms. He writes “The nineteenth century ‘founding figures’ did not think 
of themselves as having invented anything particularly new. The basic principles of anarchism - self-
organization, voluntary association, mutual aid - referred to forms of human behaviour they assumed to have 
been around about as long as humanity.”  This is very far from popular depictions of anarchism, as masked 461
insurrectionists rioting in the streets, having no inclination other than to engage their most animal, 
uncivilised instincts of destruction.  
 Even the most egoistic of the anarchist theorists, Max Stirner, developed a concrete theory of social 
organisation, denoted as the ‘union of egoists’, and which “is a concept that Stirner uses to contrast an 
organisation based on his concepts of ownness and property with those based on self-renunciation and 
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dispossession.”  A simple demarcation of this difference can be seen in the organisational principles of a 462
syndicate in contrast to a corporation. A syndicate is a non-binding association of voluntary participants who 
each take an equal stake in the terms of the organisation, and who can leave at will. A syndication has no 
central site of organisational power or authority and exists only to serve the common interests of the 
participants. Anarchy is, by definition, an opposition or negation of hierarchy, the notion that rulership is 
sacred, not an opposition to the voluntary organisation of willing participants. It is opposed to “the state and 
all forms of structural violence, inequality or domination”  and thus the depictions of anarchists as seeking 463
a break from law in order to inflict harm on others is nothing more than a fanciful caricature.  
 The founding figures of anarchism, then, did not see themselves as inventing a theory, but rather 
collecting already existing imperatives of human morality into an anti-state, pro-social discourse of political 
deconstruction. The core of modern anarchism can be seen in its common conception with socialism in the 
First Communist International, and the sectarian division that evolved around the question of the vanguard 
state, leading to Michael Bakunin’s socialist split from what he called the ‘state communists’. While some 
anarchists, including Bakunin, can be thought of as advocating a kind of authority, such as reason or logical 
necessity, even “if they do not reject all forms of authority outright [eg, scientific, technical, traditional, 
authorial, etc] all anarchists are suspicious of authority, especially that imposted from above, and seek to 
minimise its influence in society.”  In terms of late 19th century revolutionary thought, Bakunin argues that 464
the working class should be liberated from the oppressive conditions of labour relations, rather than within 
them: the disagreement principally arises in terms of the Marxist insistence that labour relations will be the 
very form that this revolutionary liberation will take. Bakunin explicates his break with Marxist politics in 
two key volumes, Marxism, Freedom and the State (1868-1872) and God and the State (1882), taking 
particular issue with the logic of authoritarianism, whether democratic or otherwise. Bakunin points out that 
the ambitions of Marx are not very conceptually different from those of Bismarck, writing “Marx is a 
democrat, an Authoritarian Socialist, and a Republican … That is what separates Marx from Bismarck - the 
form and the conditions of Government.”  It is important to note here that ‘authoritarianism’ should be 465
distinguished from the style of government in play, whether a monarchy, democracy, laissez-faire capitalist 
market or scientifically socialist republic. Authoritarianism, drawing on Theodore Adorno’s studies into 
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fascist psychology,  in practice refers to the principle of Order being central to the organising logic of a 466
political system. Illustratively, liberalism itself can be, and often is, authoritarian. Graeber notes that  
  
Academics love Michel Foucault’s argument that identifies knowledge and 
power, and insists that brute force is no longer a major factor in social 
control … In fact the threat of that man with the stick permeates our world at 
every moment … if you see a hungry woman standing several yards away 
from a huge pile of food … there is a reason you can’t just take some and 
give it to her. A man with a big stick will come and very likely hit you.  467
This can be seen to conform with Camus’ critique of the communist project in The Rebel (1951) as becoming 
self-defeating in its valorisation of Justice as a principle higher than any one person, and that individual 
subjects can be sacrificed in the service of furthering this authoritarian principle. This is where anarchist 
philosophy intersects with Nietzsche’s philosophy, in that there is no benefit to be gained from changing the 
specific laws that determine social relations, and instead “most anarchists call, like Nietzsche and Emma 
Goldman, for a transvaluation of values, a going beyond existing definitions of good and evil, to forge a new 
morality for a free society.”  Anarchists have rarely, if ever, proposed an abandonment of our moral duties, 468
or endorsed the inalienable right to bring harm onto others.  Rather, it is the State and its authority that 469
represents the actualisation of violence in the immanent present, being the principal instigator of war and 
retaining a monopoly over the right of violence in domestic affairs.  
 In opposition to the perpetual, adversarial nature of representative democracy, enforced by the legal 
application of violence, anarchist theory can be described as an attempt at an immanent, consensus-based 
model of politics. Geoffrey Allan Plauche states that “There are at least three conditions necessary for 
immanent politics to take place: direct participation, direct action, and individual liberty.”  In this sense, the 470
freedom that anarchism is arguing for, takes on its Sartrean quality of anguish, both liberating and 
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inescapable.  It entails a responsibility to be a moral agent, to be individually involved in all political 471
decisions and to commit to those decisions in action. This requires a revaluation of our political values, and 
the very nature of our political discourse. Graeber differentiates the process of representation, whether in the 
form of liberal parliamentary politics, or the fundamentals of the social contract, with a model of consensus:  
In consensus process, everyone agrees from the start on certain broad principles …  
they also accept as a matter of course that no one is ever going to convert another 
person completely to their point of view, and shouldn’t try; and that therefore 
discussion should focus on concrete questions of action, and coming up with a plan 
that everyone can live with and no one feels is in fundamental violation of their 
principles.  472
The typical response to this kind of description is that it is merely aspirational politics, and that many of the 
fundamental aspects of human nature require coercive repression, for the safety of the public as a whole. It 
should be abundantly clear that these apparently uncontrollable, positivist elements of human psychology are 
far from universally proven. The nature of Peter Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1902) is an 
attempt to painstakingly demonstrate the importance of cooperation to the success of the vast majority of 
population samples in the biological and anthropological record. Kropotkin’s encyclopaedic approach spans 
from the study of insects and pack hunters to examinations of indigenous American and Australian social 
structures, asserting that mutual aid is as much a demonstrable ‘rule’ of nature as competition has been in 
shaping the imperatives of evolutionary development. Graeber’s argument focusses on ethnographic studies 
from early anarchist anthropologists, such as Al Brown (an admirer of Kropotkin),  Marcel Mauss and 473
Pierre Clastres, as well as his own interactions with the indigenous populations of Madagascar. In particular, 
he cautions against the proclivity of 19th Century anthropologists to romanticise these groups as examples of 
utopia, reminding the reader that while they offered elements of anarchic organisation, they are not “entirely 
egalitarian: there are always certain key forms of dominance, at least of men over women, elders over 
juniors.”   474
 “Anguish: The reflective apprehension of the Self as freedom, the realisation that a nothingness slips in between my 471
Self and my past and future so that nothing relieves me from the necessity of continually choosing myself and nothing 
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 However, the existence of these oppressive structures are not a mea culpa for the anarchist vision, as 
they are not within, but against the impulse of anarchic counter-power. Graeber continues by arguing that it 
“is hardly a coincidence that when larger, more systematically violent forms of domination do emerge, they 
draw on precisely these idioms of age and gender to justify themselves.”  Even if it were to be shown that 475
these are inescapable certainties of human behaviour, the argument that people should submit to the 
protection of an expanded version of paternalist authority through the western ‘social contract’, should be 
seen as nothing short of a protection racket. Michel Foucault, in his text Discipline and Punish (1975), 
concretises these power relations as ‘economies of illegality’ linked to class associated discourses, such as 
rights and property.  The protection and benefits of the state are available to those outside of the dominant 476
hierarchy, but only in return for a submission to behaviours that maintain these economies of oppression 
which constitute the hierarchy.  
 While Graeber looks to the anthropological studies of pre-industrial societies for models of non-
coercive rule, Peter Marshall looks to the antecedents of anarchist philosophy in the non-dual structures of 
early Eastern civilisations. Non-duality is of course not a universal tendency in eastern cultures and 
philosophies, nor is the rejection of authoritarianism. Confucianism, for example, is recognised as one of the 
earliest forms of legalistic philosophy, and according to Marshall, while “the Taoists have long been 
recognised as forerunners of anarchism, the libertarian tendency within Buddhism is not immediately so 
obvious.”  The associations of Taoist and Buddhist philosophy have been explored at many levels of this 477
study, through Nietzsche’s interactions with early translations of Indian texts and Camus’ exposure through 
the influence of his mentor, Jean Grenier. It is no surprise that the historical links and metaphysics that 
underpin the ethics and revaluation projects of each of these thinkers are conducive also to a politics that 
seeks to actualise these ethics in concrete action. Marshall’s analysis of ancient anarchisms provides a link 
between the metaphysical positions described in previous chapters, and the modern forms of political 
organisation proposed here. Marshall writes of the ‘Heraclitian’ perspective that undermines the constancy of 
authority, noting that “like most later anarchists, the Taoists see the universe as being in a continuous state of 
flux. Reality is in a state of process; everything changes, nothing is constant.”  This can be seen to form the 478
basis of a cosmological critique of the concept of a persistent, intergenerational social contract. To speak of a 
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contract that is agreed to before one is born is an absurdity, and to seek to impose one on future generations 
to come after one’s own death is an immorality. Further, in contrast to the legalistic impulses of Confucian 
order, the socialist vision of self-organising societies coalescing around common labour is strongly akin to 
the Taoist ideal, which Marshall says “was a form of agrarian collectivism which sought to recapture the 
instinctive unity with nature which human beings had lost in developing an artificial and hierarchical culture. 
Peasants are naturally wise in many ways.”  As with Graeber’s discussion of New World civilisations 479
above, this is not to suggest that the adoption of the modern rituals of Taoism constitutes a comprehensive 
political doctrine. Rather, these cultures present a model of how these natural, rather than historical, values 
are incarnated through social discourse with all of their advantages and pitfalls, and can suggest methods of 
reviving these values within the defined limits of contemporary anarchic politics to address the challenges of 
the modern world.  
 The theoretical, anthropological and cultural aspects of anarchic philosophy presented in this section 
have largely revolved around systems and strategies of counter-power. Counter-power, it has been shown, is 
a structural impulse within a social group that seeks to impose a protective limit to the expansion of power or 
accumulation of status that would imbalance the continuation of the social group. As has been shown, and 
will continue to be discussed throughout this chapter, these limits and values are largely drawn from natural 
phenomena, and seek to emulate the cyclical forms of the natural environment. This chapter will continue to 
explore these anarchic and naturalistic values in terms of the impact that they had on Camus’ engagement 
with the anarchist movement and his drive to demonstrate a politics of immanence with which to counter the 
expansion of a nihilistic political and moral void.  
Camus and the anarchist movement 
The most logical starting point regarding Camus’ anarchist political leanings is with the break between his 
political activities and those of the Communist movement at large, and the support for vanguardism from 
Sartre and the French intelligentsia in particular. In this way, an exploration of Camus’ associations with 
various anarchist and syndicalist groups can help to inform the evolving position he took in a theoretical 
search for a viable revolutionary alternative to the authoritarian consequences of Soviet communism. As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, Camus was opposed to ascribing to a fixed political position, but the 
tension between his deontological view of ethics balanced against the inalienable liberty that can be asserted 
by all thinking beings, convincingly lead Camus to an acceptance of the broad project of anarchism. This 
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section will survey lines of evidence that concretely situate Camus within the anarchist and syndicalist 
movements, including his contributions to major anarchist publications, his affinity with the Catalonian 
anarchist diaspora and his direct involvement and personal interaction with anarchist organisations and 
individuals. In addition to these historical lines of inquiry, an assessment of the aesthetic-ontological 
structure of non-duality that has been traced throughout this thesis will be shown to inform Camus’ 
appropriation of the project of ‘revaluation of all values’ into the anarchic relations of an artistic ‘good 
nihilism’ or as he referred to it in The Myth of Sisyphus, to “give the void its colours.”  Ashley Woodward, 480
in his paper ‘Camus and Nihilism’ (2011), links this notion to a broader democratisation of nihilism through 
the Absurd, which involves a politics without appeal, a perpetual creative rebellion and an embrace of a 
political ‘no-thingness’ which allows a politics to arise spontaneously from the relations between people in 
the living moment. These non-dual ‘becomings’ of a political-performative will be demonstrated through 
links to the structures of the aesthetics of tragedy as well as the social philosophies of the East that Camus 
had been exposed to. Of critical focus to the importance of this political revaluation is Camus’ philosophy of 
nature, and the imperative to cease the transformation of a living world into an artefact of civilisation. The 
annihilation of the human species and the natural world through catastrophic climate change is an 
increasingly vivid horizon, and one which presents a powerful intensification of the Absurd. In no clearer 
terms could the particulars of the modern feeling of absurdity be demonstrated: the sheer futility of human 
action transformed into a gleeful and narcissistic self-destruction. Even amongst the rise of 21st Century far 
right politics, the existential threat of total climate collapse presents the most pressing argument for direct 
revolutionary action and a moral imperative to divert an industrial murder of a scale that the dictators of the 
20th Century could never achieve.  
 Camus’ public falling out with the communist movement and its backers in the French intelligentsia 
has been extensively documented, including in his own words with a vast repudiation of what he saw as the 
logic of the Soviet Gulags in The Rebel (1951). However, as has been discussed in previous chapters, this 
passionate response to industrial murder was prefigured by an earlier break with the Algerian Communist 
Party. Part of this may have been the influences which lead him to join communist politics, as “the first 
influence came from Camus’s teacher, the peculiar eclectic thinker Jean Grenier, an anti-Communist who 
advised his pupil to join the Communist Party.”  This backgrounds Peter Dunwoodie’s identification of two 481
core reasons for Camus’ philosophical drift away from communist politics, firstly a somewhat reactionary 
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distaste for ‘Caesarism’ , but also a more sophisticated appreciation of the central threads of French 482
anarchist thought: “Camus makes little distinction between the three currents which are generally 
distinguished in French anarchism: an individualist strand, originating with Stirner, at times Proudhon; a 
collectivist current known as ‘communiste libertaire’, shaped by Bakunin, Kropotkin, Louis Michel, Elisée 
Reclus; an anarcho-syndicalist current, based on the French CGT then the Spanish CNT.”  Many of these 483
theorists have been discussed in the above section, but what arises of interest here is Camus’ continued 
appreciation for political limits rather than absolute political values. His refusal to distinguish between, for 
example, the individualist and collectivist impulses is not a resignation to their incompatibility, but rather an 
admission that the anarchist project arises through the relation of these principles as the outer limits of a 
moral politics. It is here that we see Camus invoking the metaphysics and aesthetics of non-duality, his neo-
Hellenic fusion of opposites reflecting the self-same generative power which was identified by Nietzsche in 
the contrary impulses of the Apolline and Dionysian.  
 The universal, however, is always a threat that looms over revaluation. We saw in the opening act of 
this thesis that Nietzsche was susceptible to political appropriation, and the open-ended nature of Nietzsche’s 
work as an unfinished project increases the propensity for his writing to be interpreted as a set of rules for a 
new phase of human history. In The Rebel, Camus identifies a key weakness in Nietzsche’s thought as a 
pathway from individual will to power leading directly to the adoption of a universal will to power.  484
Nietzsche can be seen as identifying the freedom generated by the fall of traditional values and power 
relations, but he appears to implore his reader to grasp that freedom and wield it as one's right. The 
qualification Nietzsche offers that this freedom is only for a select few becomes not a test of spiritual 
strength but rather a judgement levelled at those deemed undeserving. Camus claims that “rebellion, with 
Nietzsche, ends again in the exaltation of evil. The difference is that evil is no longer a revenge. It is accepted 
as one of the possible aspects of good and, with rather more conviction, as part of destiny”  and on the 485
same page further points to the inevitable consequences of these thoughts falling into the hands of ‘mediocre 
men’. He continues to say that “a race of vulgar overlords, with a blundering desire for power, adopted, in his 
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name, the ‘anti-semitic deformity’ on which he never ceased to pour scorn.”  This may very well be a 486
misreading by Camus, the Nazi propagandists, and even the avant garde artists discussed previously. 
Nietzsche continually invokes the notion of ‘amoralism’ to define the projection of his vision, and in 
conjunction with his dismissal of humanism, this can be easily exploited to justify the inhumane, whereas 
this thesis has erred towards an interpretation of justifying the inhuman. The a-moral is much more a post-
morality than an immorality, and if we consider the revaluation of values to be an avenue of personal 
affirmation, then we can see that Nietzsche has missed an opportunity in emancipatory politics. Camus 
rightly points out that even setting aside the possibility of misunderstanding, a silence remains in Nietzsche’s 
work in which “he failed to perceive that the doctrines of social emancipation must, by an inevitable logic of 
nihilism, lead to what he himself had dreamed of superhumanity.”  Camus is more amenable to 487
emancipations of philosophy, grounded in a rebellion against prevailing norms or the vulnerability of the 
body, such as the Hellenic schools of Stoicism, Epicureanism or Graeco-Buddhism. It is for this reason that 
he casts his net wider in the Greek mythological realm, seeking a symbol which can more appropriately 
capture the eternal struggle of personal development and discipline without devolving into universalism.  
 A more concrete example of Camus’ mythological influences would be, of course, the titular 
character of his most well-known philosophical essay, the Greek King Sisyphus. Ian Birchall identifies the 
use of this mythological image in correspondence between Rosa Luxembourg and Eduard Bernstein, in 
which Luxembourg uses the image of Sisyphus as a representation of the restrictions that capitalist 
production impose on the revolutionary potential of the union movement.  Birchall further notes that 488
Camus may have been aware of Luxembourg’s use of the myth prior to writing his own treatise on Sisyphus, 
and that acknowledgements of Luxembourg appear at later times in his notebooks.  If Camus were to be 489
seen as deploying the Sisyphean myth as in terms of syndicalist labour, then it is clear that Camus sides with 
Bernstein rather than Luxembourg, opting for the gradual and deliberate progression of proletarian freedom, 
but clearly in the sense of his ‘politics without appeal’. Camus’ conception of freedom in The Myth of 
Sisyphus (1942) is explicitly non-metaphysical, and relates directly to the freedom of the incarnated subject 
to think and act without restriction in the immanent moment. To link the syndicalist strains of the labour 
movement to Camus’ insistence that we ‘must imagine Sisyphus happy’ is to conceive of the labourer as 
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drawing value from their work and experiencing the wonder of creation, without a mind to an eventual, 
abstract goal of a socialist utopia. This leads Bernstein to question whether or not Camus is right to praise 
revolutionary syndicalism, or if he would have been better to develop his argument against totalitarian 
Marxism through a more moderate trade union reformism.  This discussion retains some argumentative 490
force, particularly in terms of Camus’ repudiation of political murder, and the concrete gains that the French 
trade union movement secured for working class rights and living standards throughout his own life in the 
early 20th Century. There is some merit to this critique, particularly in conjunction with discussions in the 
previous chapter around Camus’ self-imposed silence regarding the Algerian War of Independence. However, 
some examples from Camus’ writings in Combat, as well as his documented writing on the Spanish 
syndicalist movement, may help to clarify his position regarding the project of revolution.  
 I argue that Camus ‘metaphysical rebellion’ was at heart a pragmatic and non-violent politics of 
anarchism, informed by the traditions of Hellenic cynicism and Epicureanism. While his philosophy exalts 
passionate experiences, these are intended to be related only to the immanent and bodily passions, not an all-
consuming revolutionary fervour. Political ideologies of the modern world have sought to replace absolute 
authority by filling the halls of power with Enlightenment values, whether replacing God with Freedom, 
Freedom with Power or Power with Justice. This is to say that Camus would see the adoption of the Leninist 
politics of Communism simply out of resistance to the politics of Fascism as an abstract, rather than a 
concrete political decision. Camus broadly organised his understanding of State Communism around the 
political incarnation of the abstract value of Justice,  and Fascism as much the same, though in the service 491
of the value of Power.  It is not too much of an extension of these critiques to conceive of democratic 492
capitalism as being a third political incarnation of an absolute value, derived from the conception of Liberty 
that arose in the Enlightenment period of Western philosophy.  
 Camus’ position, it seems, is that none of these absolute political values are capable of justifying 
themselves and are thus in competition with the opposing values in order to gain legitimacy through conflict. 
Camus’ refusal to engage in a violent revolution (that is, rational terror) is drawn from a kind of political 
ascesis, a rejection of the notion that political murder and class oppression is acceptable in the service of one 
abstraction, so long as it prevents others doing the same for their preferred political values. Camus’ pacifism 
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resides in his insistence on both a metaphysics and a politics without appeal, that is, appeal to a value beyond 
the immanent needs of the polis. In The Rebel, Camus explicitly links the ethics of rebellion to the movement 
of revolutionary trade unionism, claiming that unions have done more for the material conditions of people’s 
lives than the ballot box has achieved.  This could be largely due to the consistency of trade unionism in 493
producing collective rights concerning working conditions, and concentrating on the concrete needs of the 
working class, both within and outside the union membership. Birchall himself points out that another anti-
Stalinist voice on the left, Alfred Rosmer, with whom Camus was associated, was praised for being an anti-
Stalinist by virtue of the actions of the regime, rather than by a reactionary attachment to opposing right wing 
values,  and it is in this way that I would argue that Camus’ position should be understood. Camus himself 494
directly repudiated politicians who governed for values rather than for the flesh and blood people who they 
were supposed to serve. In a 1944 editorial for Combat, Camus wrote the following: 
  
If this history leaves us without resentment, it nevertheless stiffens our resolve. 
And we are resolved first of all not to open the doors of French politics to those 
who left at a time when the resistance was prepared to welcome them. In other 
words, the affairs of this country should be managed by those who paid and 
answered for it. In other words, we are determined to replace politics with morality. 
That is what we call a revolution.  495
For Camus, the revolution was explicitly a revaluation, and thus his language shifts from revolution to 
rebellion. This reading is reinforced by Samantha Novello’s suggestion that Camus’ philosophy can be 
appropriated in contemporary political thought with the possibility that “the tragic thought developed 
principally in Le Myth de Sisyphe resonates with efforts to trace different ‘aesthetic’ declinations of the 
political in twenty-first century philosophico-political debate.”  Novello argues that through the aesthetics 496
of Tragedy, the move away from political principles of the Enlightenment allows the possibility “of political 
action as creation, exposing the relation … between nihilism and the possibility of plural ‘aesthetic’ 
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declinations of the political.”  These ‘plural aesthetic declinations of the political’ could be thought of as 497
the death of the authority of the state, a kind of counter to totalitarian ‘end of history’ philosophies which 
posit a single, unified end of the human struggle. The core of this difference is the anti-foundational position 
on humanism that Camus takes wherein flesh and blood people are regarded as ‘incarnated singularities’  498
in direct juxtaposition to the Totalitarian or Liberal projects of bio-political and ‘immunitarian’ attempts to 
protect the continuation of the human species as a whole.  In basic terms, this puts Camus on the side of 499
people as opposed to what he sees as ethical red-herrings regarding the protection of the abstract category of 
‘humanity’. 
 In this sense then, the advent of nihilism is transformed from the impending loss of meaningfulness 
from the collapse of the historical model of civilisation, to a generative and creative space, wherein the value 
of life begins to re-emerge from an engagement between the actuality of a person in the flesh (la chair) and 
the immanent life-world. For Camus, the simultaneous yes/no of the Rebel arises in the rejection of a 
‘totalitarian’ denial of nihilism, as in the act of suicide for example, but that this denial must be tempered by 
the complementary ‘yes’ of a denial built in the perpetual embodiment of immanent values. It is my 
contention that this political attitude was significantly influenced by the metaphysic and ethic of indifference 
which was propounded by Camus’ mentor, Jean Grenier. As was discussed in the earlier chapter on Camus’ 
theological influences, Grenier was deeply interested in Taoist philosophy, and drew extensively on eastern 
sources in the development of his own thought.  The indeterminate flux of nature drawn from Grenier’s 500
interpretation of Taoism which exalts the full spectrum of natural phenomena, from the beauty of life to the 
horror of decay and death, influenced a young Camus to write in an essay titled ‘On Jean Grenier’s Les Iles’ 
of how he learned from his mentor that “these outward appearances are beautiful, but that they were doomed 
to perish and therefore should be loved in despair.”  This may appear pessimistic, but in the non-dual 501
framework of Camus' aesthetics and the ‘Mediterranean temperament’, it is only because these natural 
beauties are finite, fragile and fleeting that they appear to us as meaningful at all. This tragic view of the 
immanent flux of experience has further influences from the Hellenic world, which Camus saw as the 
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classical prefiguring of his ‘New Mediterranean Culture’ of the “geographical and cultural locale at the 
crossroads between East and West.”  This again highlights Camus’ ‘Hellenist fusion’ wherein he avoids 502
essentialism or reductionism in his use of classical philosophies, rather investigating them as defining the 
aesthetic limits of incarnated human experience. An early critic of Camus’ use of Hellenic sources, Paul 
Archambault, argues that at the time of writing Christian Metaphysics and Neoplatonism (1935) Camus had 
a “total vision of Hellenism and Christianity [which] is obscured by ambiguities and contradictions”  503
though notes that his later writings on the topic took a more sophisticated view. However, it is in view of the 
aesthetics of tragedy that I would offer a defence of the juxtaposition which Camus presents between these 
two late Classical philosophies.  
 One of the distinct aspects of Alexander the Great’s conquest of the Near East was the establishment 
of many Greek cities and the eventual rise of Eastern Greek kingdoms, such as Bactria and the Seleucid 
Empire. These cities and civilisations retained much of their local character, but with the infusion of the 
dynamics of Greek politics and aesthetics. In this cosmopolitan environment, with varying degrees of 
success, Greek and South Asian cultures engaged fruitfully, producing cultural legacies such as Graeco-
Buddhism and literature such as the The Milinda Pañha (circa. 100BCE - 200CE), a philosophical 
engagement between Buddhist dialectics and Greek rationalism. For Camus, the specific day-to-day 
functioning of these societies would be of little practical importance to his political study: rather, as in his 
attempts to produce a cosmopolitan solution to the colonial violence in Algeria, these Hellenic cultures 
present a fusion of peoples which in the spirit of Greek tragedy sees the ambiguity of both sides being 
“equally legitimate, equally justified.”  For Camus, this is an archetype of a pluralist political model, that 504
can be contrasted against the narrative certainty of the ‘dramatic’ Christianisation of Europe. “Christianity 
plunges the whole of the universe, man and the world, into the divine order”  and that order is instituted in 505
the world as a historical attitude to the incarnation of Christ, which adopts the position of absolute truth and 
moral legitimacy. This should not be taken in the manner of the ‘New Atheist’ critique of Christianity, that it 
is a logically or morally flawed position: rather, Camus is attempting to identify the discursive limits of 
Christianity as an organising logic for a society. These discursive limits become personal limits, as they are 
internalised and confirmed experientially in the process of a cyclical hermeneutic. Whether this be "the 
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substitution of the ‘Christian man’ for a ‘Greek man’”  or the more modern ‘ideological consciousness’ of 506
the Marxist, libertarian or fascist, Camus’ concern is overwhelmingly in reference to philosophies of History, 
which he identifies as absolutist and authoritarian and which claim to transcend the individual concerns of 
incarnated subjects. But to stay true to the metaphysics of rebellion, one cannot simply replace the 
authoritarianism of the divine with a new authority, nor merely destroy the power structures of historical 
society: the simultaneous affirmation/denial in the ethic of rebellion seeks to re-concretise value in a politics 
of immanence. Against this, Camus uses the demarcation of ‘Hellenism’ to describe a conscious attitude that 
is grounded in the hermeneutics of nature, an aesthetic adoption of indifference and flux. In terms of Camus’ 
modern political position, he saw the adoption of historical consciousness as a privilege of the wealthy and 
powerful, whereas his literature and journalism regarding the working poor shows a people who live day to 
day, in the cycles of nature and the seasons, too concerned with the immediacy of survival to consider the 
abstract notions of a ‘universal humanity’.  
 In April of 1945, Camus responds to a letter which contains the simple phrase “I am a teacher, and 
I’m hungry.”  In response to this everyday misery, Camus directs his answer to those who have taken on 507
the role of responsibility, and repudiates the government which “continues to live in a world of abstractions, 
while hundreds of thousands of French men and women continue to suffer from everyday realities that could 
not be more discouraging.”  In many ways, modern politics continues to reflect this same engagement with 508
abstraction over incarnation, transcendence over immanence. Military interventions, such as the 2003 
invasion of Iraq by western powers, are paradoxically justified in abstracted terms of the value of freedom: 
fifteen years of conflict later, the estimated civilian death toll in Iraq is between 182,650 - 205,043.  While 509
state and federal governments in Australia spend exorbitant amounts on reviews of reviews regarding the 
wellbeing of Australia’s marginalised indigenous population, real health outcomes in Indigenous Australia 
have continued to deteriorate.  As with the early 20th Century, the early 21st Century is enthralled by the 510
strongman politics of nationalism, wherein the good of the state is used to justify austerity and security 
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amidst the malaise of industrial economic downturns. Camus’ conception of a ‘creative nihilism’ with which 
to break out of these cycles of historical politics is encapsulated in the immanence of the ethics of mesure, 
which will be presented here as a guide to balancing the conflicting limits of the anarchist project.  
 
Camus, Anarchism and the Ethics of Mesure 
Camus, like Nietzsche before him, refused to articulate a concrete, unitary system of politics or social 
organisation that would constitute an adequate response to the decline of politics associated with modern 
nihilism. Both philosophers approached the problem through a framework of recalibrating the moral or 
ethical attitude of the incarnated subject as a reciprocal engagement with the immanent, rather than historical 
world. It is my contention that Camus pushed this process further, in response to the totalitarian political 
regimes of the twentieth century, and articulated the ‘ethic of mesure’ as a model for the practical application 
of the syncretic affirmation/denial of the Rebel and to balance the mutual arrangements of non-dualist 
politics of anarchism. This reading will be reinforced by Matthew Sharpe’s description of a move from 
political messianism to philosophical naturalism, as well as an engagement with Ashley Woodward’s 
interpretation of Camus’ democratisation of nihilism. These, and other texts, will be used to help inform 
Camus’ direct commentary on the ethics of mesure, as presented in The Rebel, with the purpose of providing 
a philosophical counter to the claims of totalitarian politics. 
 The drive to determine this model of action in the closing chapters of The Rebel (1951) appear as a 
response to the acceleration of political devaluation, as the crisis of secularism is replaced with the religious 
fanaticism of political and economic dogmas. Thomas Warren argues that the common English translation of 
la mesure to ‘moderation’ is a misrepresentation of the Hellenic roots of Camus’ thought, and  “that the 
Greek ethical concept from which Camus’s la mesure implicitly derives is sophrosyne, a cardinal moral 
concept which must not be translated as ‘moderation,’ but rather as ‘measuredness,’ ‘measure,’ ‘harmony,’ 
‘limitedness,’ ‘proportion,’ or ‘rule.’”  This allows us to distinguish Camus’ political thought from the 511
liberal moderate, who seeks an ideal compromise between competing political values, such as the privacy of 
the individual and the safety of the community. This construction of a moderated centre is to be distinguished 
from the measured maintenance of moral limits. Warren goes on to discuss that the French terminology of la 
mesure and la modération, writing that “‘moderation’ describes a kind of behavior [sic] that is modest, mild, 
controlled, or without extremes. In contrast, a concern for ‘measure’ is a concern for objective meaning, 
 Warren, Thomas H. ‘On the Mistranslation of La Mesure in Camus's Political Thought.’ Journal of the History of 511
Philosophy 30, no. 1 (1992): 123-130 (124).
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implying a moral (and epistemological) interest in the very criteria, standards, forms, or proportions of nature 
or reality themselves.”  The distinction appears largely as between la modération as a normative value and 512
la mesure as a summative form of ethics, which deals with the world in terms of its material and moral 
reality. This frames the profound break that Camus experienced with the French intelligentsia and the 
communist movement, as Camus was not willing to moderate his criticism of the Soviet gulags, rather 
making the gulags the measure of the moral authenticity of the Soviet project. The same refusal can be seen 
above in Camus’ condemnation of the free French government, which he saw as pursuing political 
abstractions over the lived realities of those who were still dependent on a black market for even basic 
subsistence. On the most basic level, Camus is approaching a rejection of the moderation between nature and 
history, wherein the former is continually compromised for the progression of the latter. This definition then 
allows an account of the ethic of mesure which takes the totalitarian values of Europe’s modern politics and 
reframes them as the limits that define the boundaries our social relations, rather than the goals or 
foundations of political action.  
 Camus presents the logic of nihilism as a kind of externalism of the concept of ‘philosophical 
suicide’ which was developed in his treatise on the Absurd in The Myth of Sisyphus (1942). However, rather 
than pursuing a logic to its own negation for the purpose of establishing existential meaning, ‘philosophical 
murder’ seeks to negate moral limits for the purpose of justifying indefinite conquest. Philosophical murder, 
as Camus presents the idea in The Rebel (1951), is not merely a murder justified by philosophical principles, 
but the very destruction of philosophical value by subordinating it through physical violence. It is this 
purposeful disregard of philosophical limits in enactments of metaphysical suicide and murder that Camus 
sees as the common factor to both personal and political nihilism. He writes that “If the limit discovered by 
rebellion transfigures everything; if every thought, every action which goes beyond a certain point negates 
itself, there is in effect a measure by which to judge events and men.”  Woodward presents this as a 513
moralist reformulation of Descartes’ rationalist project of radical doubt. In doing so, he points to a limit on 
this reading itself, arguing that especially through Camus’ moral articulations in his literary works, wherein 
“Camus’ rationalist response to nihilism departs from the counter- Enlightenment thinkers by by-passing, or 
rejecting, any attempt to ‘reground’ our irrational background significance and thus enrich the 
meaningfulness of life.”  This of course is not a rejection of rationalism in its entirety, but an 514
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acknowledgement and appreciation for the limits of different aspects of subjective experience. What arises of 
interest from Woodward’s reading is the deployment of a relation between the rationalist and non-rationalist 
responses to nihilism which Camus blends in his literary works, in effect democratising the aesthetics of 
nihilism, and exposing the ethics of rebellion to the broadest audience. Woodward argues that  
Literature has the power to both engage the nonrational in us as individuals, by exercising 
our imaginations and rousing our emotions, and to form part of our cultural horizon. 
Insofar as literature engages at the nonrational level, it can remedy the shortcomings of 
Camus’ seemingly rationalist solution to the problem of nihilism, without thereby 
sacrificing the dimension of rational argumentation itself. Moreover, literature gives a 
democratic voice to Camus’ works by appealing to a wider audience than do purely 
theoretical texts, and by better engaging the life of the ‘average’ person. Working 
together, these two elements of Camus’ solution to nihilism—the rational and the 
nonrational—mean that his work acts as a powerful intervention into the problem.   515
Only by countering the rational with the non-rational can Camus construct an ethic to counter nihilism which 
itself avoids the totalities of the rational or the irrational, as presented in his discussion of political murder in 
The Rebel. This counter is of course not a negation: Camus’ rationalist approach has been extensively 
documented. Rather, the non-rational provides the limit for the rational, which is to say, that encountering the 
unknowable is not a negation of knowledge, and nor does knowledge need to be total to be legitimate. The 
primary ground of this ‘knowledge of the limit of knowledge’ is, for Camus, our setting amongst nature. 
Camus’ emphasis on the natural world as the framing that defines our incarnated existence has been 
discussed previously in Chapter 5, but in the ethics of mesure, the significance of nature takes on a political 
dimension. Nature provides an abundance of limits to the impulses of historical consciousness, and is the 
realm of objective life against the pseudo-transcendentalism of speculative politics. Rather than focussing on 
grand political abstractions like liberty or justice, these ideals can only be truly viable in terms of the 
immanent struggles of day to day living, and “real demands of political life, Camus argues, need to be 
balanced against those given to us by our nature as finite, mortal, natural beings inhabiting an order we did 
not create.”  There are distinct shades of Camus’ neo-Hellenism present in his eco-political vision, notably 516
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the intellectual humility of Pyrrhonism, the moral lucidity of Stoicism and the subsistence hedonism of 
Epicurus. But these philosophical approaches are predicated on a cosmological interpretation that would 
appear mystical and alien to the modern historical consciousness, as Sharpe explains, “Greek polytheism 
mythically expresses, for Camus, a sagely balanced sense of the place of human reality in the larger, plural 
order of the world. We are neither at its providential centre nor, because of that, bereft of our own limited 
place and intrinsic dignity.”  An authentic politics need not take us back to Eden or onwards to Utopia, and 517
the attempt to transcend the trials of the natural world by sacrificing countless modern souls on the altar of 
history, whether in the concentration camp, gulag or sweat shop, only succeeds in further eroding our 
humanity. As Camus writes, “He who dedicates himself to this history dedicates himself to nothing and, in 
his turn, is nothing. But he who dedicates himself to the duration of his life, to the house he builds, to the 
dignity of mankind, dedicates himself to the earth and reaps from it the harvest which sows its seed and 
sustains the world again and again.”  Modern society has postponed the incarnation of justice and freedom, 518
with the historical consciousness seeing the present as nothing more than a brief, imperfect stop on the 
pathway to totalising liberation and the indisputable reign of reason.  
 Camus’ proposition is that the extent of our political organisation should be restricted to the present, 
and is concerned with mutual rather than overall or majority goals, a manner of social organisation “which 
will exclude nothing.”  This, like anarchism as a broad philosophical position on political organisation, 519
should not be considered as an absolutist utopia in and of itself, as in the pretensions of the historical attitude 
to conquering the evils of nature and moral misconduct. Even with the most advanced system of medicine, or 
the manipulation of genetically optimal offspring, on the scale of human understanding, injustice will always 
be present to us. This can be seen in Sharpe’s interpretation of Camus’ view, that “By human standards of 
justice (and parental love), the death of a helpless child by natural causes is as outrageous as the 
systematically-engendered, and politically chosen atrocities of fascism, Stalinism, or colonialism. But we can 
theoretically attempt to comprehend as much of this natural order as we can, humbly attentive to the way it 
operates indifferently to human hopes and fears.”  As the Taoist sage, Boddhisatva or Stoic philosopher 520
would have argued, the anarcho-syndicalist position does not posit an external or positivist solution to the 
evils of existence, but rather accepts them as a matter of course. Like the confrontation with the Absurd, the 
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anarchist or Rebel must accept that they are a matter of an order that is larger than themselves, and after the 
moment of sublime disinterestedness, one must come back down the mountain and work within the limits of 
nature to mitigate the evils that its grand indifference visits upon us. No description of the kingdom of 
heaven or justice could ever justify the sacrifice of even one person; no amount of economic expansion can 
justify the wholesale destruction of our natural environment. What the Hellenic priests and poets described in 
mythical terms, we have come to discover in the political: that is, that exceeding the limits of the order we 
reside within only multiplies the scale of our difficulties. Mesure encourages a meditative, rather than 
analytical account of the limits of nature, and to replicate this model of meditative limitation as a viable 
alternative to the politics of transcendental historicism.  
Conclusion: Trust, Solidarity, Anarchy and Mesure 
As was noted by David Graeber at the beginning of the chapter, it is important to have a vision of utopia, an 
understanding of what we could call an ideal political organisation. But it is also important to understand that 
even the most carefully designed system will ultimately be at the mercy of forces which are beyond our 
comprehension or even awareness. This shift from moral values as the centre of political thought to being the 
limits of political action represents the aesthetic reframing which Camus posited as the basis for a plurality of 
responses to nihilism. These limits exist in both immanent and transcendent forms. They begin with Camus’ 
early discussion of Augustinian apologetics, the formulation of a kind of ‘theodical imperative’ in which 
innocent deaths are recognised as inevitable, and that any attempt to resolve this in the future by way of the 
sacrifice of innocence in the present, is morally illegitimate. Further immanent limits are found in nature, 
such as the slow progression of nature in producing sustainable resources, or for natural systems to cope with 
the by-products of industrial action. Death provides the most concrete of natural, immanent limits, both to 
our ability to influence the living world and as a clear outer limit to our right to influence others. 
 This chapter has examined the history of the anarchist movement in terms of pre-industrial cultures, 
as well as the post-revolutionary writers of modern Europe. As with the anthropological observations in 
Chapter Seven on stone age economies, recorded examples of anarchic societies conform to neither the 
extremes of Eden nor violent brutality. Rather, anarchist philosophy takes advantage of discursive harmonies 
and social equilibrium, as a clear alternative to the pervasive politics of universal history. Camus’ work 
balances these concerns as immanent limits, predominantly discussed in terms of the conflict between 
Liberty and Justice, as conceived through the ideological conflicts of 20th Century political ideology. In 
setting values as limits, Camus hopes to immunise our political thought from the processes of ‘philosophical 
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suicide’ and ‘philosophical murder’, wherein the logic of a system is pursued to the point of self-
contradiction or the contravention of other competing values, respectively. Finally, the ethic of mesure has 
offered a link to the Pagan metaphysics of non-duality, particularly when considering its relation to the 
Aristotelean virtue of sophrosyne. Using the related aesthetics of tragedy, Camus hopes to balance these 
various competing elements of political thought and action in a harmonious syncretism that builds a political 
ethic out of these disparate imperatives. 
 166
Epilogue: Light and Shadow, Beyond Liberal 
Democracy 
This thesis set out to discover the role of the metaphysical proposition of non-duality in shaping the ethics 
and aesthetics of the modern counter-nihilistic philosophers, Friedrich Nietzsche and Albert Camus. 
Nietzsche and Camus have both been studied in terms of their exposure to Eastern philosophies and 
religions, predominantly in terms of their shared outcomes or (particularly in the case of Nietzsche) implicit 
criticisms of those movements. Further, both writers have extensively valorised Hellenic philosophy and 
culture, which has figured predominantly in the scholarship surrounding their work. However, my thesis has 
explored more specifically the relationship between the non-duality drawn from philosophies of Pagan 
Greece and the Classical East and the attempts of Nietzsche and Camus to reorganise the modern relationship 
between subject and world, a relationship which had been increasingly disrupted by the industrial age and the 
dualist primacy of history over nature. The development of this non-dual ‘revaluation of all values’ has been 
explored chronologically and as a narrative of ‘enactment’, beginning with Nietzsche’s identification of an 
absolutist impulse in the modern consciousness, which elevates the importance of the abstract over the 
concrete, the mind over the body and moral judgement over passionate experience: this philosophical 
negation of the immanent aspects of subjectivity has been shown to encourage a repression of the feeling of 
meaning, leading to the advent of nihilistic experience. Nietzsche recognises a solution in the grounding of 
transcendent ethics and aesthetics in the immanent experience of the body, drawing on the ecstasy of tragic 
theatre in his own studies on Hellenic culture, as well as in reflections on Indian philosophy which he had 
encountered through the influence of Arthur Schopenhauer, as well as the broader ‘Orientalist’ interest in 
nineteenth-century Germany.  
 Due to the deterioration of his health, Nietzsche was unable to articulate his final vision of a post-
nihilistic Europe. After his death in 1900, Nietzsche’s ideas were disseminated through Europe via the advent 
of modernist art, with this study particularly focussing on attempts by the Surrealists and the Futurists to 
articulate and resolve the crisis of meaning which Nietzsche had warned of. However, these artistic 
movements became increasingly authoritarian and tied to the historicist politics and emergent ideologies of 
communism and fascism. After the opening act, the thesis then progresses to the works of Albert Camus, 
who having recognised the potential for light and darkness in Nietzsche’s vision, sought to engage with the 
same Pagan and Eastern philosophies that had inspired Nietzsche, rather than simply attempting to resolve 
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the nihilistic crisis from within the bounds of modern European historicism. The study of Camus’ reply to 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis begins with an exploration of Camus’ metaphysics, regarding firstly religion and evil, 
particularly through the influences of his adoration of nature, the ‘necessary hedonism’ of poverty and that of 
his mentor Jean Grenier, before moving on to his Pagan articulation of environmental philosophy. Finally, 
Act Two considers the role of the body as the limit between our transcendental, spiritual being and the 
complementary immanent domain of the lived world. Many parallels are drawn here to the philosophy that 
Nietzsche had envisioned as required for a post-nihilistic society, including the emphasis on performativity in 
bodily metaphysics, and the relationship between ‘primal’ nature and the feeling of nostalgia. The third act 
moves into the later phase of Camus’ philosophy, considering his political turn brought on by the social and 
militaristic upheavals in his homeland of French Algeria and the successive conflicts of Continental Europe. 
Drawing on his childhood experiences of poverty, as well as the visceral and bloody lessons of the Algerian 
War of Independence, Camus sought to produce a system of politics based on the concept of metaphysical 
limits, rather than the establishment of an ideal and universal political imperative. This is born out of his 
rejection of what he saw as the messianic tendency of communist philosophy, as well as the assertion of a 
historically necessary authority over the populace by supposedly liberal governments. These political 
considerations led to an affiliation with anarchist and syndicalist politics, which I have proposed as a way of 
understanding Camus’ non-dual proposition of what he once referred to as a ‘good nihilism’ : that is, a 521
political lack, or space, as the precondition for a creative and immanent social organisation which balances 
the competing needs of freedom and justice. 
 In order to properly pose non-duality as a political aesthetic, it is important to reiterate that neither 
Nietzsche nor Camus saw themselves as having proposed a philosophy of non-dualism, nor did either seek to 
revive any of the classical systems through which they have been discussed. What has been discovered is not 
a concrete rule of action, but instead a measure and limit with which to confront the eternally recurring 
absurdity of rational life in an irrational universe. This reading has been deployed firstly to counter 
dismissals of Nietzsche’s and Camus’ work as contradictory madness or mere poetic mysticism. Both 
thinkers have displayed an awareness of an incomprehensible order that defies our capabilities to perceive 
and understand, but intimately tie their philosophies to the lived realities of incarnated subjects in the world. 
While Kant may have us ponder our transcendent faculties through judgement of the sublime, or Hegel 
through our participation in the Geist of history, both Nietzsche and Camus take up a defence of the 
immanent. Camus in particular, we know, was sincerely concerned with the question of justice, even as a 
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moral principle that transcends individuals, yet still he says “I believe in justice, but I will defend my mother 
before justice.”  This is not, as was discussed in Chapter Eight, an attempt to deny political freedom to the 522
Arab population, but rather a demand that our politics remain connected to immanent, natural values: the 
love of one’s mother, solidarity amongst smiling faces, the joy of the sun and the ocean and the sharing of the 
fruits of the earth. 
 There are clear divergences in method, concern and ethical outcomes between the works of 
Nietzsche and Camus. Nietzsche lived amongst the middle-class elite at the height of Imperial German 
power, and felt himself confronted daily with the decadence of a culture that preached a morality of spiritual 
asceticism. Contrasted with his experiences as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), 
where the desperation and daily struggle for life would have rendered every action with paramount 
importance, the vanity of ‘higher culture’ lacked a certain vitality. Nietzsche was propelled to reforge culture 
in the image of immanent, bodily and passionate needs, that provided a path of struggle and self-
development. Camus, by contrast, began life in a state of poverty and came to know the struggle of everyday 
existence as the norm, for himself and the majority of his community. Camus seemingly agrees that 
European bourgeois culture is decadent, but from the harsh environment of working-class Algiers, he knew 
that a culture of trial did not need to be fabricated, and that one merely needed to ‘come down from the 
mountain’ to see the struggles and triumphs of modern life.  
 Over a century since Nietzsche’s intuition of the decadent decline of Western political culture, we 
have reached a point in history where our globalised consumptive societies are strangling the life support 
systems of the planet as a whole. Our natural environment, which Camus identified as the immanent ground 
of our tangible values, has been relegated to the realm of instrumentality, only worth saving in terms of our 
overall economic prosperity. Camus implores us to seek experiential prosperity instead, hoping that we could 
abandon our attempts to control the environment, and by extension the people in it, and return to a space of 
humility and spiritual reverence for the natural world. In the early twenty-first century, with high 
expectations of environmental collapse and already hundreds of thousands of climate refugees, such 
aspirations may be too late. The problem of political nihilism is rendered most extreme under the shadow of 
losing the very life-support systems that sustain our existence on this planet, and the realisation that even if 
radical action is taken in the immediate future, the deleterious consequences of unconsidered economic 
expansion will continue to wreak havoc on the environment. Furthermore, the possibility of an adequate 
 Quoted in: Carroll, David. Albert Camus, the Algerian: Colonialism, Terrorism, Justice. Co-  522
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response appears to be increasingly unlikely even as the threat of existential disaster looms ever closer. The 
contemporary political era is widely described as being the age of ‘post-truth’, with the Oxford English 
Dictionary having nominated the hyphenated phrase as its 2016 word of the year.  The concept of a post-523
truth politics refers to the dissolution of an agreed set of facts, and the injection of emotive and ideological 
versions of reality into the political process. This has been perceived as an existential threat to the institutions 
of liberal democracy, institutions which the Western world has cherished as the solution to historical conflict 
since the fall of the Soviet Union. However, these potentially universal institutions - security, liberty, 
prosperity, education and free expression - have been revealed as methods of oppression when the values 
themselves are pursued to the point of internal contradiction. For example, the freedom to participate in one’s 
own exploitation or the accumulation of debt to sustain wealth are paradoxical values. The selective 
application of these values as they relate to historically oppressed classes of people suggests that they are 
merely euphemistic reiterations of the projects of colonialism and patriarchy. It has been a core aim of this 
study to demonstrate that the failure of these institutions is not because of a redeemable fault in their 
behaviour, or the methods by which they aim to achieve their goals, but that the very nature of a universal 
politics is inherently totalitarian and incompatible with the multiplicity of human needs. 
 One of the repeated themes discussed in Albert Camus’ The Rebel (1951) is the propensity for 
revolutionary movements to seek to replicate the authority of the political power that has been overthrown. 
This thesis has discussed a possible response to the problem of authoritative politics through the lens of non-
duality, posing non-dualism in terms of philosophy, aesthetics, theology and politics. The response is framed 
by the limits of the incarnated human subject as body, and the natural environment in which we exist. The 
ethic of rebellion is posited as an extension of the recognition of the Absurd, and this relationship between 
absurdity and rebellion is necessary in order to act in the face of impossible odds. The decline in the absolute 
supremacy of Western political hegemony is all but inevitable, whether by the collapse of the systems on 
which it depends, or through its replacement by an alternative political vision. What has emerged of 
importance from this study is the necessity of resisting the messianic promises of a universal future at the 
cost of justice in the present, an ethical attitude of measuredness with which to confront the indifference of a 
natural order of a scale that transcends us, and above all, a commitment to life in any circumstances. Whether 
the oppression of moral evil in the gulags or concentration camps, or the  
 Oxford University Press. ‘Word of the Year’. Oxford Dictionaries. <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-523
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oppression of natural evil, now intensified through human attempts to control the course of nature and the 
resultant consequences of destabilised ecological systems, an imperative remains to seek the light amongst 
the shadow. It is inevitable that the human species will cease to exist, whether by our own hand or the 
randomness of the cosmos, and this tragic fate binds us to a common destination that renders all of our 
transcendent projects futile, yet restores the value of our immanent and fleeting experiences. 
 It is from the Absurd that our happiness emerges, and by non-dual contrast against the void that 
meaningful experiences and values can be rendered within the universe, rather than as the abstract totality of 
its external justification. The relational ontology of non-duality provides a pathway out of the destructive 
totalitarianism of mono-politics, and provides a space, informed by the limits of nature and moral value, 
within which a politics can be perpetually recreated in order to serve the diverse and contingent needs of 
cosmopolitan pluralist societies. Beyond the bourgeoise bastion of liberal democracy, a more authentically 
deliberative and philosophical form of politics emerges as an opportunity to revitalise the non-dual holism of 
Pagan and Eastern ethico-political organisation, and to combat the polarised state of oppositional politics 
which have paralysed holistic political discourse in the twenty-first century. 
 Beyond the limited scope of this study, more remains to be said for both the Nietzschean-left and the 
renaissance of interest in Camus’ political thought. In terms of Nietzschean politics, a constant vigilance is 
needed against the misuse of Nietzsche’s work to promote totalitarian and racialist discourses, which persist 
despite the horrific example of twentieth century ideological conflicts. In particular, the affinity that 
Nietzsche had with non-Western thought provides an avenue to privilege a multi-cultural and counter-
essentialist interpretation of his thought. For Camus’ philosophy, I have sought to highlight his engagement 
with various fields that resist the masculinist and Eurocentric fields of thought he has been consistently 
associated with. A more developed discourse on Camus’ relation to later post-structuralist philosophers could 
be useful in helping to translate the complexity of modern power relations into more immanent forms of 
understanding that could be of critical value to the disempowered and working classes. This allows us to 
position his work as a bulwark against the increasing polarisation and disenfranchisement of political 
discourse in the contemporary and declining West. Through an acceptance of the unknown, voluntary 
associations of equals and respect for the Other, a harmonious politics of non-dualism can arise from the 
tension between the absolute and nihilistic relativism. 
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